

Marley Spoon AG (MMM) – Q3 Report

Reopening headwinds require a re-set; Growth guidance lowered

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| Recommenda | tion _ | В | uy PT 🞙 | 51.41 | |
|--|--|--|--|---|--|
| Risk Rating | | | High | | |
| 12-mth Target Price | (AUD) | | \$1.41 (v | vas \$2.67) | |
| Share Price (AUD) | | | \$0.875 | | |
| 12-mth Price Range | | | \$0.81 - | \$3.22 | |
| Forecast 12-mth Capit | al Growth | , , | 61.1% | φ0. L L | |
| Forecast 12-mth Divid | | | 0.0% | | |
| | | | | | |
| 12-mth Total Shareh | Dider Ret | urn | 61.1% | | |
| Market cap (\$m) | | | 248.5 (E | EUR 159.1 | m) |
| Net debt (net cash) (\$ | m)(Dec 2 ² | 1e) | (62.3) (8 | EUR 39.9m | ו) |
| Enterprise Value (\$m) | | | 310.8 (E | EUR 198.9 | m) |
| Gearing (Net Debt/ Ec | uity) | | -251% | | · · |
| Shares on Issue (m) | | | 284.1 | | |
| Options / est. Convert | ible bonds | s (m) | 0.1 | | |
| Sector | | | Consum | ner (Interne | et mkting) |
| Average Daily Value T | raded (\$r | n) | \$1.6m | | |
| ASX 300 Weight | | | 0.1% | | |
| Financial Forecasts | & Valua | ation Met | rics | | |
| Years ending Dec € m | 19(A) | 20(A) | 21(e) | 22(e) | 23(e) |
| Sales revenue | 129.6 | 254.0 | 316.9 | 336.5 | 407.1 |
| Sales growth | 41% | 96% | | 6% | |
| | | | 25% | | 21% |
| EBITDA | -30.2 | -0.9 | -40.2 | -27.0 | 21% -22.9 |
| EBITDA NPAT (reported) | -30.2 -34.5 | -0.9 -86.2 | -40.2 -53.7 | -27.0 -43.0 | 21% -22.9 -42.1 |
| EBITDA NPAT (reported) NPAT (adjusted) | -30.2 -34.5 -40.1 | -0.9 -86.2 -14.8 | -40.2 -53.7 -53.7 | -27.0 -43.0 -43.0 | 21% -22.9 -42.1 -42.1 |
| EBITDA NPAT (reported) NPAT (adjusted) EPS (adjusted) | -30.2 -34.5 -40.1 -27.4 | -0.9 -86.2 -14.8 -7.9 | -40.2 -53.7 -53.7 -18.9 | -27.0 -43.0 -43.0 -15.1 | 21% -22.9 -42.1 -42.1 -14.8 |
| EBITDA NPAT (reported) NPAT (adjusted) EPS (adjusted) EPS growth | -30.2 -34.5 -40.1 -27.4 -23% | -0.9 -86.2 -14.8 -7.9 -71% | -40.2 -53.7 -53.7 -18.9 139% | -27.0 -43.0 -43.0 -15.1 -20% | 21% -22.9 -42.1 -42.1 -14.8 -2% |
| EBITDA NPAT (reported) NPAT (adjusted) EPS (adjusted) EPS growth DPS | -30.2 -34.5 -40.1 -27.4 -23% 0.0 | -0.9 -86.2 -14.8 -7.9 -71% 0.0 | -40.2 -53.7 -53.7 -18.9 139% 0.0 | -27.0 -43.0 -43.0 -15.1 -20% 0.0 | 21% -22.9 -42.1 -42.1 -14.8 -2% 0.0 |
| EBITDA NPAT (reported) NPAT (adjusted) EPS (adjusted) EPS growth DPS OCF / share | -30.2 -34.5 -40.1 -27.4 -23% | -0.9 -86.2 -14.8 -7.9 -71% | -40.2 -53.7 -53.7 -18.9 139% | -27.0 -43.0 -43.0 -15.1 -20% | 21% -22.9 -42.1 -42.1 -14.8 -2% |
| EBITDA NPAT (reported) NPAT (adjusted) EPS (adjusted) EPS growth DPS OCF / share Valuation | -30.2 -34.5 -40.1 -27.4 -23% 0.0 -20.7 | -0.9 -86.2 -14.8 -7.9 -71% 0.0 2.4 | -40.2 -53.7 -53.7 -18.9 139% 0.0 -14.1 | -27.0 -43.0 -43.0 -15.1 -20% 0.0 -11.0 | 21% -22.9 -42.1 -42.1 -14.8 -2% 0.0 -9.2 |
| EBITDA NPAT (reported) NPAT (adjusted) EPS (adjusted) EPS growth DPS OCF / share Valuation P/E | -30.2 -34.5 -40.1 -27.4 -23% 0.0 -20.7 -2.0x | -0.9 -86.2 -14.8 -7.9 -71% 0.0 2.4 -7.1x | -40.2 -53.7 -53.7 -18.9 139% 0.0 -14.1 -3.0x | -27.0 -43.0 -43.0 -15.1 -20% 0.0 -11.0 -3.7x | 21% -22.9 -42.1 -42.1 -14.8 -2% 0.0 -9.2 -3.8x |
| EBITDA NPAT (reported) NPAT (adjusted) EPS (adjusted) EPS growth DPS OCF / share Valuation P/E P / OCF | -30.2 -34.5 -40.1 -27.4 -23% 0.0 -20.7 -2.0x -2.7x | -0.9 -86.2 -14.8 -7.9 -71% 0.0 2.4 -7.1x 23.8x | -40.2 -53.7 -53.7 -18.9 139% 0.0 -14.1 -3.0x -4.0x | -27.0 -43.0 -43.0 -15.1 -20% 0.0 -11.0 -3.7x -5.1x | 21% -22.9 -42.1 -42.1 -14.8 -2% 0.0 -9.2 -3.8x -6.1x |
| EBITDA NPAT (reported) NPAT (adjusted) EPS (adjusted) EPS growth DPS OCF / share Valuation P/E P / OCF EV / Sales | -30.2 -34.5 -40.1 -27.4 -23% 0.0 -20.7 -2.0x -2.7x 1.66x | -0.9 -86.2 -14.8 -7.9 -71% 0.0 2.4 -7.1x 23.8x 0.67x | -40.2 -53.7 -53.7 -18.9 139% 0.0 -14.1 -3.0x -4.0x 0.69x | -27.0 -43.0 -43.0 -15.1 -20% 0.0 -11.0 -3.7x -5.1x 0.80x | 21% -22.9 -42.1 -42.1 -14.8 -2% 0.0 -9.2 -3.8x -6.1x 0.76x |
| EBITDA NPAT (reported) NPAT (adjusted) EPS (adjusted) EPS growth DPS OCF / share Valuation P/E P / OCF EV / Sales EV / Ebitda | -30.2 -34.5 -40.1 -27.4 -23% 0.0 -20.7 -2.0x -2.7x 1.66x -7.1x | -0.9 -86.2 -14.8 -7.9 -71% 0.0 2.4 -7.1x 23.8x 0.67x -182.5x | -40.2 -53.7 -53.7 -18.9 139% 0.0 -14.1 -3.0x -4.0x 0.69x -5.4x | -27.0 -43.0 -43.0 -15.1 -20% 0.0 -11.0 -3.7x -5.1x 0.80x -10.0x | 21% -22.9 -42.1 -42.1 -14.8 -2% 0.0 -9.2 -3.8x -6.1x 0.76x -13.5x |
| EBITDA NPAT (reported) NPAT (adjusted) EPS (adjusted) EPS growth DPS OCF / share Valuation P/E P / OCF EV / Sales | -30.2 -34.5 -40.1 -27.4 -23% 0.0 -20.7 -2.0x -2.7x 1.66x | -0.9 -86.2 -14.8 -7.9 -71% 0.0 2.4 -7.1x 23.8x 0.67x | -40.2 -53.7 -53.7 -18.9 139% 0.0 -14.1 -3.0x -4.0x 0.69x | -27.0 -43.0 -43.0 -15.1 -20% 0.0 -11.0 -3.7x -5.1x 0.80x | 21% -22.9 -42.1 -42.1 -14.8 -2% 0.0 -9.2 -3.8x -6.1x 0.76x |



215.4

Enterprise Value



171.0

218.2

270.8

309.6

Marley Spoon AG (MMM) is a subscription-based weekly meal kit provider founded in Germany in 2014. A meal kit is a box delivered directly to the customers' home which includes the required ingredients to cook typically two or more meals along with step-by-step recipe instructions. Menus change weekly with 20-30 different choices per week.

MMM currently services customers in 8 countries across 3 three continents: Australia, USA and Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden). MMM has also launched a second value brand – Dinnerly.

MMM launched in Germany in August 2014, the USA in April 2015 and Australia in June 2015. It listed on the ASX in 2018. It has a stated ambition of achieving EUR 1.0bn of sales by 2025 and EUR 5.0bn by 2030. (v Key rival HelloFresh at EUR 3.75bn in CY20). Our forecasts are below that ambition.

3Q report

Summary

• MMM posted a disappointing Q3 update in the seasonally weak quarter as Covid tailwinds boosted Australia, but became headwinds in the USA and Europe.

• Revenue of EUR 79m -2% QoQ but up 14% on the pcp was OK, but 6% below our forecast. Aust revenue +21% but USA -7% and Europe down -28% QoQ. Growth guidance was lowered to 26%-28% (from 30-35%, down 4%-7%).

• Contribution margin OK at 28%, up 1.5 points QoQ.

• Q3 Ebitda was a loss of EUR -12.7m (v -9.1m loss in Q2 and 0.4m profit in the pcp). USA -5.0m loss, Aust -0.9m, Europe -2.0m. Central costs -4.8m.

• Marketing costs of EUR 22m (+32% QoQ and up 124% YoY) at a whopping 28% of Sales could not arrest the turning tide. Active Customers down 3% with Aust +27%, USA -12% and Europe -24% QoQ.

• Operating cash-out-flow of EUR 7.2m was similar to Q2's 7.5m outflow. 9-mth YTD cash outflow EUR 9.9m.

• WOW 7.0% bonds converted to equity (EUR 17.2m), but MMM drew-down EUR 39m of new debt (Tranche 1) from Runway Growth Capital and EUR 3.7m from NAB for capex.

Our Forecasts

We downgrade Ebitda by EUR -15m/ -18m / -21m for CY21 / 22 / 23 for new more conservative post-Covid assumptions.

Valuation & Recommendation

Our composite valuation and 12-mth Price Target is now \$1.41 based on a 33%/33%/33% weighting of EV/Sales, DCF and EV per active customer. This implies +61% potential upside.

Despite our PT downgrade, we think the long-term global growth story for MMM is still intact. Potential user numbers and TAMs (total addressable markets) are huge at ~ 190m households for MMM's existing countries. Customer awareness is high and acceptance growing. And HelloFresh is showing the way. MMM is targeting EUR 1bn revenue by 2025 and 5bn by 2030 (we regard as stretch targets).

The share price is down -42% since the Q3 result. We maintain our Buy (High Risk) recommendation.

Review of Q3 Report

MMM posted a disappointing Q3 report, well below our expectations, as Covid reopening and normalisation turned into a headwind in the USA and Europe. A huge increase in marketing costs was unable to offset these headwinds, in difficult and variable market conditions.

MMM Aust revenue benefitted from further lock-downs in Victoria and NSW, but still posted an increased loss (possibly due to costs of the West Australian launch of the Marley Spoon brand in the quarter, following the Dinnerly brand launch last December).

We review MMM's Q3 report in detail in the table below. Our colour coding is: Orange = negative trend; Green = positive trend. There is a lot of orange (negative trends).

We have also analysed global leader HelloFresh's (HF) Q3 result which experienced similar trends. Refer pages 12-16 of this report. However HelloFresh remained profitable and upgraded its revenue growth guidance for Q4 / full CY, whereas MMM's losses blew out and it downgraded revenue growth guidance. HF share price up 21% since its Q3 result. MMM down ~42% (\$1.51 to \$0.885 currently).

| Marley Spoon - FINANCIALS | | | | | | | | | CY20 | | | | Chge | Chge | Our Comments | CY20 9mths | 9mths | Chnge % |
|---------------------------------|------|-------|------|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|---|---------------|-------|------------|
| Year ended Dec (EUR m) | 1Q19 | | 3Q19 | 4Q19 | 1Q20 | 2Q20 | 3Q20 | 4Q20 | Year | 1Q21 | 2Q21 | 3Q21 | QoQ | YoY | | YTD | YTD | |
| Revenue (EUR m)(geo splits ar | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| USA | 13.1 | 14.1 | 14.0 | | 20.4 | 38.3 | 34.2 | | 127.2 | 37.1 | 37.8 | 35.2 | -7% | | Q3 is holiday season, so increased skip-rates | 92.9 | 110.1 | 19% |
| Australia | 9.5 | 11.8 | | | | 24.0 | 25.3 | | 86.0 | 24.4 | 27.3 | 32.9 | 21% | | Lockdown benefit in Vic & NSW. First time contribn from WA | 64.1 | 84.6 | 32% |
| Europe | 6.8 | 6.0 | | | 7.6 | 11.0 | 9.8 | 12.4 | 40.8 | 15.8 | 15.7 | 11.3 | -28% | 15% | Losing momentum post Covid | 28.4 | 42.8 | 519 |
| Difference to reconcile | 0.0 | 0.0 | | | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | -0.2 | | | | 0.1 | 0.1 | nr |
| Group Total | 29.4 | 32.0 | | | 42.9 | 73.3 | 69.3 | 68.5 | 254.0 | 77.4 | 80.9 | 79.2 | -2% | 14% | No growth QoQ, and only 14% growth YoY | 185.5 | 237.5 | 28 |
| Revenue growth (QoQ) | n/a | 9% | | | 22% | 71% | -5% | -1% | n/a | 13% | 5% | -2% | | | | | | |
| Revenue growth (YoY) | 0% | 0% | | | 46% | 129% | 110% | 95% | 96% | 80% | 10% | 14% | | | Losing momentum post Covid | | | |
| Contribution Margin (EUR m)(G | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| JSA | 2.7 | 3.0 | | | | 10.7 | 7.9 | 8.9 | 32.7 | 10.4 | 9.1 | 8.1 | -11% | | Staffing challenges, higher labour rates, input inflation | 23.9 | 27.6 | 159 |
| Australia | 3.0 | 3.9 | | | | 8.9 | 9.0 | 7.8 | | 8.1 | 9.0 | 11.2 | 25% | | Lockdown benefit in Vic & NSW | 23.5 | 28.3 | 209 |
| Europe | 0.0 | 0.0 | | | | 2.8 | 2.5 | 3.1 | 10.1 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 2.9 | -16% | 14% | Losing momentum post Covid | 6.9 | 9.5 | 389 |
| Difference to reconcile | -5.8 | -6.9 | | | | 0.0 | -0.1 | 0.0 | | 0.1 | 0.0 | -0.1 | | | | -0.1 | 0.0 | -1009 |
| Group Total | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9.3 | 8.8 | 12.5 | 22.4 | 19.3 | 19.9 | 74.1 | 21.7 | 21.5 | 22.2 | 3% | 15% | Aust saves the qtr; 15% growth YoY is solid | 54.2 | 65.4 | 21 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Contribution Margin % | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| JSA | 21% | 21% | | | 26% | 28% | 23% | 26% | 26% | 28% | 24% | 23% | -1% | 0% | Staffing challenges, higher labour rates, input inflation | 26% | 25% | |
| Australia | 32% | 33% | | | 38% | 37% | 36% | 36% | 36% | 33% | 33% | 34% | 1% | -1% | Aust absorbing extra costs re new premises in Perth & Sydney. | 37% | 33% | |
| Europe | 0% | 0% | | | 21% | 25% | 26% | 25% | 25% | 20% | 22% | 26% | 4% | 0% | | 24% | 22% | |
| Group Total | 0% | 0% | 28% | 25 % | 29% | 31% | 28% | 29% | 29% | 28% | 26.6% | 28.0% | 1% | 0% | Effectively gross profit margin. Holding up OK | 29% | 28% | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Operating contribution margin | | | | | 38% | | | 37% | 37% | 38% | 36% | | | | | 38% | 37% | |
| mpact of vouchers & fixed costs | €m) | | | | -12.1 | -22.0 | -18.9 | -19.5 | -73.8 | -21.3 | -21.2 | -21.8 | 3% | 15% | Vouchers & fixed costs up EUR 2.9m YoY (includes leases) | -53.8 | -65.0 | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0.004 | | | | | - |
| Marketing costs | | | | | -11.6 | -9.5 | -9.9 | -8.2 | -30.5 | -15.5 | -16.8 | -22.2 | 32% | 124% | Up \$5.3m QoQ, but delivered declining benefits | -31.0 | -54.5 | 769 |
| % of revenue | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 27% | 13% | 14% | 12% | 12% | 20% | 21% | 28% | 7% | 8% | Massive spend 28% of sales, did not have expected benefit | 17% | 23% | |
| General & Admin costs (ex D&A) | | | | | -7.4 | -8.3 | -9.0 | -10.5 | -44.2 | -11.9 | -13.8 | -12.7 | -8% | | Cost 8% lower QoQ, but 41% higher YoY | -24.7 | -38.4 | 55% |
| 6 of revenue | 0% | 0% | 0% | | 17% | 11% | 13% | 15% | 17% | 15% | 17% | 16% | -1% | 6% | | 13% | 16% | |
| Total marketing, G&A costs | 0.0 | 0.0 | | | -19.0 | -17.9 | -18.9 | | -74.7 | -27.4 | -30.6 | -34.9 | 14% | | Big cost increases; especially marketing | -55.7 | -92.9 | 67 |
| % of revenue | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 44% | 24% | 27% | 27% | 29% | 35% | 38% | 44% | 6% | 13% | | | | |
| Operating Ebitda | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| JSA | 0.0 | 0.0 | | | - | 4.6 | 0.7 | 1.7 | | -1.0 | -2.0 | -5.0 | 150% | | Holidays & Normalisation hurts performance | 2.4 | -8.0 | |
| Australia | -1.9 | 0.1 | 0.0 | | | 3.6 | 3.4 | 2.9 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | -1.1 | nm | | Big adverse swing. Costs of Perth & expanded new Sydney FCs | | -1.1 | -116 |
| Europe | -5.0 | 0.0 | | | | -0.9 | -0.6 | 0.1 | | -1.5 | -1.5 | -2.0 | 33% | | Holidays & Normalisation hurts performance | -2.0 | -5.0 | |
| Central costs | N/a | N/a | | | - | -2.9 | -3.1 | -3.6 | | -3.2 | -5.6 | -4.6 | -18% | | MMM investing strongly in IT, people & capability | -8.8 | -13.4 | 529 |
| Group Total | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | N/a | -6.5 | 4.5 | 0.4 | 1.1 | -0.5 | -5.7 | -9.1 | -12.7 | 40% | -3275% | Loss blows out \$3.6m more than Q2. Sequoia EUR 7.2m | -1.6 | -27.5 | 16619 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I | | |
| Operating ebitda margin % | N/a | N/a | N/a | N/a | -15% | 6% | 1% | 2% | 0% | -7% | -11% | -16% | -5% | -17% | | -1% | -12% | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Operating cash flow per 4C | -6.8 | -10.7 | -5.6 | -7.4 | 0.5 | 7.6 | -1.3 | -3.6 | 3.1 | 5.3 | -7.5 | -7.7 | 3% | 483% | Not as bad as Ebitda loss, as customers pay in advance | 6.8 | -99 | -2469 |

