Last night’s collapse of UK mortgage lender Market Financial Solutions (MFS), and the resulting fear-driven sell-off of some Wall Street financial titans got me thinking…
The past 6-years have seen a period of massive fiscal priming (the Covid & covid-recovery era) followed by an explosion of Private Credit in recent years (likely in response to the lending void left behind by the withdrawal of that massive fiscal largesse). This extended period of relatively easy credit & turbo-charged credit – has led to a massive rise in Private Credit, a loose umbrella term for a whole bunch of financial intermediaries acting like de-facto banks to lend investors’ capital direct to a range of corporate borrowers and entrepreneurial ventures, the capital for which is has been attracted by offering considerably higher returns to investors.
While some PC lenders will have sufficient (or even greater) sophistication than the banks with respect to niche lending areas (such as experts in real estate development lending), there is simply no escaping the fact that the industry is very lightly regulated - with PC lenders’ own risk standards and the quality of borrowers highly opaque and near impossible to ascertain on an industry-wide, macro-level. However if history is any guide, given the explosion in the number of PC operators in recent years - there will inevitably be a number of cowboys and inexperienced operators who have flocked to the latest in-vogue honeypot to make as much hay for themselves as possible while the sun is out, with not enough experience (or in some cases regard) for their clients’ eventual loan outcomes down the track.
Contagion is a strange beast. Like Chaos Theory / The Butterfly Effect – seemingly unrelated events and risk exposures can be far more inter-connected and prone to systemic risk than we would believe, until the dominoes have started falling & a sense of horror sets in as we belatedly realise just how complex and interconnected the 21st century interwoven web of global finance is.
Last year’s collapse of Tricolor Holdings (US auto lender) and First Brands Group (US car-parts supplier) seemed like a bit of an isolated event. However this week’s collapse of MFS in the UK got me wondering anew whether we might just be seeing the early rumblings of a future credit crisis brewing. After all, it has been around 18 years since the last big one (GFC) – and the cycle always seems to be painful memories fade, a new generation of young ambitious finance professionals come up through the ranks, and eventually greed creeps in leading to chasing of incremental returns & business by way of riskier lending & lower credit standards in the hunt for extra returns.
From previous credit crises - it seems very few people see the buried landmines ahead of time clearly, each major credit event through history seems to have a unique and slightly different flavour and initial catalysts. In the GFC it was the huge run-up in low-doc loans & too-clever-by-half financial wizardry of CDOs and NINJA loans, conveniently packaged up as MBS with a parcel of less odorous MBS enough to receive a AAA credit rating, and then flogged off via reputable financial intermediaries to unsuspecting investors and institutions around the world.
To the average Australian investor in late 2006 to early 2007, it was un-imaginable that in 12 months poor lending practices in the US would rapidly lead to global contagion and a near collapse of the world’s financial system. It was the hidden tentacles of global finance and truckloads of packaged up landmines sold around the world that most of us not at the coal face in Wall Street debt securitisation simply couldn’t have known about or imagined the galling extend of. Human greed played a powerful role, motivating not just investment bankers – but even the global credit rating agencies themselves – to become hopelessly compromised – and package up low-quality landmines with gay abandon as long as they were making off like bandits today.
This time around I am sure the seeds of the next credit crisis have already been sewn amongst the highly opaque and massively-expanded light-touch world of private credit. A period of low yields & tighter credit standards in traditional lenders seems to have opened the door for more non-conventional lenders to plug the gap. Investors hunting for additional yield have most likely gone far further up the risk curve than they realise or some PC lenders would have them believe. Once again we find a horde of financial intermediaries (PC lenders) with a huge potential for conflicts of interest (more we lend, more we make) - have sprung up alongside the longer-established PC lenders (with presumably tighter risk controls & in it for the long-game). Incentivised to lend investors capital to make money - all that lies between PC investors capital being loaned to substandard or high-risk enterprises is the financial intermediaries’ acuity, experience, ethics and morals. And when it comes to ethics - humankind is usually scattered across the spectrum.
The one thing seared into my consciousness from the GFC was just how critical “trust” is between counterparties in today’s financial world. Once enough higher-profile collapses occur and liquidity seizes up as funds freeze redemptions to try stem the panic / stabilise their own ship – trust is quickly a casualty – and investors rightly start to question everything. A crisis of confidence can quickly set in, as everyone second-guesses every other financial counterparty’s safety to do business with.
I don’t mean to be alarmist – but these low probability / high consequence rare events can lead to devastating shocks & equities drawdowns – so while near impossible to predict, one can still be alert to potential warning signs &/or fault-lines in the global financial fabric.
The heightened volatility and anxiety in markets of late has had my spidey senses tingling a little – with some pretty devastating routs in SaaS stocks and potential AI-exposed tech stocks, Bitcoin and other market pockets of hot money. While no one of these alone are enough to cause massive concern – these kind of substantial and unexpected crunches in valuations across certain sectors of course led to investors nursing real-life material losses. And given the massive Veil of Private Credit & unlisted investment activity out there now – how many of the recipients of private credit funds have been unknowingly inadvertently exposed to material losses in these.
I guess none of us will know for sometime – but the magnitude and opaqueness of private credit in today’s world scares the hell out of me…