Source: Company; Sequoia estimates

Key points Q3

- **Revenue** Q3 revenue was EUR 79.2m (v 80.9 in Q2) down -2% on Q2, but (v 69.3m pcp) up 14% on pcp. Sequoia Q3 estimate EUR 84m, so 5.7% below our expectations. Global competitor HelloFresh (HF) Q3 revenue was down -9.0% and up 46% YoY (+44% excluding our estimate of the Factor75 acquisition).
- USA revenue was -7%, Europe -28% whilst Australia was up 21% benefitting from lock-downs in Victoria and NSW, and also the launch of the Marley Spoon brand in WA during the quarter. Q1 & Q3 are usually quieter quarters for MMM because people are travelling on vacation and skipping weeks. With the northern hemisphere reopening, consumers are back to going on holidays and eating out again, so less need for weekly meal kits.
- Contribution margin % was 28% up ~1.5 points on Q2 and in line with the pcp. This included operating costs of new leased fulfilment centres (FCs) in Perth (3,000 sqm, opened Dec 2020) and Sydney (13,500 sqm, opened Q2) both of



which have significant surplus capacity available for future growth. So MMM is starting to show some improved efficiency and operating leverage from scale. Competitor HelloFresh's contribution margin was 22% down 3.6 points QoQ and down 4.6 points YoY. HelloFresh said it was impacted by the rapid opening of new FCs in its international segment and lower utilisation rates.

- Operating Ebitda loss EUR -12.7m (v -9.1m in Q2) was 40% worse than Q2; and (v 0.4m profit in the pcp) was significantly worse YoY. Sequoia forecast was EUR -7.2m, so the result was EUR 5.5m or 76% worse than our forecast. Negative Ebitda margin of -16.0% (v +1.0% positive in the pcp). Competitor HelloFresh was positive 5.6% (v 12.5% in the pcp).
- The main problem was that MMM spent a massive EUR 22.2m on marketing (v 16.8m in Q2 +32%) and (v 9.9m pcp, +124%) but did not derive the full benefit that it expected. This was a whopping 28% of sales (v 21% in Q2, and 14% in the pcp). Competitor HelloFresh invested 14.8% of Sales (v 12.8% pcp).
- G&A (General & admin) costs were EUR 12.7m (v 13.8m Q2) down 8%, but up 40% YoY as MMM continues to invest in staff, digital and capability. This excludes depreciation.
- Implied depreciation (and share-based payments) EUR 2.9m, so 11.6m annualised (v 6.5m in CY20), +78%.
- Q3 EBIT was a loss of EUR -15.6m (v loss of -1.2m pcp).

Operating Statistics

Several key performance statistics appear to be rolling over, as Covid tailwinds turn into a headwind. However we think that once consumer behaviour normalises, the strong growth exhibited by HelloFresh and Marley Spoon pre-Covid will continue. Both companies had 41% revenue growth in CY19 pre-Covid (see page 12).

- Active customer number (includes first time trialists) rolling over in USA & Europe.
- Orders per customer and orders per subscriber both reducing slightly (frequency).
- Marketing costs / customer acquisition costs rising / unsurprisingly not as
 effective as during lock-downs.

| Marley Spoon (MMM) - 3Q21 Re | view | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CY20 | | Chnge |
|------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|--|-------|-------|-------|
| | | | | | | | | | CY20 | | | | Chge | Chge | Our Comments | | 9mths | % |
| Year ended Dec (EUR m) | 1Q19 | 2Q19 | 3Q19 | 4Q19 | 1Q20 | 2Q20 | 3Q20 | 4Q20 | Year | 1Q21 | 2Q21 | 3Q21 | QoQ | YoY | | YTD | YTD | |
| Active Customers (000s)(end) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| USA | 100 | 81 | 89 | 80 | 117 | 176 | 180 | 161 | | 196 | 197 | 173 | -12% | | Losing momentum post Covid | 180 | 173 | -4% |
| Australia | 50 | 59 | 74 | 68 | 81 | 114 | 123 | 99 | | 123 | 133 | 169 | 27% | | Lockdown benefit in Vic & NSW | 123 | 169 | 37% |
| Europe | 40 | 32 | 32 | 35 | 42 | 60 | 60 | 67 | | 93 | 94 | 71 | -24% | 18% | Losing momentum post Covid; But still up 18% YoY | 60 | 71 | 18% |
| Difference to reconcile | 0 | 0 | 0 | -1 | 0 | 0 | -1 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | |
| Group Total | 190 | 172 | 195 | 182 | 240 | 350 | 362 | 327 | | 412 | 424 | 413 | -3% | 14% | Customer nos appear to have peaked, despite huge marketing | 362 | 413 | 14% |
| Growth (QoQ) | n/a | -9% | 13% | -7% | 32% | 46% | 3% | -10% | n/a | 26% | 3% | -3% | | | | | | |
| Growth (YoY) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 26% | 103% | 86% | 80% | | 172% | 121% | 114% | | | | | | |
| No. of Orders | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Orders (worldwide)(000s) | 685 | 726 | 758 | 800 | 945 | 1,551 | 1,563 | 1,536 | | 1,749 | 1,811 | 1,691 | -7% | 8% | Losing momentum post Covid | 4,059 | 5,251 | 29% |
| Growth (QoQ) | n/a | 6% | 4% | 6% | 18% | 64% | 1% | -2% | n/a | 14% | 4% | -7% | | | | | | |
| Growth (YoY) | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 38% | 114% | 106% | 92% | | 85% | 17% | 8% | | | | | | |
| Orders per subscriber | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| USA | n/a | n/a | n/a | 6.1 | 7.0 | 7.9 | 7.1 | 6.7 | | 6.8 | 6.6 | 6.2 | -6% | -13% | Losing momentum post Covid | | | |
| Australia | n/a | n/a | n/a | 6.7 | 7.6 | 8.2 | 8.0 | 6.8 | | 7.5 | 7.4 | 7.6 | 3% | -5% | Lockdown benefit in Vic & NSW | | | |
| Europe | n/a | n/a | n/a | 5.4 | 6.2 | 6.9 | 5.6 | 6.2 | | 6.6 | 5.9 | 4.7 | -21% | -16% | Losing momentum post Covid | | | |
| Orders per subscriber | 6.4 | 6.3 | 6.4 | 6.1 | 6.9 | 7.8 | 6.9 | 6.6 | | 6.9 | 6.7 | 6.4 | -4% | -7% | Post lock-down headwind | | | |
| Meals sold (m) (Volume) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| USA | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 3.4 | 6.6 | 6.4 | 6.3 | 22.7 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 5.7 | -15% | -11% | Losing momentum post Covid | 16 | 19 | 16% |
| Australia | 1.6 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 4.5 | 4.8 | 4.1 | 16.1 | 4.6 | 5.2 | 6.6 | 27% | 38% | Lockdown benefit in Vic & NSW | 12 | 16 | 37% |
| Europe | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 7.8 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 2.1 | -34% | 11% | Losing momentum post Covid | 5 | 9 | 57% |
| Group Total (m) | 4.9 | 5.4 | 5.9 | 6.2 | 7.5 | 13.2 | 13.1 | 12.8 | 46.7 | 14.5 | 15.1 | 14.4 | -5% | 10% | Post lock-down headwind; But still up 10% YoY | 34 | 44 | 30% |

Source: Company reports; Sequoia analysis

9 Months YTD financial performance

- Revenue EUR 237m +28% (1H21 +36%; 3Q -2%).
- Contribution margin EUR 65.4m (v 54.3m) +21%.
- Contribution margin percent of revenue 27.6% (v 29.3%) -1.7 points. This is potentially an attractive medium margin business, but it needs more scale.
- Marketing spend of 23.0% of sales is obviously unsustainable. Either MMM achieves scale, or it will have to reduce marketing to more affordable levels.



- Operating Ebitda loss (means before share-based payments) EUR -27.5m (v -1.6m). Ebitda loss margin 11.6% (v 0.9%).
- EBIT loss EUR -34.8m (v -6.5m), +435%. EBIT loss margin -14.7% (v -0.9%).

Regional Performance

• USA was a an operating Ebitda loss of EUR -5.0m (v 0.7m profit pcp), Europe a loss of EUR -2.0m (V -0.6m pcp), Australia a surprising loss of EUR -1.1m (v 3.4m profit pcp), and Central costs were EUR -4.6m (v 3.1m pcp). All regions were below our forecasts. We review each region separately further below.

MMM USA Division

| Marley Spoon (MMM) - 3Q21 Revie | ew - Ope | erating N | letrics | | | | | | | | | CY20 | CY21 | Chnge |
|-------------------------------------|----------|-----------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--|-------|-------|--------------------|
| | | | | | | | | | Change | Change | Our Comments | 9mths | 9mths | % |
| USA | 4Q19 | 1Q20 | 2Q20 | 3Q20 | 4Q20 | 1Q21 | 2Q21 | 3Q21 | QoQ | YoY | | YTD | YTD | |
| Revenue (EUR m) | 15 | 20 | 38 | 34 | 34 | 37 | 38 | 35 | -7% | 3% | Losing momentum post Covid, but still up 3% on Covid boosted | 93 | 110 | 19% |
| COGS & fulfilment costs (EUR m) | -12 | -15 | -28 | -26 | -25 | -27 | -29 | -27 | -5% | 3% | | -69 | -83 | 20% |
| Contribution margin (EUR m) | 3 | 5 | 11 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 8 | -11% | 3% | Staffing challenges, higher labour rates & food cost inflation | 24 | 28 | 15% |
| Contribution margin (%) | 23.0% | 26.0% | 28.0% | 23.0% | 26.0% | 28.0% | 24.0% | 23.0% | -1% | 0% | | 25.7% | 25.0% | -0.7% |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Marketing costs (est. at group rate |) | -6 | -5 | -5 | -4 | -7 | -8 | -10 | 25% | 100% | Big increases in group marketing | -16 | -25 | 61% |
| G&A costs (EUR m) | N/a | -3 | -1 | -2 | -3 | -4 | -3 | -3 | 3% | 45% | Big cost increase YoY; New larger FC in California | -6 | -10 | 75% |
| Operating Ebitda (EUR m) | N/a | -2.9 | 4.6 | 0.7 | 1.7 | -1.0 | -2.0 | -5.0 | 150% | -814% | EUR 5.0m loss v EUR 0.7m profit in the pcp, a huge 5.7m swing | 2 | -8 | <mark>-435%</mark> |
| Operating Ebitda margin (%) | 0% | -14% | 12% | 2% | 5% | -3% | -5% | -14% | -9% | -16% | 14% loss margin is back to 1Q20 level | 2.6% | -7.3% | -9.8% |
| Stats | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Active customers (k) | 80 | 117 | 176 | 180 | 161 | 196 | 197 | 173 | -12% | -4% | Active customers down 12% QoQ | | | |
| Active subscribers (k) | 56 | 62 | 99 | 108 | 114 | 120 | 125 | 114 | -9% | 6% | Subscribers down 6%. Post Covid normalisation | | | |
| No. of orders (k) | 339 | 432 | 780 | 772 | 760 | 813 | 823 | 705 | -14% | -9% | Volume down 14% QpoQ and 9% YoY | 1,984 | 2,341 | 18% |
| Orders per customer | 4.2 | 3.7 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 4.7 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 0% | -3% | Order frequency down | | | |
| Orders per subscriber | 6.1 | 7.0 | 7.9 | 7.1 | 6.7 | 6.8 | 6.6 | 6.2 | -6% | -13% | Order frequency down | | | |
| Meals (m) | 2.6 | 3.4 | 6.6 | 6.4 | 6.3 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 5.7 | -15% | -11% | Volume down 15% QoQ and -11% YoY | 16.4 | 19.1 | 16% |
| Avge. Order value (EUR) | 44.2 | 47.2 | 49.1 | 44.3 | 45.1 | 45.6 | 45.9 | 50.0 | 9% | 13% | Price increase implemented; Probably also impacted orders | 46.8 | 47.0 | 0% |

Source: Company reports; NB. Several figures including geographical revenue are estimates derived and rounded due to incomplete reporting by MMM; Sequoia analysis

- **Operations**: In September, MMM moved into its new fulfilment centre in California (1 of 3 in the USA) with triple the previous capacity. MMM also rolled out new automated picking equipment at all 3 sites which simplified operations, improved customer experience and enables further order personalisation. We assume there were some added costs in the quarter for these changes, plus higher depreciation and lease interest payments going forward. The CFO told us that exiting the previous lease was managed well with no significant extra costs. But we think there must be a cost increase here for the extra space.
- USA revenue (our estimate of EUR 35m) was down 7% on Q2, but up 3% YoY on the Covid19 benefitted pcp. Annoyingly, MMM does not provide exact figures at Q1 & Q3 reporting stage (Vs HelloFresh which provides full accounts including summary balance sheet).
- US rival HelloFresh's Q3 US revenue was also down 7%, but up 50% YoY (+45% excluding Factor75 acquisition on our estimates) so it looks like MMM is losing market share to HelloFresh.
- Active customers (which includes trialists) was down -12% QoQ and active subscribers (MMM's preferred measure which excludes short-term trialists) was down -9% QoQ. We think this was partly normal Q3 seasonality, but mostly normalisation of customer behaviour post Covid.
- Orders were down -14% and meal volumes down 15% in Q3, which is traditionally a softer quarter due to northern hemisphere holiday season. Revenue was down less than this due to a 9% price rise towards the end of the quarter (Dinnerly brand from end-August, Marley Spoon brand from end September). Whilst necessary due to rising food and labour costs, this is expected to further reduce demand in Q4. MMM said it noticed an immediate decline in orders when the price increases were announced. MMM tries to set its prices the same as supermarkets, but we think price rises will be more obvious on MMM's per meal charge, than supermarkets' price rises spread over an array of different products.



- The contribution margin was 23% down 1 point QoQ, but up 40bps YoY per management. The decline was attributed to continuing staffing shortages, higher labour rates and food cost inflation. Packaging costs are also higher in the summer months (insulation/ ice packs). Higher costs and lower fixed cost utilisation due to the new FC in California would also have had some impact.
- Marketing costs MMM does not split these costs by region, but we now allocate at the group % of sales rate as an estimate. (It also makes our model consolidate the regions more easily).
- Combined SG&A (selling, general & administrative costs) were up 83% on the pcp.
- USA landed an Ebitda loss of EUR -5.0m (v -2.0m in Q2) and (v +0.7m in the Covid benefitted pcp), a substantial -5.7m adverse swing. Sequoia forecast EUR -2.5m, so the result was EUR 2.5m (100%) worse than our forecast.
- **Outlook for Q4:** Normalisation is expected to continue to impact demand and skip rates. Price rises expected to have a minor negative impact on orders into Q4, but obviously a more positive revenue benefit. MMM expects lower Ebitda losses in Q4. Competitor HelloFresh is expecting improved margins and a slightly stronger Q4.
- In CY20 Q4 profit was EUR 1.0m better than Q3 but revenue and meals (volume) were similar. MMM enters 4Q with 6% more subscribers than 4Q 2020, plus the benefit of 9% price rises, and the new equipment helping efficiencies, but staffing challenges, and now normalisation headwinds remain challenges. So we expect only a small reduction in losses for Q4.
- We forecast an Ebitda loss for the US division of EUR 4.0m for Q4 (v 5.0m in Q3).



MMM Europe

| Marley Spoon (MMM) - 3Q21 Revie | ew - Ope | erating N | letrics | | | | | | | | | CY20 | CY21 | Chnge |
|-------------------------------------|----------|-----------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--|-------|--------|-------|
| | | | | | | | | | Change | Change | Our Comments | 9mths | 9mths | % |
| Europe (6 countries) | 4Q19 | 1Q20 | 2Q20 | 3Q20 | 4Q20 | 1Q21 | 2Q21 | 3Q21 | QoQ | YoY | | YTD | YTD | |
| Revenue (EUR m) | 6 | 8 | 11 | 10 | 12 | 16 | 16 | 11 | -28% | 15% | Losing momentum post Covid, but still up 15% on boosted pcp | 28 | 43 | 51% |
| COGS & fulfilment costs (EUR m) | -5 | -6 | -8 | -7 | -9 | -13 | -12 | -8 | -32% | 15% | | -22 | -33 | 55% |
| Contribution margin (EUR m) | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | -16% | 14% | Losing momentum post Covid | 7 | 10 | 38% |
| Contribution margin (%) | 20.0% | 21.0% | 25.0% | 26.0% | 25.0% | 20.0% | 22.0% | 25.8% | 4% | 0% | Contribution margin held flat on pcp, despite lower Revenue & vo | 24.3% | 22.3% | -2.0% |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Marketing costs (est. at group rate |) | -2 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -3 | -3 | -3 | -3% | 126% | Big increases in group marketing | -5 | -10 | 95% |
| G&A costs (EUR m) | N/a | 0 | -2 | -2 | -2 | -2 | -2 | -2 | 3% | 0% | SG&A costs up EUR 2m or 46% on pcp | -4 | -5 | 24% |
| Operating Ebitda (EUR m) | N/a | -0.6 | -0.9 | -0.6 | 0.1 | -1.5 | -1.5 | -2.0 | 33% | 233% | EUR 2.0m loss v EUR 0.6m loss in the pcp, a -1.4m swing | -2 | -5 | 150% |
| Operating Ebitda margin (%) | N/a | -7% | -8% | -6% | 1% | -9% | -10% | -18% | -8% | -12% | 18% ebitda loss margin V -6% pcp | -7.0% | -11.7% | -4.6% |
| Stats | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Active customers (k) | 35 | 42 | 60 | 60 | 67 | 93 | 94 | 71 | -24% | 18% | Losing momentum post-Covid, but still up 18% on pcp | | | |
| Active subscribers (k) | 30 | 30 | 39 | 44 | 50 | 62 | 68 | 59 | -13% | 34% | Losing momentum post-Covid, but still up 34% on pcp | | | |
| No. of orders (k) | 161 | 186 | 269 | 245 | 310 | 410 | 403 | 276 | -32% | 13% | Losing momentum post-Covid, but still up 13% on pcp | 700 | 1,089 | 56% |
| Orders per customer | 4.6 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 4.1 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 4.1 | -4% | 0% | Losing momentum | | | |
| Orders per subscriber | 5.4 | 6.2 | 6.9 | 5.6 | 6.2 | 6.6 | 5.9 | 4.7 | -21% | -16% | Losing momentum | | | |
| Meals (m) | 1.2 | 1.4 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 2.1 | -34% | 11% | Volume down 34% QoQ, but still up 11% on pcp | 5.4 | 8.5 | 57% |
| Avge. Order value (EUR) | 39.5 | 40.9 | 40.9 | 40.0 | 40.0 | 38.5 | 39.0 | 40.8 | 5% | 2% | Pleasing increases | 40.6 | 39.3 | -3% |

Source: Company reports; NB. Several figures including geographical revenue are estimates derived and rounded due to incomplete reporting by MMM; Sequoia analysis

- **Operations:** No major business changes in Europe. This region now includes the benefit of new automated picking equipment. MMM is trialling its own last mile delivery service, and is planning a new FC for sometime next year.
- Revenue was down 28% on Q2, but still up 15% on the pcp. As in the USA, MMM said Europe saw extensive post-lockdown holiday related customer behaviour impacting revenue. So a combination of some northern hemisphere holiday seasonality, plus post Covid normalisation headwinds.
- Active customers (includes trialists) was down -24% on Q2 and active subscribers (longer-term measure) was down 13%, partly due to normal Q3 seasonality (2 months of 3 are school holidays), but we think mostly due to post-Covid normalisation.
- The contribution margin improved in Q3 over Q2 despite the revenue and volume declines, and was flat at 25.8% YoY. MMM said that Europe also experienced some labour shortages and wage rate inflation and food cost inflation. So we think this was a creditable performance.
- SG&A costs were EUR 5m, up EUR 2m or 56% YoY. Obviously MMM continues to market hard in all regions.
- Europe landed an Ebitda loss (before head office costs) of EUR 2.0m (v -1.5m in Q2) and -0.6m pcp).
- Europe has only had 1 profitable quarter (Q4 2020). With just 59,000 active customers across 6 countries, MMM Europe still looks sub-scale at this stage.
- **Outlook for Q4**: 4Q CY20 was a strong result for MMM. It enters 4Q2021 with 34% more subscribers than last year, but with post-Covid normalisation raising new challenges, we expect a similar break-even result to last year.
- We forecast an Ebitda loss for the European division of EUR 2.0m for Q4 (v 2.0m in Q3, unchanged).



| | | MM | M A | ustra | alia | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|----------|-----------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----------|--------|--|-------|-------|--------|
| Marley Spoon (MMM) - 3Q21 Revie | ew - Ope | erating N | letrics | | | | | | | | | CY20 | CY21 | Chnge |
| | | | | | | | | | Change | Change | Our Comments | 9mths | 9mths | % |
| Australia | 4Q19 | 1Q20 | 2Q20 | 3Q20 | 4Q20 | 1Q21 | 2Q21 | 3Q21 | QoQ | YoY | WA: Dinnerly launched in Dec 2020 & Marley Spoon Sep 2021 | YTD | YTD | |
| Revenue (EUR m) | 14 | 15 | 24 | 25 | 22 | 24 | 27 | 33 | 21% | 30% | Lockdown benefit in Vic & NSW. First time contribn from WA | 64 | 85 | 32% |
| COGS & fulfilment costs (EUR m) | -9 | -9 | -15 | -16 | -14 | -16 | -18 | -22 | 18% | 33% | | -41 | -56 | 39% |
| Contribution margin (EUR m) | 5 | 6 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 11 | 25% | 25% | Scale & efficiency benefits | 24 | 28 | 20% |
| Contribution margin (%) | 36.0% | 38.0% | 37.0% | 35.6% | 36.0% | 33.0% | 33.0% | 34.2% | 1% | -1% | Down on pcp due to higher voucher activity | 36.7% | 33.5% | -3.2% |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Marketing costs (est. at group rate |) | -4 | -3 | -4 | -3 | -5 | -6 | -9 | 63% | 155% | Big increases in group marketing | -11 | -20 | 83% |
| G&A costs (EUR m) | N/a | -2 | -2 | -2 | -2 | -3 | -3 | -3 | -7% | 56% | Includes costs of WA opened Dec 20, and expanded Sydney FC | -6 | -10 | 65% |
| Operating Ebitda (EUR m) | N/a | -0.1 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 2.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -1.1 | large -ve | -132% | Surprise loss of EUR 1.1m?? | 7 | -1 | -116% |
| Operating Ebitda margin (%) | 0% | -1% | 15% | 13% | 13% | 0% | 0% | -3% | -3% | -17% | Surprise loss margin ?? | 10.7% | -1.3% | -12.0% |
| Stats | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Active customers (k) | 68 | 81 | 114 | 123 | 99 | 123 | 133 | 169 | 27% | 37% | Lockdown benefit in Vic & NSW. First time contribn from WA | | | |
| Active subscribers (k) | 45 | 43 | 61 | 68 | 69 | 70 | 79 | 93 | 18% | 37% | Lockdown benefit in Vic & NSW. First time contribn from WA | | | |
| No. of orders (k) | 300 | 327 | 502 | 545 | 466 | 526 | 585 | 710 | 21% | 30% | Lockdown benefit in Vic & NSW. First time contribn from WA | 1,374 | 1,821 | 33% |
| Orders per customer | 4.4 | 4.0 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.7 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 0% | -1% | | | | |
| Orders per subscriber | 6.7 | 7.6 | 8.2 | 8.0 | 6.8 | 7.5 | 7.4 | 7.6 | 3% | -5% | | | | |
| Meals (m) | 2.4 | 2.7 | 4.5 | 4.8 | 4.1 | 4.6 | 5.2 | 6.6 | 27% | 38% | Lockdown benefit in Vic & NSW. First time contribn from WA | 12.0 | 16.4 | 37% |
| Avge. Order value (EUR) | 46.0 | 45.3 | 47.8 | 46.4 | 46.8 | 46.4 | 46.6 | 46.3 | -1% | 0% | | 46.7 | 46.4 | 0% |

Source: Company reports; NB. Several figures including geographical revenue are estimates derived and rounded due to incomplete reporting by MMM; Sequoia analysis

- **Operations:** MMM launched in Perth/ WA in December 2020 with the lower priced Dinnerly brand first. During Q3 it added the Marley Spoon brand.
- **Revenue** Australia delivered 30% revenue growth boosted by lock-downs in Vic & NSW, and the launch of the Dinnerly brand in WA in December 2020 and Marley Spoon in WA during this quarter as mentioned.
- Active customers (includes short-term trialists) grew by 27% QoQ and 37% YoY. Active subscribers (longer-term measure) grew by 18% QoQ and 37% on the pcp which was a strong result. Orders were up 21% QoQ and 30% YoY.
- The contribution margin at 34.2% (v 35.6% pcp) was down -1.4% QoQ reflecting higher investment in new customer acquisition / higher use of vouchers as MMM took advantage of a favourable new customer acquisition environment. And the new Perth FC would have had a minor impact.
- SG&A expenses were EUR 12m +37% QoQ and +120% YoY. Some of this increase was due to the new Perth FC from December, plus extra marketing spend on the Marley Spoon WA brand launch in the quarter.
- Despite the strong revenue growth, Australia reported a surprise EUR 1.1m Ebitda loss (v 3.4m profit in the pcp, a large adverse swing of EUR -4.5m. Ebitda margin -3.0% (v +13%). This is hard for us to fathom as the inefficiencies and extra costs from Covid would have been captured in the contribution margin (impact -0.5m).
- We forecast an Ebitda loss for the Australian division of EUR 0.9m for Q4 (v 1.1m in Q3).



MMM's new FC at 300 Victoria St Wetherill Park, Sydney. MMM has ~50% of the facility (Building 2A, ~13,500 sqm). Source: JLL.com.au and CBRE.com.au



Cash Flow Report

- Cash receipts EUR 80.7m up 1% on Q2 and up 15% on the pcp. This was slightly better than accounting revenue of EUR 79.2m (-2%). 9 months YTD cash receipts were EUR 239.3m (v 187.1m) +28% again slightly better than accounting revenue of EUR 237.5m (+28%).
- The Q3 operating cash flow was an outflow of EUR 7.7m (similar to Q2's -7.5m outflow). This was better than the Ebitda loss of EUR -12.7m because of the positive working capital benefit (customers pay 1 week in advance; MMM pays suppliers 30 days in arrears).
- 9 months YTD was an out-flow of EUR -9.9m (v an inflow of +6.8m pcp). MMM recorded 3 positive cash flow quarters but has been unable to maintain that.
- We forecast a Q4 outflow of approximately EUR 3m making EUR -12.8m for CY21.
- Investing cash flow was EUR -5.5m comprising EUR 3.7m on plant and equipment (new fulfilment centre opened in California during the quarter, and new automated picking equipment at all 3 US centres), and EUR 1.8m of capitalised intellectual property investment (IT development costs).
- Financing cash flow was EUR 0.3m included lease payments and interest of EUR 2.0m, offset by a net draw down of EUR 3.5m of borrowings.

| MMM: Analysis of Quarterly Cash Flo | ows | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|--------|---------|---------------|---------------|---|---------------|-------------|-------------|
| Year ended Dec (EUR m) | 1QFY19 | 2QFY19 | 3QFY19 | 4QFY19 | 1QFY20 | 2QFY20 | 3QFY20 | 4QFY20 | 1Q21e | 2Q21e | 3Q21e | Change QoQ | Change YoY | Comments | 3QFY20 YTD | 3Q21 YTD | Change % |
| 1. Receipts from customers | 30.6 | 31.8 | 32.5 | 34.7 | 43.0 | 73.8 | 70.3 | 67.4 | 78.7 | 80.0 | 80.7 | 1% | 15% | 1% growth QoQ; 15% growth YoY | 187.1 | 239.3 | 28% |
| 1a. Other Revenue (Grants) | 50.0 | 51.0 | 52.5 | 54.1 | 40.0 | 75.0 | 10.5 | 07.4 | 10.1 | 0.019 | 00.7 | 170 | 1370 | Quarterly growth looks to have stalled | 0.000 | 0.019 | 207 |
| () | | | | | | | | | | | | | | YTD cash receipts +28% in line with Reven | | | |
| 2. Cash Payments | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Product manufacturing & operating cos | (19.9) | (22.9) | (22.1) | (26.8) | (26.0) | (47.0) | (47.8) | (51.2) | (47.4) | (59.9) | (53.8) | -10% | 12% | | (120.8) | (161.1) | 339 |
| Advertising & marketing | (9.9) | (11.7) | (7.2) | (9.5) | (7.6) | (10.8) | (12.9) | (7.8) | (12.8) | (14.2) | (18.0) | 27% | 40% | Up 40% on pcp Vs Sales +15% | (31.2) | (44.9) | 449 |
| Administration and corporate | (7.4) | (7.5) | (8.8) | (5.7) | (8.7) | (8.1) | (10.4) | (11.5) | (13.0) | (13.3) | (16.8) | 26% | 61% | | (27.2) | (43.1) | 589 |
| Interest received | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | nm | nm | | 0.0 | 0.1 | nr |
| Interest paid | (0.3) | (0.2) | (0.0) | (0.1) | (0.3) | (0.3) | (0.4) | (0.6) | | 0.0 | 0.0 | nm | nm | | (0.9) | 0.0 | nr |
| Tax & Other | (0.0) | (0.1) | (0.0) | 0.0 | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.1) | (0.0) | (0.3) | (0.1) | 0.1 | nm | nm | | (0.1) | (0.2) | nn |
| Cash expenses | (37.4) | (42.5) | (38.2) | (42.1) | (42.5) | (66.2) | (71.6) | (71.0) | (73.4) | (87.5) | (88.4) | 1% | 23% | Costs flat QoQ | (180.3) | (249.3) | 389 |
| 3. Operating Cash flow | (6.8) | (10.7) | (5.6) | (7.4) | 0.5 | 7.6 | (1.3) | (3.6) | 5.3 | (7.5) | (7.728) | 3% | 483% | Another \$7.7m out-flow quarter | 6.8 | (9.9) | -246 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 3 qtrs of positive cash-flow unable to repeat | | | |
| 4. Investing Cash Flow | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Property Plant & Equipment | (2.5) | (0.9) | (0.7) | (0.4) | (0.5) | (1.7) | (1.3) | (1.8) | (2.3) | (7.8) | (3.7) | -52% | 192% | New facility in California completed | (3.4) | (13.8) | 303% |
| Acquisition of Businesses | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | | | | nm | nm | | 0.0 | 0.0 | nn |
| Intellectual Property (capitalised R&D) | (0.5) | (0.3) | (0.3) | (0.8) | (0.8) | (1.0) | (0.9) | (0.7) | (0.8) | (0.8) | (1.8) | 130% | 103% | Big increase it capitalised R&D | (2.7) | (3.5) | 28% |
| Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | (0.2) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | | | | | nm | nm | | 0.0 | 0.0 | nn |
| Total Investing Cash Flow | (3.1) | (1.2) | (1.1) | (1.2) | (1.3) | (2.7) | (2.2) | (2.5) | (3.1) | (8.6) | (5.5) | -35% | 155% | | (6.1) | (17.2) | 1819 |
| 5. Financing Cash Flow | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Equity issues (incl options exercise) | | 2.5 | | 1.5 | | 10.0 | 2.0 | 34.0 | 0.001 | 1.734 | (1.0) | -155% | -147% | Negative cash from options exercise??? | 12.0 | 0.8 | -94% |
| Convertible debt issues | 12.0 | | 15.9 | | 2.3 | | | 0.0 | | | | nm | nm | NB. WOW bonds converted to equity in qtr | 2.3 | 0.0 | nn |
| Transaction costs on equity & convertib | ole issues | (0.2) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.0) | (0.7) | 0.0 | (1.5) | (0.039) | 0.000 | (0.2) | nm | -735% | | (0.8) | (0.2) | nn |
| Debt issued (repaid) | (2.0) | 11.4 | (10.5) | 5.6 | 0.3 | (0.3) | 0.6 | (6.9) | 2.8 | 23.8 | 3.5 | -85% | 458% | Drawing down on debt | 0.6 | 30.1 | 50879 |
| Other financing changes | | | (1.0) | (1.0) | (1.1) | (1.2) | (1.2) | (1.2) | (1.3) | (1.4) | (2.0) | 38% | 70% | | (3.4) | (4.7) | 379 |
| Cash from Financing | 10.0 | 13.8 | 4.3 | 6.0 | 1.4 | 7.7 | 1.5 | 24.3 | 1.5 | 24.144 | 0.328 | -99% | -78% | | 10.6 | 26.0 | 1449 |
| 6. Opening Cash | 8.6 | 8.8 | 10.6 | 7.9 | 5.4 | 5.9 | 18.4 | 16.5 | 34.4 | 38.5 | 46.3 | | | | 5.4 | 34.4 | |
| 7. Net increase (decrease) in cash | 0.1 | 1.9 | (2.4) | (2.5) | 0.6 | 12.7 | (2.0) | 18.2 | 3.6 | 8.1 | (12.9) | | | | 11.3 | (1.1) | |
| 8. FX movements | 0.1 | (0.1) | (0.2) | 0.0 | (0.2) | (0.2) | 0.2 | (0.3) | 0.4 | (0.3) | (0.4) | | | | (0.2) | (0.2) | |
| 9. Cash at end of period | 8.8 | 10.6 | 7.9 | 5.4 | 5.9 | 18.4 | 16.5 | 34.4 | 38.5 | 46.316 | 33.049 | -29% | 100% | | 16.5 | 33.1 | 100% |
| | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |

Source: Company reports; Sequoia analysis

Balance Sheet changes

- MMM ended Q3 with a cash balance of EUR 33.0m (v EUR 46.3m in Q2), down EUR 13.3m.
- Shareholders funds was boosted by EUR 17.2m (A\$27m) Woolworths (WOW) subsidiary W23 Investments Pty Ltd converting the last two outstanding 7.0% convertible bonds into shares (on 6/9/21). Debt reduced by the same amount. The conversion price was set by a complicated growth formula, but worked out to be A\$0.965 per CDI. This became a 9.87% stake briefly, which WOW immediately sold on market at A\$1.91 per share (a 6.0% discount) for A\$53.5m.
- This additional equity was almost completely eliminated by the EUR 15.6m EBIT loss for Q3.
- We have included a cash outflow of EUR 3.6m for 3 years of accumulated interest to WOW paid at maturity.



• During Q3 MMM entered into a new asset financing facility with National Australia Bank (NAB) for EUR 3.7m (A\$6m) at 3.5% interest rate. This was used to fund the fit-out of the new Sydney fulfilment centre (FC). MMM has taken 50% of the 27,000 sqm premises (i.e. ~13,500 sqm) but has sub-leased some of that out, which it can take back later for future expansion when needed.

Subsequent to Sept 30

- MMM said that in late October it had drawn down the remaining US\$15m (EUR 13m) of its USD \$45m (EUR 39m) Tranche 1 facility from Runway Growth Capital, which is earmarked for capex on digital platforms and further fulfilment centre expansion. Tranche 2 of US\$20m (EUR 17m) remains undrawn. The interest rate on this facility we understand is ~10.25% pa.
- Net debt (including leases) was EUR 30.5m at June 30. We estimate net debt at end December would be ~EUR 40m (being 30.5m at June, + 0.3m increase in Q3 per the 4C, less 17.2m WOW bonds conversion on 6/9/21, plus 3.6m interest on maturity + 13m further draw down in October for capex + say 7.0m further operating outflow in Q4 plus 3.0m other).
- Shareholders Funds was a deficit of EUR -12.2m at end June. Add 17.2m WOW bonds conversion, less Q3 EBIT loss -15.6m, less interest expense estimate \$0.9m for Q3, gives us an estimated deficit of -11.5m at end-September.

Company Guidance updated

- MMM reduced its previous guidance of 30-35% revenue growth to 26-28% (-4% to -7%).
- It maintained it guidance for contribution margin at ~29%, in line with CY2020.
- However MMM also stated that operating conditions were highly variable, and post-Covid recovery behaviour had changed, and it was not deriving the benefit it previously expected from aggressive marketing spend and voucher use. Whilst we sympathise with most businesses trying to manage their way through Covid, and into the reopening period, the uncertainty expressed by management is a worry to us.
- MMM also expects losses in Q4 to be lower than the EUR 15.6m EBIT loss in Q3. Q4 is seasonally better (competitor HelloFresh expecting improved margins sand result in Q4).
- Guidance for cash flow for CY22 MMM's strategy for CY22 and beyond is to continue investing for strong customer and revenue growth towards its long-term ambition of EUR 1.0bn of sales, while keeping operating cash flow around breakeven. However a moderately significant cash outflow will occur in CY21 (EUR -9.9m for the 9 months YTD).
- Combined with the company's negative working capital dynamics (+EUR 1.5m benefit in CY20; customers pay 1 week in advance; MMM pays suppliers 30 days in arears a good thing), this implies ongoing Ebitda losses.
- So we think that as long as MMM continues with its EUR 1.0bn revenue ambition (by 2025) and EUR 5bn by 2030, investors will not see any reported profits (maybe Ebitda will be positive).



Sequoia estimates

We have reviewed MMM's Q3 result in detail in this report. We also reviewed global competitor HelloFresh's Q3 result on pages 12-14.

With the USA, Europe and now NSW and even Victoria finally reopening, there is now a Covid headwind in all of MMM's markets rather than a tailwind. We make significant downgrades to our forecasts.

Given the uncertainty highlighted by management, we have decided to be more conservative than the company's downgraded guidance.

| MMM: Changes in Estimates | FY20A | | FY21e | | | FY22e | | | FY23e | |
|---------------------------------------|-------|--------|--------|------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Years ending Dec EUR m | | Old | New | Change | Old | New | Change | Old | New | Change |
| Sales revenue | 254.0 | 330.6 | 316.0 | -4.4% | 392.6 | 329.0 | -16.2% | 453.4 | 390.5 | -13.9% |
| Sales growth | 96.1% | 30.1% | 24.4% | -5.7% | 18.7% | 4.1% | -14.6% | 15.5% | 18.7% | 3.2% |
| Sales growth guidance | | 30-35% | 26-28% | -4% to -7% | | | | | | |
| Contribution margin | 74.1 | 94.4 | 87.2 | -7.7% | 122.3 | 96.4 | -21.2% | 145.0 | 117.5 | -19.0% |
| Contribution margin % | 29% | 29% | 28% | -1.0% | 31% | 29% | -1.9% | 32% | 30% | -1.9% |
| Operating costs | -75.1 | -119.4 | -114.9 | -3.8% | -131.4 | -125.2 | -4.7% | -143.2 | -143.4 | 0.1% |
| EBITDA | -0.9 | -25.0 | -27.7 | 11% | -9.1 | -28.8 | 217% | 1.9 | -25.9 | -1499% |
| Ebitda Margin % | -0.4% | -7.6% | -8.8% | -1.2% | -2.3% | -8.8% | -6.4% | 0.4% | -6.6% | -7.0% |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | -6.5 | -8.0 | -9.5 | 18.8% | -8.8 | -10.5 | 18.8% | -9.5 | -11.2 | 18.8% |
| EBIT | -7.4 | -33.0 | -37.2 | 13% | -17.9 | -39.3 | 119% | -7.6 | -37.1 | 388% |
| Ebit Margin % | -2.9% | -10.0% | -11.8% | 18% | -4.6% | -11.9% | 162% | -1.7% | -9.5% | 467% |
| Interest expense | -7.4 | -4.0 | -4.0 | 0% | -4.2 | -5.5 | 31% | -4.5 | -8.0 | 78% |
| Pre-Tax Profit (Loss) | -14.8 | -37.0 | -41.2 | 11% | -22.1 | -44.8 | 103% | -12.1 | -45.1 | 273% |
| Abnormal items | -71.4 | | | | | | | | | |
| NPAT (reported including Abnormals) | -86.2 | -37.0 | -41.2 | 11% | -22.1 | -44.8 | 103% | -12.1 | -45.1 | 273% |
| NPAT (normalised) | -14.8 | -37.0 | -41.2 | 11% | -22.1 | -44.8 | 103% | -12.1 | -45.1 | 273% |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| EPS (normalised) (euro cents) | -7.9 | -13.7 | -14.5 | 6% | -8.2 | -15.8 | 93% | -4.5 | -15.9 | 256% |
| EPS growth % | -71% | 72% | 83% | 11% | -40% | 9% | 49% | -45% | 1% | 46% |
| Operating Cash Flow | 4.4 | -11.9 | -27.6 | 132% | -5.0 | -33.4 | 566% | 5.6 | -29.8 | -634% |
| Cash Flow per share (euro cents) | 2.4 | -4.4 | -9.7 | 122% | -1.9 | -11.8 | 536% | 2.1 | -10.5 | -609% |
| DPS (euro cents) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| Payout rate (of normalised EPS) | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0.0% | 0% | 0% | 0.0% | 0% | 0% | 0.0% |
| Shares on issue (F/D; weighted averag | 187.2 | 271.1 | 284.1 | 4.8% | 271.1 | 284.1 | 4.8% | 271.1 | 284.1 | 4.8% |

Source: Sequoia estimates

Key modelling assumptions:

Australia

Active customers: Q4 -5% as a post-Covid correction, and partly mitigated by the WA start-up; CY22 +10%; CY23 +20%; CY24 +20%.

Order rate: Q4 -5%; CY22 -5%; CY23 n/c; CY24 n/c.

Avge Order Value: Q4: 0%; CY22 +5%; CY23 +3%, CY24 +3%.

USA

Active customers: Q4 -3% (with Q3's -12% makes -15% post-Covid correction); CY22 +10%; CY23 +20%; CY24 +20%.

Order rate: Q4 -5%; CY22 -3%; CY23 n/c; CY24 n/c.

Avge Order Value: Q4: +5%; CY22 +5%; CY23 +5%, CY24 +5%.

Europe

Active customers: Q4 +4% (with Q3's -24% this makes a -20% post-Covid correction); CY22 +5%; CY23 +20%; CY24 +20%. Order rate: Q4 -5%; CY22 -5%; CY23 n/c; CY24 n/c. Avge Order Value: Q4: +5%; CY22 +5%; CY23 +5%, CY24 +5%.

Worldwide

The above assumptions result in forecast revenue growth of 25% for FY21 (slightly below



guidance of 26-28%), 6% for CY22 (a post-Covid rebalancing year), +21% in CY23 and 26% in CY24.

Group Costs

Marketing costs is a key variable for MMM, and is mostly discretionary. We now assume: Q4 25% of sales; CY22 23% of sales; CY23 20% of sales; CY24 20% of sales.

However there are some lasting benefits from Covid:

- MMM now has significantly more active customers (413,000 worldwide Vs 183,000 at Dec 2019 pre-Covid, +126%), and 265,000 active subscribers (v 182,000 Dec 2019, +46%.
- Consumers have significantly more awareness of meal kit companies (Hello Fresh/ Every Plate, and Marley Spoon / Dinnerly) and pre-prepared meal home delivery companies (e.g. Youfoodz, taken over by HelloFresh in October).
- Online purchasing of virtually everything has become more accepted and changed habits forever, including the grocery category where MMM plays.

Recommendation and Price Target

Our revised blended valuation is \$1.41 (was \$2.67, -47%), based on an equal-weighted blend of 3 different valuation methodologies.

| Marley Spoon - Sequoia - Blended valuation | | | CY20A | CY | ′21e | CY22 | | CY23e |
|---|-----|------|--------------|------|--------|--------|-----|--------|
| HelloFresh (key comp) details: | | | OTZUA | | 210 | 0122 | | 01230 |
| HelloFresh share price (HFGG.DE) (EUR) | | | | | 84.76 | | | |
| Shares on issue | | | | 1 | 73.864 | | | |
| Market Cap EUR m | | | | | 4,737 | | | |
| Net cash (Net debt) EUR m | | | 371.9 | | 519.1 | | | |
| Enterprise value EUR m | | | | 1 | 4,218 | | | |
| Active customers (m) | | | 5.29 | | 6.94 | | | |
| EV per customer EUR (AUD) | | | | € | 2,049 | \$ 3,2 | 201 | |
| Consensus Revenue forecasts EUR m | | | 3,750 | | 5,746 | 6,8 | 340 | 7,82 |
| Consensus Ebitda forecasts EUR m | | | 481.2 | | 522.0 | 64 | 4.0 | 830. |
| Ebitda margin | | | 12.8% | | 9.1% | 9. | .4% | 10.6 |
| HelloFresh - Consensus EV / Revenue multiples | | | | | 2.43x | 2. | 04x | 1.78 |
| HelloFresh - Consensus EV / Ebitda multiples | | | | | 26.9x | 21 | .8x | 16.9 |
| (consensus per Refinitiv, years ended Dec) | | | | | | | | |
| MMM EV/ Sales multiple | | | | | 0.69x | 0 | 81x | 0.76 |
| MMM discount to HFGG.de | | | | | -72% | | 80% | -57 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Implied MMM share price using HFGG multiples | | | | \$ | 4.02 | \$ 3 | .27 | \$ 3.3 |
| | | ۷ | Veighting | Valu | | | | |
| Method A - Discounted EV/ Sales multiple (as above) | | | | | | | | |
| We apply a 50% discount (prev 20%) | | | 33.3% | \$ | 2.01 | \$ 1 | .64 | \$ 1.6 |
| -50% | | | | | | | | |
| Method B - Discounted cash flow valuation | | | | | | | | |
| Our DCF valuation is negative as we do not forecast | | | 33.3% | \$ | - | | | |
| positive cash flows in our 5-yr forecast period. | | | | | | | | |
| So we use Nil as a valuation under this method. | | | | | | | | |
| Extremely conservative. | | | | | | | | |
| Method C - Discounted EV/ Customer valuation | | | | | | | | |
| MMM active customers at 30/9/21 (m) | 0 | .413 | | | | | | |
| Implied value using HF valn per active customer (m) | - | 46.1 | | | | | | |
| less: estimated net debt at 31/12/21e | | 39.9 | | | | | | |
| Implied Equity value (EUR m) | - | 06.2 | | | | | | |
| We apply a 50% discount (for quality, risk etc) | | 03.1 | | | | | | |
| AUD valuation (A\$m) | - | 29.9 | | | | | | |
| MMM CDIs on issue (F/d) (m) | • • | 84.1 | | | | | | |
| AUD valuation per CDI (A\$) | _ | 2.22 | | | | | | |
| EV/ customer Valuation Per share | | | <u>33.3%</u> | \$ | 2.22 | | | |
| Plandad valuation | | | 100% | ¢ | 1 44 | | | |
| Blended valuation | | | 100% | \$ | 1.41 | | | |

Source: Consensus estimates for HelloFresh per Refinitiv, Sequoia estimates for MMM

Revenue multiple basis

We value MMM at \$2.01 per share based on a 50% discount (previously 20%) to global leader HelloFresh's EV/ Sales multiple for CY21 of 2.43x (i.e. implies 1.22x Sales).



HelloFresh is >90 times the market cap of MMM and has forecast revenue 28x MMM's for CY21. It is now profitable since CY19 and cash-flow positive. MMM is not profitable, and will burn significant cash in CY21, CY22 and CY23 on our revised (downgraded) forecasts. So we are taking a very conservative approach. We note the market is currently applying a 57% to 77% discount depending on the year selected.

We show other comparable companies at Appendix 2 (page 22). Goodfood Market Corp in Canada trades on 1.16x FY1 sales and My Food Bag in New Zealand on 1.30x.

DCF Valuation – now nil

Our DCF valuation is now a negative figure, because of the aggressive investment in costs (particularly growth marketing) in the next 3 years and beyond, and MMM's ambition to achieve EUR 5bn in sales in 10 years (HelloFresh is already there for CY21). As we understand it, MMM's strategy is to invest <u>all available cash flow</u> into further customer acquisition, whilst keeping operating cash flow around break-even. (However, MMM will not even come close to this cash-flow break-even target in CY21. We now forecast a material EUR 40m cash out-flow for CY21; no longer a modest out-flow).

Because of the negative working capital in the business (a good thing - customers pay 5 days in advance, MMM pays creditors 30 days in arrears), this means that Ebitda will generally be EUR 2-5m worse than management's targeted cash flow result, and will continue to be a negative result in our opinion until MMM can achieve sufficient scale. We do not forecast positive cash flows in the next 5 years, and expect MMM's strategy to continue for years 5-10 so we don't assume anything positive in our terminal value either. So we now have a negative DCF valuation (previously we thought MMM would cross over into profits and positive cash flows in 3-4 years). To highlight this point to investors, we include our DCF component at Nil in our blended valuation. We assume that other analysts who have positive DCF valuations must be assuming a cross over to profits at some stage in the near future, or a big cut in the marketing budget. But we highlight that MMM is very clear on its strategy, which will not see meaningful operating cash flows for a long time.

We can amend our long-term modelling, if and when it becomes clear that MMM will surface a profit or positive cash flows. Investors who think this is too extreme can consider our other two valuation measures.

Valuation per active customer

We have added a third valuation metric, being the enterprise valuation per customer achieved by HelloFresh, the global leader in the category. HF's valuation works out to be EUR 2,049 per active customer (~A\$3,200). This sounds quite high to us, but understandable as a profitable global market leader now operating in 15 countries (+ Japan #16 coming soon). Myfoodbag in NZ (MFB.NZ) is valued at NZ \$4,039/ customer (A\$3,921) for its 76,875 customers in a single small market. It is profitable.

MMM is not profitable, and will burn significant cash in CY21. So we again apply a 50% discount to HF's "EV per active customer" valuation. This produces a valuation of A\$2.22 per MMM CDI.

Risk Rating

We consider MMM a high-risk investment, as it does not yet have an established track record of profitability, it has estimated net debt of EUR 39m at September 30 and is much smaller than its main rival Hello Fresh (which is already profitable). In addition, the path to normalisation post Covid and how that could affect MMM are still unknown, and our forecasts are quite sensitive to changes in key assumptions (e.g. net customer additions and frequency of orders). However, we expect these risks to decline over the next year or two as the current Covid headwinds abate, and as MMM derives scale benefits / capacity utilisation benefits in its recently expanded fulfilment centres (WA, Sydney & California all new, and have significant spare capacity).

Recommendation

With the share price down some 42% since the Q3 result, and Q4 expected to be seasonally stronger (although Covid headwinds now prevalent), we maintain our buy recommendation for the long-term growth potential. HelloFresh has shown the way.



HelloFresh Q3 result review & Comparison

HelloFresh also posted a trend reversal, although it managed to stay in profit and stay cash-flow positive. HelloFresh was approximately break-even at the EBIT line in CY19, and has been profitable since.

It was interesting that both companies grew revenue in CY19 by 41%, which was before the boost from Covid. We expect a modest decline/ pull-back post Covid (it has already started) making 1H22 and perhaps all of CY22 a low growth year, then for growth to resume at perhaps ~20% per annum in CY23.

| Years ended Dec (EUR m) | CY14 | CY15 | CY16 | CY17 | CY18 | CY19 | CY20 (Covid | CY21e Consensus | 2 yr CAGR | 5 yr CAGR | 3Q20 QTR | 3Q21 QTR | 3QYTD 9 mths | 3QYTD 9 mths |
|------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|-------|--------|--------|----------------|--------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| | | | | (IPO) | | | Boost) | Consensus | CAGN | CAGN | WIN | WIN . | Jinuis | 5 muis |
| Revenue | 69.6 | 305.0 | 597.0 | 909.9 | 1279.2 | 1809.0 | 3749.9 | 5746.0 | 78.2% | 57.3% | 970.2 | 1415.5 | 2641.4 | 4413.4 |
| Revenue growth % | n/a | 338% | 96% | 52% | 41% | 41% | 107% | 53% | | | | 46% | | 67% |
| Ebitda (adjusted ex SBPs) | -12.2 | -86.2 | -82.6 | -70.1 | -54.5 | 46.5 | 505.2 | 522.0 | 235.1% | | 114.7 | 79.8 | 331.4 | 396. |
| Ebitda growth % | n/a | nm | -4% | -15% | -22% | -185% | 986% | 3% | | | | -30% | | 20% |
| Ebitda margin | -17.5% | -28.3% | -13.8% | -7.7% | -4.3% | 2.6% | 13.5% | 9.1% | | | 11.8% | 5.6% | 12.5% | 9.0% |
| EBIT | -15.8 | -115.5 | -90.5 | -88.8 | -82.8 | 1.3 | 97.9 | 429.2 | 1717.0% | | 92.1 | 41.4 | 272.8 | 306.4 |
| growth % | n/a | nm | -22% | -2% | -7% | -102% | 7430% | 338% | | | | -55% | | 12% |
| EBIT margin | -22.7% | -37.9% | -15.2% | -9.8% | -6.5% | 0.1% | 2.6% | 7.5% | | | 9.5% | 2.9% | 10.3% | 6.9% |
| Total Assets | 28.1 | 158.6 | 151.7 | 452.9 | 559.1 | 570.2 | 1525.6 | 2058 | 90.0% | 68.5% | 1172.5 | 2099.6 | 1172.5 | 2099. |
| growth % | n/a | nm | -4% | 199% | 23% | 2% | 168% | 35% | | | | 79% | | 79% |
| Return on Assets % (EBIT) | -56% | -73% | -60% | -20% | -15% | 0% | 6% | 21% | | | 31% | 8% | 31% | 19% |
| Shareholders Funds (ex minorities) | 14.6 | 87.6 | 20.6 | 303.3 | 546.1 | 245.3 | 656.0 | 968.4 | | | 518.5 | 834.8 | 518.5 | 834. |
| growth % | n/a | nm | -76% | 1372% | 80% | -55% | 167% | 48% | | | | 61% | | 61% |
| | | | | | | | | 9mths YTD | | | | | | |
| Active customers (Q4)(m) | n/a | 0.62 | 0.86 | 1.45 | 2.04 | 2.97 | 5.29 | 6.94 | 52.9% | 51.9% | 5.00 | 6.94 | 5.00 | 6.9 |
| Customer growth | n/a | n/a | 38% | 69% | 41% | 46% | 78% | 31% | | | | 39% | | 39% |
| Orders (m) | 1.7 | 6.8 | 12.4 | 19.0 | 27.1 | 37.5 | 74.3 | 87.9 | 53.2% | 48.0% | 19.49 | 27.59 | 52.33 | 87.8 |
| Orders growth % | n/a | nm | 82% | 53% | 43% | 38% | 98% | 18% | | | | 42% | | 68% |
| Average Order Value (Q4) EUR | 41.1 | 44.9 | 48.2 | 46.6 | 48.6 | 48.0 | 47.1 | 51.3 | 3.4% | 1.3% | 49.7 | 51.3 | | |

Source: HelloFresh reports

We show MMM's data in a similar format.

| Marley Spoon (founded May 2014; | IPO 2/7/18) | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|-------------|---------|---------|--------|--------|--------|----------------|--------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Years ended Dec (EUR m) | CY14 | CY15 | CY16 | CY17 | CY18 | CY19 | CY20 (Covid | CY21e Consensus | 2 yr CAGR | 5 yr CAGR | 3Q20 QTR | 3Q21 QTR | 3QYTD 9 mths | 3QYTD 9 mths |
| | | | | | (IPO) | | Boost) | | | | | | | |
| Revenue | Founded | 3.9 | 20.2 | 53.2 | 92.0 | 129.6 | 254.0 | 323.9 | 58.1% | 74.2% | 69.3 | 79.2 | 185.5 | 237.2 |
| Revenue growth % | | n/a | 418% | 164% | 73% | 41% | 96% | 28% | | | | 14% | | 28% |
| Ebitda | | -11.4 | -24.0 | -26.8 | -35.0 | -30.2 | -0.9 | -30.3 | nm | nm | 0.4 | -12.7 | -1.6 | -27.5 |
| Ebitda growth % | n/a | nm | 111% | 12% | 31% | -14% | -97% | 3135% | | | | -3275% | | 1619% |
| Ebitda margin | | -292.3% | -118.8% | -50.4% | -38.1% | -23.3% | -0.4% | -9.4% | | | 0.6% | -16.0% | -0.9% | -11.6% |
| EBIT | | -11.5 | -24.2 | -27.2 | -35.9 | -34.8 | -7.4 | -38.8 | 5.6% | | -1.2 | -15.6 | -6.5 | -34.8 |
| growth % | n/a | nm | 110% | 13% | 32% | -3% | -79% | 422% | | | | 1200% | | 435% |
| EBIT margin | | -294.9% | -119.8% | -51.2% | -39.0% | -26.8% | -2.9% | -12.0% | | | -1.7% | -19.7% | -3.5% | -14.7% |
| Total Assets | | 0.0 | 15.3 | 10.2 | 23.2 | 37.0 | 73.1 | 98.73 | 63.4% | | | n/a | | n/a |
| growth % | n/a | nm | #DIV/0! | -33% | 127% | 59% | 98% | 35% | | | | | | |
| Return on Assets % (EBIT) | | | | -266% | -154% | -94% | -10% | -39% | | | | | | |
| Shareholders Funds (ex minorities) | | 0.0 | 7.4 | -11.7 | -5.2 | -35.7 | 8.1 | -27.87 | | | Our est: | -11.5 | Our est: | -11.5 |
| growth % | n/a | nm | #DIV/0! | -259% | -56% | 589% | -123% | -443% | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | 9mths YTD | | | | | | |
| Active customers (Q4)(m) | | | 0.042 | 0.093 | 0.172 | 0.182 | 0.327 | 0.413 | 50.6% | 58.0% | 0.362 | 0.413 | 0.36 | 0.413 |
| Customer growth | | | n/a | 121% | 85% | 6% | 80% | 26% | | | | 14% | | 14% |
| Orders (m) | | | 0.442 | 1.1 | 2.2 | 3.0 | 5.6 | 5.3 | 33.0% | 64.0% | 1.563 | 1.691 | 4.059 | 5.251 |
| Orders growth % | n/a | n/a | n/a | 155% | 91% | 38% | 89% | -7% | | | | 8% | | 29% |
| Average Order Value (Q4) EUR | | | 45.7 | 47.2 | 42.7 | 43.6 | 45.2 | 46.7 | 3.5% | 0.4% | 44.4 | 46.8 | | |
| Source: MMM reports | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Source: MMM reports



We summarise some key differences in the performance metrics of these two companies. We recognise that there is a massive size disparity between the two companies.

| Marley Spoon & HelloFresh - Varian | | | | | CY20A | | | | CY20 YTD | CY21 YTD | Our comments |
|--------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------|--------|--------|--------|----------|----------|---|
| | 1QCY20 | 2QCY20 | 3QCY20 | 4QCY20 | (12 mths) | 1QCY21 | 2QCY21 | 3QCY21 | (9 mths) | (9 mths) | |
| Customer growth (QoQ) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| HelloFresh (incl acqn from 31/12/20) | 41% | 0% | 20% | 6% | 78% | 38% | 5% | -10% | n/a | | Both HF & MMM had seasonally weak |
| MMM | 32% | 46% | 3% | -10% | 80% | 26% | 3% | -3% | n/a | n/a | quarters; Slowing was already evident |
| MMM difference | -8.9% | 45.8% | -16.2% | -15.5% | 1.6% | -11.6% | -2.6% | 7.0% | | | in Q2 after 100%+ gains in CY20. |
| Revenue growth QonQ | | | | | | | | | | | |
| HelloFresh (incl acqn from 31/12/20) | 37% | 39% | 0% | 14% | n/a | 30% | 8% | -9% | n/a | n/a | Both HF & MMM had seasonally weak |
| MMM | 22% | 71% | -5% | -1% | n/a | 13% | 5% | -2% | n/a | n/a | quarters; Slowing was already evident |
| MMM difference | -14.5% | 31.7% | -5.3% | -15.4% | | -17.2% | -3.2% | 6.8% | | | in Q2 after 100%+ gains in CY20. |
| Revenue growth on pcp | | | | | | | | | | | |
| HelloFresh (incl acqn from 31/12/20) | 66% | 123% | 120% | 117% | 107% | 106% | 60% | 46% | | 67% | HF out-performing MMM, although |
| МММ | 46% | 129% | 110% | 95% | 96% | 80% | 10% | 14% | n/a | | boosted by the Faxctor75 Inc acqn |
| MMM difference | -20.4% | 6.7% | -10.6% | -21.7% | -11.2% | -26.1% | -49.5% | -31.6% | | -39.1% | |
| Contribution margin % | | | | | | | | | | | |
| HelloFresh | 28.6% | 26.1% | 26.6% | 30.6% | 28.0% | 27.9% | 25.6% | 22.0% | 26.9% | 25.2% | Contribution margins similar. Differences |
| MMM | 29.2% | 30.5% | 27.9% | 29.0% | 29.2% | 28.0% | 26.6% | 28.0% | 29.2% | | could just be classifications. |
| MMM difference | 0.5% | 4.4% | 1.3% | -1.6% | 1.2% | 0.1% | 0.9% | 5.9% | 2.3% | 2.3% | |
| Marketing % of sales | | | | | | | | | | | |
| HelloFresh | -17.0% | -8.6% | -12.8% | -12.9% | -12.5% | -15.1% | -13.7% | -14.8% | -12.4% | -14.5% | HF clearly deriving scale benefits over MMM |
| MMM | -27.0% | -13.0% | -14.3% | -12.0% | -15.5% | -20.0% | -20.7% | -28.0% | -16.7% | | Massive spend by MMM in Q3; Revenue |
| MMM difference | -10.0% | -4.4% | -1.5% | 0.9% | -2.9% | -4.9% | -7.0% | -13.2% | -4.4% | | decline could have been muich worse. |
| G&A % of sales | | | | | | | | | | | |
| HelloFresh (includes D&A) | -5.0% | -3.7% | -4.3% | -3.0% | -3.9% | -3.5% | -3.5% | -4.3% | -4.2% | -3.8% | HF clearly deriving scale benefits over MMM |
| MMM (excludes D&A) | -17.2% | -11.4% | -13.0% | -15.4% | -17.4% | -15.4% | -17.1% | -16.0% | -13.3% | | Not directly comparable |
| MMM difference | -12.2% | -7.7% | -8.7% | -12.4% | -13.5% | -11.9% | -13.6% | -11.7% | -9.1% | -8.5% | |
| Operating Ebitda (before SBPs) % | | | | | | | | | | | |
| HelloFresh | 9.0% | 15.8% | 11.8% | 15.7% | 13.5% | 11.0% | 10.1% | 5.6% | 12.5% | 9.0% | |
| MMM | -15.1% | 6.1% | 0.6% | 1.6% | -0.2% | -7.4% | -11.2% | -16.0% | -0.8% | | MMM's 3 quarters of profit did not last; It |
| MMM difference | -24.1% | -9.7% | -11.2% | -14.1% | -13.7% | -18.4% | -21.4% | -21.7% | -13.4% | | has spooked investors by swinging back into material losses |

Source: Marley Spoon and HelloFresh reports; Sequoia analyis



| | | | | | | _ | | | | | 20 | 20 | 20VTD |
|---------------------------------------|---------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|---------------------|---------|--------|
| HelloFresh SE (HFGG.DE) | | | | | | 0)/00.4 | | | | | 3Q | 3Q | 3QYTD |
| Financials (EUR m) | | | | CY20 YTD | 10 01/00 | CY20A | 100/01 | 000101 | | CY21 YTD | Change | Change | Change |
| Years ended Dec (EUR m) | 1QCY20 | 2QCY20 | 3QCY20 | (9 mths) | 4QCY20 | (12 mths) | 1QCY21 | 2QCY21 | 3QCY21 | (9 mths) | QoQ | YoY | ΥοΥ |
| Revenue - USA | 436.7 | 525.9 | 527.9 | 1,488.9 | 582.8 | 2,073.3 | 802.4 | 846.9 | 789.3 | 2,444.3 | -6.8% | 49.5% | 64.2% |
| Revenue - R.O.W | 262.4 | 446.2 | 442.3 | 1,152.5 | 525.7 | 1,676.6 | 640.5 | 708.1 | 626.2 | 1,969.1 | -11.6% | 41.6% | 70.9% |
| Revenue - Group | 699.1 | 972.1 | 970.2 | 2,641.4 | 1,108.5 | 3,749.9 | 1,442.9 | 1,555.0 | 1,415.5 | 4,413.4 | <mark>-9.0</mark> % | 45.9% | 67.1% |
| Growth on pcp % | 66.4% | 122.6% | 120.2% | 103.6% | 116.7% | 107.3% | 106.4% | 60.0% | 45.9% | 67.1% | | | |
| COGS | (240.6) | (342.2) | (332.4) | (915.3) | (361.5) | (1,276.7) | (487.3) | (532.7) | (489.8) | (1,509.8) | -8.1% | 47.4% | 65.0% |
| % of revenue | -34.4% | -35.2% | -34.3% | -34.7% | -32.6% | -34.0% | -33.8% | -34.3% | -34.6% | -34.2% | | | |
| Gross Profit | 458.5 | 629.9 | 637.8 | 1,726.1 | 747.0 | 2,473.2 | 955.6 | 1,022.3 | 925.7 | 2,903.6 | -9.4% | 45.1% | 68.2% |
| Gross profit margin % | 65.6% | 64.8% | 65.7% | 65.3% | 67.4% | 66.0% | 66.2% | 65.7% | 65.4% | 65.8% | | | |
| Fulfilment costs | (258.3) | (376.3) | (379.8) | (1,014.5) | (407.7) | (1,422.1) | (553.0) | (623.5) | (613.8) | (1,790.4) | -1.6% | 61.6% | 76.5% |
| % of revenue | -36.9% | -38.7% | -39.1% | -38.4% | -36.8% | -37.9% | -38.3% | -40.1% | -43.4% | -40.6% | | | |
| Contribution Margin | 200.2 | 253.6 | 258.0 | 711.6 | 339.3 | 1,051.1 | 402.6 | 398.8 | 311.9 | 1,113.2 | -21.8% | 20.9% | 56.4% |
| Contribution margin % | 28.6% | 26.1% | 26.6% | 26.9% | 30.6% | 28.0% | 27.9% | 25.6% | 22.0% | 25.2% | | | |
| Marketing expenses | (118.6) | (83.7) | (124.3) | (326.6) | (143.1) | (469.7) | (218.0) | (213.4) | (209.5) | (640.9) | -1.8% | 68.5% | 96.2% |
| % of revenue | -17.0% | -8.6% | -12.8% | -12.4% | -12.9% | -12.5% | -15.1% | -13.7% | -14.8% | -14.5% | | | |
| General & Admin, Other | (35.0) | (35.8) | (41.6) | (112.2) | (33.6) | (146.0) | (50.7) | (54.4) | (61.0) | (165.9) | 12.1% | 46.6% | 47.9% |
| % of revenue | -5.0% | -3.7% | -4.3% | -4.2% | -3.0% | -3.9% | -3.5% | -3.5% | -4.3% | -3.8% | | | |
| Other income (expense) | | | | | -950.0% | (9.5) | | | | | | | |
| EBIT | 46.6 | 134.1 | 92.1 | 272.8 | 153.1 | 425.9 | 133.9 | 131.0 | 41.4 | 306.4 | -68.4% | -55.0% | 12.3% |
| % of revenue | 6.7% | 13.8% | 9.5% | 10.3% | 13.8% | 11.4% | 9.3% | 8.4% | 2.9% | 6.9% | | | |
| Add back: Depreciation & amortisation | 10.6 | 11.5 | 11.6 | 33.7 | 13.4 | 47.1 | 15.6 | 24.8 | 25.6 | 65.9 | 3.2% | 120.7% | 95.5% |
| EBITDA | 57.2 | 145.6 | 103.7 | 306.5 | 166.5 | 473.0 | 149.5 | 155.8 | 67.0 | 372.3 | -57.0% | -35.4% | 21.5% |
| % of revenue | 8.2% | 15.0% | 10.7% | 11.6% | 15.0% | 12.6% | 10.4% | 10.0% | 4.7% | 8.4% | 01.070 | 00.470 | 21.070 |
| Add back: Abnormal/ special items | 0.270 | 1.7 | 4.7 | 6.7 | 1.5 | 8.2 | 2.5 | 1.3 | 3.9 | 7.8 | 200.0% | -17.0% | 16.4% |
| Add back: Share-based payments | 5.5 | 6.3 | 6.2 | 18.1 | 6.0 | 24.0 | 7.1 | 0.6 | 8.8 | 16.6 | 1366.7% | 41.9% | -8.3% |
| Adjusted Ebitda | 63.1 | 153.7 | 114.7 | 331.4 | 174.1 | 505.2 | 159.2 | 157.8 | 79.8 | 396.8 | -49.4% | -30.4% | 19.7% |
| Ebitda margin % | 9.0% | 15.8% | 11.8% | 12.5% | 15.7% | 13.5% | 11.0% | 10.1% | 5.6% | 9.0% | -43.470 | -30.470 | 13.170 |
| CASH FLOW | 0.070 | 10.070 | 11.070 | 12.070 | 10.170 | 10.070 | 11.070 | 10.170 | 0.070 | 0.070 | | | |
| Operating cashflow | 132.5 | 148.9 | 134.8 | 416.1 | 185.3 | 601.5 | 208.7 | 102.6 | 85.2 | 396.3 | -17.0% | -36.8% | -4.8% |
| | | | | | | (82.2) | | | | | 42.7% | | |
| Investing cash flow (ex M&A) | (19.2) | (10.6) | (14.2) | (44.0) | (38.2) | · · · | (26.8) | (40.3) | (57.5) | (124.5) | 42.7% | 304.9% | 163.0% |
| Investing cash flow - M&A | - | - | 400.0 | 070 4 | (128.3) | (128.3) | - | - | - | 074.0 | | 77.00/ | 07.00/ |
| Free cash flow | 113.3 | 138.3 | 120.6 | 372.1 | 18.8 | 391.0 | 181.9 | 62.3 | 27.7 | 271.8 | -55.5% | -77.0% | -27.0% |
| Financing cash flow | (3.7) | 173.5 | 0.9 | 170.7 | (7.3) | 163.4 | (48.1) | (2.6) | (8.5) | (59.2) | | | |
| FX & other | (3.4) | (0.1) | (10.5) | (13.9) | (5.0) | (19.0) | 13.5 | (2.6) | 2.5 | 13.5 | | | |
| Change in cash | 106.2 | 311.7 | 111.0 | 528.9 | 6.5 | 535.4 | 147.3 | 57.1 | 21.7 | 226.1 | -62.0% | -80.5% | -57.3% |
| Closing cash | 299.8 | 611.5 | 722.5 | 722.5 | 729.0 | 729.0 | 876.3 | 933.4 | 955.1 | 955.1 | 2.3% | 32.2% | 32.2% |
| STATS | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Active customers - USA (Qtr, m) | 2.64 | 1.98 | 2.49 | 2.49 | 2.61 | 2.61 | 3.69 | 3.82 | 3.48 | 3.48 | -8.9% | 39.8% | 39.8% |
| Active customers - ROW (Qtr, m) | 1.54 | 2.20 | 2.51 | 2.51 | 2.68 | 2.68 | 3.59 | 3.86 | 3.46 | 3.46 | -10.4% | 37.8% | 37.8% |
| Active customers - Group (Qtr, m) | 4.18 | 4.18 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.29 | 5.29 | 7.28 | 7.68 | 6.94 | 6.94 | -9.6% | 38.8% | 38.8% |
| No. of orders - USA (m) | 8.95 | 8.87 | 9.97 | 27.78 | 10.90 | 38.69 | 15.10 | 15.58 | 14.12 | 44.80 | -9.4% | 41.6% | 61.3% |
| No. of orders - ROW (m) | 5.79 | 9.23 | 9.52 | 24.55 | 11.10 | 35.64 | 14.18 | 15.40 | 13.47 | 43.05 | -12.5% | 41.5% | 75.4% |
| No. of orders - Group (m) | 14.74 | 18.10 | 19.49 | 52.33 | 22.00 | 74.33 | 29.28 | 30.98 | 27.59 | 87.85 | -10.9% | 41.6% | 67.9% |
| Orders per customer - USA | 3.4 | 4.5 | 4.0 | | 4.2 | | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.1 | | -0.5% | 1.3% | |
| Orders per customer - ROW | 3.8 | 4.2 | 3.8 | | 4.1 | | 3.9 | 4.0 | 3.9 | | -2.4% | 2.6% | |
| Orders per customer - Group | 3.5 | 4.3 | 3.9 | | 4.2 | | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | | -1.4% | 2.0% | |
| No. of meals - USA (m) | 61.30 | 63.90 | 72.7 | 197.9 | 80.1 | 278.0 | 113.90 | 118.40 | 108.1 | 340.4 | -8.7% | 48.7% | 72.0% |
| No. of meals - ROW (m) | 50.00 | 85.00 | 89.3 | 224.3 | 98.9 | 323.2 | 125.20 | 135.70 | 119.2 | 380.0 | -12.2% | 33.5% | 69.4% |
| No. of meals - Group (m) | 111.30 | 148.90 | 162.0 | 422.2 | 179.0 | 601.2 | 239.10 | 254.10 | 227.3 | 720.4 | -10.5% | 40.3% | 70.6% |
| Average order value - USA (EUR) | 48.8 | 59.3 | 52.9 | | 53.5 | 53.6 | 53.1 | 54.4 | 55.9 | | 2.8% | 5.6% | |
| Average order value - ROW (EUR) | 45.3 | 48.3 | 46.5 | | 47.4 | 47.0 | 45.2 | 46.0 | 46.5 | | 1.1% | 0.1% | |
| Average order value - Group (EUR) | 47.4 | 53.7 | 49.8 | | 50.4 | 50.4 | 49.3 | 50.2 | 51.3 | | 2.2% | | |
| Source: HolloErosh guarterly and Appu | | 33.1 | 43.0 | | J0.4 | 50.4 | 43.3 | 30.2 | 51.5 | | 2.270 | 5.1% | |

HelloFresh SE – Q3 Results

Source: HelloFresh quarterly and Annual Reports

Acquisitions: HF acquired US-based Factor75 Inc for EUR 219.8m on 31/12/20; And YouFoodz will be included from 27/10/21.

We have reviewed the HelloFresh (HF) results above and comment below. Key points:

- 1. HF also reported a seasonally soft quarter (Q1 & Q3 are usually softer being influenced by northern hemisphere holidays, whilst Q2 and Q4 benefit from back to school, and households getting back into a normal routine).
- 2. Q3 revenue EUR 1,415m was down 9.0% on Q2 but up 46% on the pcp. Both figures include the Factor75 Inc acquisition which had revenue of ~US\$100m (EUR 87m) in 2020. There was some operational impact from major storms in the USA, and Covid shut-downs in Australia. HF believed it had gained market share from competitors in the period as it has significantly improved its customer proposition and service levels (e.g. continued rapid expansion of its fulfilment centre capacity, faster time from ordering to delivery, expanded menu choices, constantly improving recipes, and maintaining good price points Vs supermarkets). It noted that several of its competitors were struggling with the volatility of trading conditions.
- 3. Q3 Year-to-date revenue was EUR 4,413m up 67% on the pcp.
- 4. Q3 contribution margin was 22.0% (v 25.6% in Q2) and (v 26.6% pcp). HF said this decline was a primarily driven by: (a) continued rapid expansion of its fulfilment centre capacity (3 new FC's added to international, 1 coming in USA) and associated launch



and ramp-up costs; (b) more normal seasonality which means lower fixed cost utilisation and higher packaging costs in the peak months of July and August; (c) increased production wages; (d) rising logistics costs. Also mentioned (e) stormrelated impact for 2 weeks in the USA; and (f) Covid-related quarantine measures for some production staff in Australia and New Zealand.

- 5. Q3 adjusted Ebitda was EUR 79.8m down -49% on Q2 and down -30% on the Covid boosted pcp. HF said the decline primarily reflected the short-term impact on contribution margin of a continued rapid expansion of fulfilment capacity, more normal seasonality, inflation in wages and logistics costs and a normalisation in marketing expenses.
- 6. Q3 Ebitda (adjusted) margin 5.6% (v 11.8% pcp) down 6.2% points (~4.0% due to lower contribution margin and ~2.0% from normalisation in marketing costs).
- 7. Year-to-date adjusted Ebitda was EUR 372.3m +20%. YTD Ebitda margin 9.0% (v 12.5% pcp) with about 2.0% of that margin reduction due to recent capacity expansion which has higher costs and hurts productivity and utilisation rates in the short-term.
- 8. Q4 margins are expected to improve slightly over Q3 with better capacity utilisation post summer holidays (2 months impact in Q3), and also lower packaging costs due to lower temperatures in Q4. Then a significant step up in1Q 2022.
- 9. Guidance raised With the Q3 result, HF increased its revenue growth guidance to 57% to 62% for CY21 (+45-55% previously) on a constant currency basis, due to the strong sales growth in the current financial year <u>up to and including October</u>, strong year-on-year customer growth, a continued high order rate and high average order values. This includes 0.4% from two months of Youfoodz (acquired 27/10/21). Based on current FX rates, actual revenue growth is expected to be 2-3% lower than this. HF maintained its guidance for adjusted Ebitda margins at between 8.25% and 10.25% for CY21. 9-*months YTD: 9.0%.
- 10. HF's share price has risen by 21% since the new guidance and result was given (EUR 69.96 on 1/11/21 to EUR 84.76 now).
- 11. **Outlook** HF expects slightly improved margin in 4Q and much better in 1Q. It enters CY22 with a significantly expanded customer base (6.94m at end-Sep). It is seeing a continuation of strong trends and says its value proposition to consumers is paying off. HF has been investing in people and capacity. Its trajectory towards EUR 10bn of sales long term is intact.

Other points of interest were:

- Q3 marketing costs were EUR 209m down 2% on Q2, but up 68.5% on the pcp of EUR 124m. This was 14.8% of sales (v 12.8% of sales in the pcp).
- 9 months YTD marketing costs were EUR 641m (vs 470m pcp) representing 14.5% of sales (v 12.4% of sales in the pcp). Last year's marketing costs were abnormally low as HF said demand was very strong during Covid and it was capacity constrained in many regions.
- This huge EUR 641m marketing investment (9 months) is largely a discretionary investment for growth, and represents 209% of YTD EBIT of EUR 306m. HelloFresh is building a powerful global brand (and sub-brands).
- Q3 active customers 6.94m worldwide, down 9.6% on Q2's 7.68m but up 39% on the pcp. Customer numbers include Factor75 customers (acquisition completed 31/12/20).
- Q3 orders per customer per quarter (worldwide) held up well at 4.0 (v 4.0 in Q2) and 3.9 in the pcp (+2.0%), despite a return to more normal seasonality in the quarter compared to the previous Covid boosted year.
- Q3 average order value (worldwide) also held up well at EUR 51.3 (v 50.2 in Q2,



+2.2%) and (v 49.8 in the pcp, +3.1%). Management said this was pleasing given that customers have resumed eating out once more. Food price inflation has led to price rises in some markets.

- Normalisation HF made several comments on the analysts' call and in the result regarding normalisation. It does not seem to expect a major loss of customers, order frequency or order value. Just a minor reversion to pre-Covid consumer behaviour, but now with a significantly higher customer base.
- Customer Retention HF says it is now achieving a retention rate of ~40% after 2 years, and ~30% after 4 years, up from ~20% 4 years ago. This also includes successful re-activations where lost customers come back.
- New regions HF entered Italy a couple of weeks ago (26m households), with a tailored menu offering, served from a new fulfilment centre near Milan. It plans to enter Japan in December 2021 or January 2022.
- Last mile delivery HF was now doing ~20% of its German deliveries in-house with its own fleet. HF also owns its last mile delivery in Benelux and Australia.

HelloFresh Cash Flow

- Q3 cash from operations was + EUR85.2m (v 134.8m pcp, down 37%). HF has reported positive operating cash flows in every quarter since 2QCY19.
- HF has invested EUR 125m YTD (v 82m pcp) in property, plant and equipment, adding more Fulfilment centres. (3 new FC's in International. Plus a new FC in Phoenix opens end 4Q CY21 making 6 in the USA).
- M&A activity HF entered the pre-prepared meals segment with its acquisition last year of US-based Factor75 Inc (completed 31/12/20) for EUR 220m and followed that up with the acquisition of Youfoodz Holdings Limited (YFZ) in Australia (completed 27/10/21) for A\$125m (EUR 80m). HF said Factor75 achieved midteens growth since acquisition. HF has not yet started to cross promote Factor75 to HF customers as it is also capacity constrained currently (2nd large FC being built for Factor75 in Colorado currently).
- Strategy HF was founded 10 years ago in November 2011. It aims to become the world's leading food solutions group. It has entered the pre-prepared meal segment as noted above, and is also now providing ~100 regular grocery items to its customers in the USA and is piloting ~500 items in Benelux. These moves potentially significantly expand HF's TAM (Total Addressable Market) as well as improve the value proposition to customers.
- HF had EUR 955m of cash available at end-September (v 722m pcp) +32%.



MMM - Risks / Negative Factors (updated from our previous reports)

 Covid now a clear headwind – Healthy eating / meal kits delivered direct to home companies like MMM and Hello Fresh were huge beneficiaries of the Covid-19 pandemic, especially during lock-downs. Having achieved a step-change in active customers, active subscribers and consumer awareness of both the meal kit concept and MMM's 2 brands, we expect to see some pull-back or normalisation as countries come out of Covid and normal activities resume such as eating out and taking holidays and weekend-breaks away from home.

Normalisation could include:

• Active customers - slower new subscriber additions (but given the strong momentum, continued high advertising, and the benefits to the consumer of the offering, we think unlikely to go backwards over the course of a full year) and increased churn.

• Order frequency - a reduction in the number of meals ordered per week.

• Order value – a possible reduction in the number of add-ons such as salads, desserts etc. reducing overall order value.

• Customer acquisition costs – may increase if MMM decides it needs to increase advertising and discount vouchers to maintain growth momentum, or market share.

MMM's business and customer numbers have more than doubled since Covid and so has HelloFresh. We expect a mild pull-back in customer / subscriber numbers across Q3 and Q4 and then a resumption of normal online growth that MMM and HelloFresh enjoyed pre-pandemic (Both companies posted 41% revenue growth in CY19). We have factored in a 5% reduction in customer numbers in Aust (would have been higher, but mitigated by WA launch), -15% in USA and -20% in Europe across Q3 (already happened) and Q4.

- Cash-flow negative again Q3 is a seasonally soft quarter because of northern hemisphere school holidays and people travelling once more. However we were surprised by the size of MMM's cash flow deficit in the quarter (EUR 7.7m / A\$12m). Unless MMM decides to throttle back the aggressive marketing, a further capital raising will probably be needed in the next couple of years.
- 3. Customer retention rates & churn Customer retention charts published by MMM show an average retention rate after 3 years of just under 20%. HelloFresh says it is now retaining ~30%. MMM operates in the fast-moving consumer goods sector, and has strong local and international competition. MMM has seen a record number of new customers come onto its platform (website) in 1Q21 (85,000 net new customers) but many of these will be "trialists" including people taking advantage of MMM's introductory marketing offers and free or discount voucher offers, who may not stick to become regular long-term weekly customers (subscribers). MMM say that approximately 50% of these trialists churn (leave the system). In 1Q21 MMM had 327,000 active customers, of which 233,000 or 71% were "Active Weekly Subscribers," a new measure released by MMM that shows the number of customers who ordered (or skipped) subscription orders on a weekly basis during the quarter. MMM has multiple strategies to improve retention rates, but high churn does seem to be a feature of the business.
- 4. Competition MMM operates in a competitive sector with competition from other subscription-based meal-kit companies (especially HelloFresh in all MMM's markets), subscription based pre-prepared food companies (e.g. Youfoodz, now owned by HelloFresh, Light & Easy, Weight Watchers in Australia), and broader competition from supermarkets, fast food / quick-service restaurants and take-aways, prepared food delivery services such as Deliveroo, UberEats etc. We note that HelloFresh has recently strengthened its strategic position with the Factor75 Inc acquisition in the USA (December 31) and the Youfoodz acquisition in Australia (completed October), both in the adjacent pre-prepared home-delivered meals segment. HelloFresh is becoming a behemoth. We also observe a number of new entrants increasing their marketing presence, so competition is increasing,



being attracted to the high growth rates on offer in this sector.

- 5. Possible losses / delayed profitability from entering new markets MMM was a fairly early mover in most of its initial European / US and Australian markets in 2014 and 2015. It entered Denmark (country #7) in October 2019 and Sweden (country #8) in January 2020 (fortuitous timing on both just ahead of Covid). We expect further gradual market entries in other European countries over time, which could be serviced from the existing Netherlands facility (or a second northern European facility currently being considered). However entry into new countries might be more expensive and more competitive from here, and could entail significant start-up losses to establish positions in new countries. We note that competitor Hello Fresh also operates in the UK (since 2012), Switzerland and Canada (since 2016), Luxembourg (since 2017), France and New Zealand (since 2018), and Italy (just launched) so Hello Fresh already has a 3 to 9 year start on MMM if MMM were to enter any of those markets.
- 6. Food safety and perishable products Delivery of meal kits to customers is a significant part of MMM's business and perishable products constitute a significant proportion of MMM's meal kits. Errors, disruptions, or inaccurate temperature control along the supply chain including the "last mile" to customers, may lead to spoiled product or food safety concerns or incidences. This could have significant impact on the quality of MMM's kits, the health and well-being of customers, and harm MMM's reputation or financial performance.
- 7. Supply chain disruptions MMM uses a fairly small number of ingredient suppliers including local growers in each country to maximise its buying power (Just 250 suppliers at IPO across 6 countries at that time). Any disputes, disruptions or quality control issues with these suppliers could adversely affect MMM's business model and reputation. We are somewhat astonished that MMM (and rivals) were able to operate so successfully in various countries during Covid despite transport, logistics and staffing disruptions (e.g. MMM's Melbourne fulfilment centre was closed for several weeks in August 2020 due to Covid), delivering an impressive 89% increase in orders and 108% in meals to customers. Being a provider of essential food items obviously helped, but we think MMM management and staff should be commended for this performance.

MMM was impacted by severe storms and flooding in CY20 in all 3 regions and also bushfires in Australia in early 2020. Deliveries simply could not get through, resulting in lost sales, wasted inventory and some higher costs.

8. Communications with customers – MMM depends on email and social media messaging services to communicate with its customers and potential customers. It circulates emails and alerts to inform customers of its offerings and meal choices. In addition, MMM has developed sophisticated business intelligence systems and a comprehensive database of customer behaviour and preferences. If MMM is unable to communicate with its customers (because of operational, legal or other reasons), or if its customers do not engage with these messages, MMM's service, reputation or financial performance could be impacted.



Potential Share Price Catalysts

- 1. Analysts & Fund Manager site visit to Sydney FC (Wetherill Park) on 2 December (rescheduled due to Covid lock-downs).
- 2. **Quarterly reports -** We expect MMM to continue to report generally strong revenue growth and other growth metrics. An improvement in the contribution margin is also expected as MMM achieves more scale, including the benefit of recent price rises and a gradual easing of labour supply issues in the US. We caution investors that quarterly figures for a high-growth company like MMM operating in 8 countries, can be quite volatile, as we have just seen with the Q3 report.
- 3. **MMM becoming profitable at the Group Ebitda level** for a full year (including covering head office / central costs and share-based payments). Currently we do not expect MMM to achieve Ebitda break-even in our 5 year forecasting time frame, although this is possible depending on the revenue growth and cost assumptions used.

We note that consensus estimates for MMM (Refinitiv) have a declining Ebitda loss each year, but still a loss of EUR 1.2m forecast for CY23.

We believe that MMM would be better served if it aimed at a slightly lower growth rate (perhaps 15-20% pa), to enable it to surface a small positive cash flow and small profit, with a more sustainable and affordable marketing spend of <20% of sales. The current strategy leaves no room for error – such as a bad quarter which sees cash flows and debt blow out alarmingly. Management's aim for 26-30-35% annual growth (as implied by the EUR 5bn growth ambition) is too demanding in our view, and unsustainable. Investors have trashed the share price sending management a clear message that MMM is simply aiming to high / trying too hard. And we don't like loss-making companies running up expensive debt (10.25% on the new Runway Growth Capital facility, plus fees). In our opinion, MMM has a great opportunity to be a profitable No.2 global meal kit provider after the HelloFresh juggernaut. MMM requires more conservatism on the board and should aim at a more sustainable/ manageable growth rate. We think investors would be happier with a lower risk approach.

- 4. **Possible entry into new markets -** We note that MM's closet competitor Hello Fresh operates the following markets where MMM does not: France, UK, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Canada, New Zealand and now Italy (& coming soon – Japan). To date, MMM has followed Hello Fresh into various countries a few years later (except Denmark where it looks like MMM launched first).
- 5. Possible horizontal expansion into pre-prepared foods and / or grocery items - which would significantly expand MMM's total addressable market (TAM). HelloFresh entered the pre-prepared meals segment last year with the acquisition of Factor75 for EUR 220m in November 2020, and its takeover bid for Youfoodz Holdings (ASX: YFZ) announced in July has just completed. As HelloFresh is the segment leader, we expect that MMM will be watching those competitor moves closely.
- 6. **Increased institutional ownership –** We note that Perennial has just gone substantial with a 6.15% stake.
- 7. Takeover potential As one of only two subscription-based meal kit companies operating multi-nationally, and still modestly cash-flow negative, we believe there is a chance that MMM could be acquired or privatised. We believe MMM has an excellent cash-generative, high growth business model with a massive TAM (total addressable market) opportunity. It trades at a significant discount to Hello Fresh (0.7x CY21 EV/ Sales Vs HFGG.F 2.4x), and is now even cheaper than before at just A\$250m market cap versus Hello Fresh at EUR 14.7 bn (A\$23 bn). We note that Myfoodbag in New Zealand (a



small market) now has a bigger market cap \$A\$276m) than MMM's (A\$250m) even though its growth prospects are limited by one market.

Appendix 1 – Key Statistics

- 8 countries
- 7 fulfilment centres (US 3, Australia 3, Europe 1)
- >30 recipes per week Marley Spoon; > 20 per week Dinnerly
- 47 shippers worldwide
- 1,000 SKU's (v a typical supermarket 10,000 SKU's).

Appendix 2 – Valuation comparables

| Refinitiv | Company | Market | Net Cash | Price A\$ | | Reve | nue | | | Ebito | a | | | Ebite | da | |
|------------|----------------------------------|---------------|---------------|-----------|-----------------|----------|----------|----------|---------|----------|----------|----------|--------|--------|-------|-------|
| Code | (in Market Cap order) | Сар | (Debt) | | \$m | \$m | \$m | \$m | \$m | \$m | \$m | \$m | \$m | Marg | gin | |
| | | AUD m | AUD m | | (or local curre | ncy) | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | FY0 | FY1e | FY2e | FY3e | FY0 | FY1e | FY2e | FY3e | FY0 | FY1e | FY2e | FY3e |
| MMM.AX | Marley Spoon AG (Sequoia est | 249 | 7 | 0.875 | 254.0 | 316.9 | 336.5 | 407.1 | (0.9) | (40.2) | (27.0) | (22.9) | -0.4% | -12.7% | -8.0% | -5.6% |
| Similar on | line subscription-based meal kit | companies (co | onsensus fore | casts) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MMM.AX | Marley Spoon AG (consensus) | 249 | 7 | 0.875 | 254.0 | 323.9 | 387.2 | 452.1 | (0.9) | (30.3) | (12.1) | (1.2) | -0.4% | -9.4% | -3.1% | -0.3% |
| HFGG.F | Hellofresh SE | 23,011 | 686 | 84.560 | 3,749.9 | 5,766.8 | 6,879.7 | 7,881.1 | 481.1 | 521.4 | 644.0 | 827.6 | 12.8% | 9.0% | 9.4% | 10.5% |
| APRN.K | Blue Apron Holdings Inc | 274 | 15 | 8.450 | 460.6 | 497.7 | 541.2 | 587.8 | (5.0) | (17.4) | 3.5 | 19.0 | -1.1% | -3.5% | 0.6% | 3.2% |
| FOOD.TO | Goodfood Market Corp | 592 | 47 | 7.310 | 285.4 | 391.2 | 445.0 | 508.4 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 8.7 | 14.5 | 1.0% | 0.6% | 2.0% | 2.8% |
| MFB.NZ | My Food Bag Group Ltd | 276 | -28 | 1.180 | 153.3 | 192.1 | 199.0 | 212.5 | 16.3 | 35.7 | 38.4 | 41.2 | 10.6% | 18.6% | 19.3% | 19.4% |
| LMKG.ST | LMK Group AB (publ) | 86 | -21 | 43.000 | 1,217.0 | 1,421.0 | 1,558.0 | 1,735.5 | 145.3 | 124.4 | 144.0 | 172.7 | 11.9% | 8.8% | 9.2% | 9.9% |
| Online pre | e-prepared food & groceries | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DHER.DE | Delivery Hero SE | 41,630 | -295 | 106.950 | 2,471.9 | 5,997.3 | 8,944.8 | 12,427.1 | (714.5) | (752.3) | (521.0) | 35.4 | -28.9% | -12.5% | -5.8% | 0.3% |
| TKWY.AS | Just Eat Takeaway.com NV | 20,187 | -65 | 60.910 | 2,042.0 | 4,719.0 | 6,322.2 | 7,787.5 | 57.0 | (252.5) | (25.8) | 402.8 | 2.8% | -5.4% | -0.4% | 5.2% |
| OCDO.L | Ocado Group PLC | 23,250 | 890 | 1701.500 | 2,331.8 | 2,625.1 | 3,079.8 | 3,566.0 | 81.4 | 67.3 | 145.7 | 239.4 | 3.5% | 2.6% | 4.7% | 6.7% |
| ROO.L | Deliveroo PLC | 5,395 | 1,436 | 277.200 | 1,189.6 | 1,861.6 | 2,385.6 | 2,931.3 | (9.6) | (162.3) | (130.9) | 2.8 | -0.8% | -8.7% | -5.5% | 0.1% |
| Other onli | ine businesses (non-food) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ZO1G.DE | Zooplus AG | 5,376 | 34 | 482.400 | 1,801.5 | 2,101.3 | 2,410.6 | 2,741.2 | 86.4 | 65.7 | 81.4 | 97.0 | 4.8% | 3.1% | 3.4% | 3.5% |
| KGN.AX | Kogan.com Ltd | 966 | -3 | 9.040 | 780.7 | 849.1 | 916.7 | 1,018.9 | 21.8 | 61.0 | 76.5 | 85.2 | 2.8% | 7.2% | 8.3% | 8.4% |
| MYD.AX | Mydeal.Com Au Ltd | 212 | 43 | 0.820 | 38.3 | 50.0 | 64.0 | 81.6 | (3.9) | (5.3) | (2.7) | 0.4 | -10.3% | -10.5% | -4.1% | 0.4% |
| RBL.AX | Redbubble Ltd | 1,043 | 94 | 3.780 | 657.3 | 513.0 | 628.6 | 775.8 | 56.1 | 27.8 | 42.8 | 69.8 | 8.5% | 5.4% | 6.8% | 9.0% |
| TPW.AX | Temple & Webster Group Ltd | 1,324 | 92 | 10.990 | 326.8 | 438.9 | 568.3 | 719.8 | 20.9 | 15.3 | 20.3 | 33.3 | 6.4% | 3.5% | 3.6% | 4.6% |
| Takeaway | food Comps | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| CKF.AX | Collins Foods Ltd | 1,477 | -573 | 12.660 | 1,065.9 | 1,168.0 | 1,283.5 | 1,381.1 | 185.1 | 177.3 | 199.4 | 205.4 | 17.4% | 15.2% | 15.5% | 14.9% |
| DMP.AX | Domino's Pizza Enterprises Ltd | 10,174 | -1094 | 117.550 | 2,199.1 | 2,414.1 | 2,758.5 | 3,065.4 | 401.1 | 461.2 | 543.4 | 624.2 | 18.2% | 19.1% | 19.7% | 20.4% |
| MCD | McDonald's Corp | 254,889 | -44179 | 253.100 | 19,207.8 | 23,265.5 | 24,737.4 | 25,824.6 | 8,675.9 | 12,085.4 | 12,821.6 | 13,566.4 | 45.2% | 51.9% | 51.8% | 52.5% |
| YUM | Yum! Brands Inc | 49,864 | -12991 | 126.220 | 5,652.0 | 6,578.6 | 7,026.4 | 7,561.5 | 1,931.0 | 2,338.9 | 2,513.4 | 2,732.1 | 34.2% | 35.6% | 35.8% | 36.1% |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Source: Sequoia estimates for MMM; Prospectus forecasts for MFB.NZ; Refinitiv consensus estimates for all other stocks; FY1 means forecast year 1 (FY21 in most cases) Source: Deliveroo historical underlying revenue and adjusted Ebitda per Prospectus; Rev forecasts per Sequoia based on low end of GTV guidance

Source: Deliveroo Revenue forecasts per Sequoia based on low end of GTV guidance of +30-40% for CY21e and +20-25% for the medium term. No prospectus forecasts were given.

| Refinitiv Code | Company (in Market Cap order) | | Revenue Growth | | | EV/S | ales | | I | EV/ Ebitda | | | P/E | |
|-------------------|----------------------------------|-------------|-------------------|-----------|--------|-------|-------|-------|--------|------------|---------|--------|--------|-------|
| | (| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | FY1e | FY2e | FY3e | FY0 | FY1e | FY2e | FY3e | FY1e | FY2e | FY3e | FY1e | FY2e | FY3e |
| MMM.AX | Marley Spoon AG (Sequoia est | 24.7% | 6.2% | 21.0% | 0.67x | 0.69x | 0.80x | 0.76x | -5.4x | -10.0x | -13.5x | -3.0x | -3.7x | -3.8x |
| Similar on | line subscription-based meal ki | t companies | (consensus | forecasts |) | | | | | | | | | |
| MMM.AX | Marley Spoon AG (consensus) | 27.5% | 19.5% | 16.8% | 0.95x | 0.56x | 0.47x | 0.40x | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN | NaN |
| HFGG.F | Hellofresh SE | 53.8% | 19.3% | 14.6% | 5.95x | 2.43x | 2.04x | 1.78x | 26.9x | 21.8x | 16.9x | 50.9x | 41.2x | 31.2x |
| APRN.K | Blue Apron Holdings Inc | 8.1% | 8.7% | 8.6% | 0.56x | 0.37x | 0.34x | 0.31x | NaN | 52.2x | 9.6x | NaN | NaN | NaN |
| FOOD.TO | Goodfood Market Corp | 37.1% | 13.7% | 14.3% | 1.91x | 1.16x | 1.02x | 0.89x | 190.6x | 52.3x | 31.4x | NaN | NaN | NaN |
| MFB.NZ | My Food Bag Group Ltd | 25.3% | 3.6% | 6.8% | 1.98x | 1.30x | 1.34x | 1.46x | 8.7x | 8.1x | 7.5x | 13.4x | 12.2x | 11.1x |
| LMKG.ST | LMK Group AB (publ) | 12.1% | 9.6% | 11.4% | 0.09x | 0.04x | 0.05x | 0.31x | 4.3x | 3.7x | 3.1x | 10.3x | 8.4x | 6.7x |
| Online pro | e-prepared food & groceries | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DHER.DE | Delivery Hero SE | 142.6% | 49.1% | 38.9% | 16.96x | 4.66x | 3.13x | 2.25x | NaN | NaN | 789.8x | NaN | NaN | NaN |
| TKWY.AS | Just Eat Takeaway.com NV | 131.1% | 34.0% | 23.2% | 9.92x | 2.89x | 2.15x | 1.75x | NaN | NaN | 33.8x | NaN | NaN | NaN |
| OCDO.L | Ocado Group PLC | 12.6% | 17.3% | 15.8% | 9.59x | 4.83x | 4.12x | 3.56x | 188.5x | 87.1x | 53.0x | NaN | NaN | NaN |
| ROO.L | Deliveroo PLC | 56.5% | 28.1% | 22.9% | 3.33x | 1.87x | 1.46x | 1.19x | NaN | NaN | 1243.3x | NaN | NaN | NaN |
| Other onli | ne businesses (non-food) | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ZO1G.DE | Zooplus AG | 16.6% | 14.7% | 13.7% | 2.97x | 1.61x | 1.40x | 1.23x | 51.4x | 41.5x | 34.8x | 149.0x | 116.5x | 89.1x |
| KGN.AX | Kogan.com Ltd | 8.8% | 8.0% | 11.2% | 1.24x | 1.14x | 1.06x | 0.95x | 15.9x | 12.7x | 11.4x | 30.5x | 23.1x | 19.5x |
| MYD.AX | Mydeal.Com Au Ltd | 30.4% | 28.1% | 27.4% | 4.43x | 3.40x | 2.65x | 2.08x | NaN | NaN | 484.9x | NaN | NaN | NaN |
| RBL.AX | Redbubble Ltd | -22.0% | 22.5% | 23.4% | 1.44x | 1.85x | 1.51x | 1.22x | 34.1x | 22.2x | 13.6x | 94.5x | 45.0x | 23.9x |
| TPW.AX | Temple & Webster Group Ltd | 34.3% | 29.5% | 26.7% | 3.77x | 2.81x | 2.17x | 1.71x | 80.4x | 60.8x | 37.0x | 127.6x | 103.3x | 62.8x |
| Takeaway | food Comps | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| CKF.AX | Collins Foods Ltd | 9.6% | 9.9% | 7.6% | 1.92x | 1.76x | 1.60x | 1.48x | 11.6x | 10.3x | 10.0x | 27.2x | 24.3x | 21.6x |
| DMP.AX | Domino's Pizza Enterprises Ltd | 9.8% | 14.3% | 11.1% | 5.12x | 4.67x | 4.08x | 3.68x | 24.4x | 20.7x | 18.1x | 49.8x | 40.6x | 34.2x |
| MCD | McDonald's Corp | 21.1% | 6.3% | 4.4% | 15.57x | 9.45x | 8.89x | 8.52x | 18.2x | 17.2x | 16.2x | 26.9x | 25.0x | 23.0x |
| YUM | Yum! Brands Inc | 16.4% | 6.8% | 7.6% | 11.12x | 7.18x | 6.72x | 6.25x | 20.2x | 18.8x | 17.3x | 27.7x | 25.5x | 22.8x |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Source: Refinitiv consensus estimates; Sequoia estimates for MMM

| Sequoia Financial Group Equity Research |
|---|
|---|

Marley Spoon AG (MMM) \$ 0.88 € equivalent:

0.56

| Mariey Spoon AG (MMM) | | φ 0.00 | cequi | alent: | 0.50 |
|--|--------|---------------|---------------|---------|---------|
| Profit & Loss | | | | | |
| Year end Dec (€m) | FY19 | FY20 | FY21e | FY22e | FY23e |
| | 129.6 | 254.0 | 316.9 | 336.5 | 407.1 |
| Op. Revenue | | | | | |
| Revenue growth % Cost of Goods Sold | 40.8% | 96.1% | 24.7% | 6.2% | 21.0% |
| | (71.8) | (133.3) | (164.8) | (171.6) | (203.6) |
| Gross Profit | 57.8 | 120.7 | 152.1 | 164.9 | 203.6 |
| Gross Profit Margin | 44.6% | 47.5% | 48.0% | 49.0% | 50.0% |
| Fulfillment costs | (25.5) | (46.6) | (64.7) | (65.2) | (79.7) |
| Contribution Margin | 32.3 | 74.1 | 87.4 | 99.7 | 123.8 |
| Contribution Margin % | 25.0% | 29.2% | 27.6% | 29.6% | 30.4% |
| | | | | | |
| Other Income | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Cash Operating Expenses | (62.1) | (74.7) | (126.6) | (125.7) | (145.7) |
| Share based payments | (0.4) | (0.4) | (1.0) | (1.0) | (1.0) |
| EBITDA | (30.2) | (0.9) | (40.2) | (27.0) | (22.9) |
| Ebitda Margin | -23.3% | -0.4% | -12.7% | -8.0% | -5.6% |
| | | | | | |
| Depreciation & Amort | (4.6) | (6.5) | (9.5) | (10.5) | (11.2) |
| EBIT | -34.8 | (0.0) -7.4 | - 49.7 | -37.5 | -34.1 |
| Ebit Margin | | | | | |
| U U | -26.8% | -2.9% | -15.7% | -11.1% | -8.4% |
| Net Interest Inc (Expense) | (5.6) | (7.4) | (4.0) | (5.5) | (8.0) |
| Share of Assoc NPAT | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Pre-tax profit | (40.4) | (14.8) | (53.7) | (43.0) | (42.1) |
| Income Tax Credit (Expense) | (0.0) | (0.1) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Tax Rate | 0.1% | 0.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Minorities (share of loss) | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Abnormals | 5.5 | -59.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| NPAT (reported) | -34.5 | -86.2 | -53.7 | -43.0 | -42.1 |
| Adjustments (Abnormals) | -5.5 | 71.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| NPAT (normalised) | -40.1 | -14.8 | -53.7 | -43.0 | -42.1 |
| (, | | | | | |
| Balance Sheet | | | | | |
| Cash | 5.4 | 34.4 | 12.5 | -28.7 | -62.9 |
| Receivables | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.4 |
| Inventories & contract assets | 3.7 | | 8.2 | 8.6 | 10.2 |
| | | 6.6 | | | |
| | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
| Total current assets | 12.0 | 44.1 | 24.3 | -16.5 | -48.9 |
| PP&E | 20.1 | 21.0 | 51.0 | 51.0 | 51.0 |
| Investments | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Intangibles | 3.4 | 4.9 | 7.9 | 10.9 | 13.9 |
| Deferred tax assets | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Other | 1.4 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 10.5 | 5.3 |
| Total non-current assets | 24.9 | 29.0 | 63.0 | 72.4 | 70.2 |
| Total Assets | 37.0 | 73.1 | 87.3 | 55.9 | 21.3 |
| | | | | | |
| Payables | -12.9 | -17.5 | -28.7 | -30.5 | -36.9 |
| Interest bearing liabilities - C | -6.0 | -8.2 | -13.2 | -13.2 | -13.2 |
| Provisions | -5.3 | -7.9 | -15.9 | -15.9 | -15.9 |
| Other | -1.4 | -3.4 | -6.0 | -6.0 | -6.0 |
| Total Current Liabilities | -25.6 | -37.0 | -63.8 | -65.6 | -72.0 |
| Interest-bearing liabilities - N | -47.1 | -28.0 | -39.1 | -49.1 | -49.1 |
| Provisions | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | -12.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Total Non-current Liabilities | -47.1 | -28.0 | -51.1 | -49.1 | -49.1 |
| | 47.1 | 20.0 | 51.1 | 45.1 | 43.1 |
| Total Liabilities | 70 7 | 65.0 | 444.0 | 4447 | 404.4 |
| | -72.7 | -65.0 | -114.9 | -114.7 | -121.1 |
| Total Shareholders' Equity | -35.7 | 8.1 | -27.6 | -58.7 | -99.8 |
| la ta sina a | | | | | |
| Interims | | | | | |
| Year end June | | 1H20 | 2H20 | 1H21 | 2H21e |
| Sales | | 116.2 | 137.9 | 158.0 | 158.9 |
| Sales Growth (g) | | 89.2% | 102.2% | 36.0% | 15.2% |
| EBITDA | | -2.0 | 1.5 | -14.8 | -24.4 |
| EBITDA Margin | | -1.7% | 1.1% | -9.4% | -15.4% |
| EBIT | | -5.3 | -2.2 | -19.3 | -30.4 |
| Equity Share of Assocs NPAT | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| NPAT (Reported) | | -67.5 | -18.8 | -21.0 | -32.7 |
| NPAT (Adjusted) | | -8.4 | -6.4 | -21.0 | -32.7 |
| EPS (adjusted)(cents) | | -5.2 | -2.7 | -8.2 | -10.7 |
| EPS Growth | | -65.9% | -77.6% | 58.6% | |
| | | -00.970 | -11.070 | 30.0% | 289.4% |

Source: Sequoia estimates

| Per share & Ratio data | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Year end Dec | FY19 | FY20 | FY21e | FY22e | FY23e |
| CDIs on Issue - Wavge (f/d) | 146.1 | 187.2 | 284.1 | 284.1 | 284.1 |
| CDIs on Issue - at year-end | 158.5 | 256.0 | 284.1 | 284.1 | 284.1 |
| Reported EPS (cents) | (23.7) | (46.1) | (18.91) | (15.13) | (14.82) |
| Growth | -33.7% | 94.8% | - | Large +ve | -2.1% |
| P/E ratio (x) | -2.4x | -1.2x | -3.0x | -3.7x | -3.8x |
| EPS (normalised)(cents) | (27.4) | (7.9) | (18.91) | (15.13) | (14.82) |
| Growth | -22.9% | -71.1% | . , | Large +ve | -2.1% |
| P/E ratio (x) | -2.0x | -7.1x | -3.0x | -3.7x | -3.8x |
| DPS (cents) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Franking | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| OCF per share (cents) | -20.7 | 2.4 | -14.1 | -11.0 | -9.2 |
| Price/OCF (x) | -2.7x | 23.8x | -4.0x | -5.1x | -6.1x |
| Enterprise Value \$m | 215.4 | 171.0 | 218.2 | 270.8 | 309.6 |
| EV/Sales EV/EBITDA | 1.66x -7.1x | 0.67x -182.5x | 0.69x -5.4x | 0.80x -10.0x | 0.76x -13.5x |
| EV/EBIT | -7.1X -6.2X | -162.5x | -3.4x -4.4x | -7.2x | -13.5X -9.1X |
| EV/EDIT | -0.2X | -23.0X | -4.4X | -1.2X | -9.1X |
| Liquidity & Leverage | | | | | |
| Net Cash (Debt) \$m | (47.6) | (1.8) | (39.9) | (91.1) | (125.2) |
| Net Debt / Equity % | n/a | 22% | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| ROA (EBIT / T.Assets) % | -94.0% | -10.2% | -57.0% | -67.0% | -160.1% |
| ROE (NPAT / T.Equity) % | 112.2% | -182.4% | 194.3% | 60.8% | 37.7% |
| Interest Cover (EBIT) | -6.2x | -1.0x | -12.4x | -6.8x | -4.3x |
| Dividend Payout % (of adj EPS) | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Cash Flow | | | | | |
| EBITDA | -30.2 | -0.9 | -40.2 | -27.0 | -22.9 |
| Chge in Working Capital | -1.8 | 1.5 | 9.1 | 1.3 | 4.7 |
| Interest Received (Paid) | -1.0 | -0.3 | -7.6 | -5.5 | -8.0 |
| Income taxes paid | 0.0 | 0.0 | -0.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Other | 2.7 | 4.1 | -1.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Operating cash flows | -30.3 | 4.4 | -40.1 | -31.2 | -26.2 |
| Canoy | | 5.0 | 20.0 | 17.0 | 5.0 |
| Capex Acgns & Investments | -4.4 0.0 | -5.2 0.0 | -20.0 0.0 | -17.0 0.0 | -5.0 0.0 |
| Disposals | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Capitalised IP expenditure | -1.8 | -3.3 | -3.0 | -3.0 | -3.0 |
| Net investing cash flows | -6.3 | -8.6 | -23.0 | -20.0 | -8.0 |
| | | | | | |
| Equity raised (bought back) | 4.0 | 43.7 | 17.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Dividends paid | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Change in Debt | 29.3 | -10.0 | 23.2 | 10.0 | 0.0 |
| Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Financing cash flow Change in Cash | 33.3 -3.2 | 33.7 29.5 | 41.1 -22.0 | 10.0 -41.2 | 0.0 -34.2 |
| | 0.2 | 2010 | 22.0 | | 04.2 |
| Operating Stats & Segmental | FY19 | FY20 | FY21e | FY22e | FY23e |
| Active customers Worldwide ('000s | 182 | 327 | 402 | 442 | 531 |
| Active subscribers Worldwide ('000 | 131 | 233 | 282 | 326 | 376 |
| Revenue by Segment | | | | | |
| USA | 56.1 | 127.2 | 145.6 | 143.1 | 173.1 |
| Australia | 48.8 | 86.0 | 116.4 | 141.2 | 170.8 |
| Europe Operating revenue | 24.6 129.6 | 40.8 254.0 | 54.9 316.9 | 52.2 336.5 | 63.2 407.1 |
| Ebitda by Segment | 123.0 | 204.0 | 010.3 | 000.0 | 407.1 |
| USA | -13.0 | 4.1 | -11.5 | -6.6 | -4.6 |
| Australia | -1.7 | 9.7 | -2.3 | 6.6 | 10.4 |
| Europe | -7.7 | -1.9 | -7.2 | -5.0 | -4.6 |
| Global head office costs | -7.4 | -12.4 | -18.2 | -21.0 | -23.1 |
| Ebitda (ex share-based paymts) | -29.8 | -0.5 | -39.2 | -26.0 | -21.9 |
| Operating Ebitda Margins | | | | | |
| USA | -23.2% | 3.2% | -7.9% | -4.6% | -2.7% |
| Australia | -3.5% | 11.3% | -2.0% | 4.6% | 6.1% |
| Europe | -31.2% | -4.7% | -13.1% | -9.6% | -7.2% |
| Ebitda margin %- Total | -23.0% | -0.2% | -12.4% | -7.7% | -5.4% |

Marley Spoon AG (MMM)



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Recommendation Criteria

Investment View

The Sequoia Wealth Management (SWM) Investment View is based on an absolute 1-year total return equal to capital appreciation plus yield.

| Buy | Accumulate | Hold | Reduce | Sell |
|------|------------|--------|------------|-------|
| >20% | 10% - 20% | 0%-10% | 0% to -10% | >-10% |

A Speculative recommendation is when a company has limited experience from which to derive a fundamental investment view.

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