Monday 14th July 2025: A decent day for mining and metals today - but they've been few and far between of late...


Also mining services, gold, silver, nickel, rare earths, uranium, copper and graphite, all mostly up. Energy mostly flat, coal and iron ore mixed, but BHP & RIO both up.
S32 down -5.1% dragging the Aluminium / Alumina sector down, due to South32 flagging an expected impairment due to electrical supply issues in Mozambique at their Mozal Aluminium smelter located near Maputo (Mozal-Aluminium-Update.PDF). The smelter produces high-quality, primary aluminium for domestic and export markets and contributes approximately 3% of Mozambique's national gross domestic product. South32 holds 63.7% of Mozal, the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Limited holds 32.4%, and the Government of the Republic of Mozambique holds 3.9%.
My youngest brother works at S32's Australian Alumina refinery, Worsley Alumina, located near the town of Collie in south western WA. I also used to work there in my younger years, and my other brother did as well. The alumina produced at Worsley Alumina is primarily shipped to South32's aluminium smelters in Southern Africa, specifically Hillside in South Africa and Mozal in Mozambique. A portion of the alumina also goes to the seaborne market, meaning it is sold to other smelters around the world. If S32 ultimately close down or sell Mozal because they can not secure ongoing reliable power supply for the plant, which is one possible outcome from this issue, then this may well adversely impact Worsley, their Australian alumina refinery which supplies alumina to Mozal for smelting into aluminium. On the other hand, aluminium demand is widely expected to increase over future years, and there will likely be alternative buyers for that alumina from Worsley if Mozal is shut down.
The risks of mining in West Africa are well known, however it's clear that there are also risks, albeit different risks, when mining in southern Africa, such as reliable energy infrastructure and supply.
by Daniel Newell, The West Australian (newspaper & website), Mon, 14 July 2025 10:19AM

The Mozal operation in Mozambique Credit: South32
There is a growing risk South32 will be forced to pull the plug on its Mozal aluminium operations in Mozambique early next year as the diversified miner races against the clock to secure a new electricity supply deal.
Years of talks with the southern African nation’s government to power the smelter beyond March 2026 have so far failed to yield a deal for the project, which last financial year turned over more than $800 million.
South32 has a 63.7 per cent stake in Mozal, which produced 87,000 tonnes of aluminium in the March quarter.
The Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa holds 32.4 per cent and the Government of the Republic of Mozambique has a 3.9 per cent interest.
South32 has kept full-year guidance unchanged at 350,000t.
But on Monday it said guidance for FY26 was now under review because of the uncertainty over a new contract and warned it would book an associated impairment against the value of Mozal in this year’s accounts.
--- end of newspaper article excerpt ---
By John Zadeh on May 30, 2025

In May 2025, the Kakula copper mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo experienced a significant geotechnical event that halted operations and sent shockwaves through the mining industry. The incident involved multiple pillar failures within the underground workings, causing widespread ground instability and forcing the complete evacuation of all personnel from the mine.
The failure mechanism was particularly concerning—rock pillars left to support the mine's roof (known as the "hanging wall" in mining terminology) began to fail under pressure. This resulted in what engineers call "pillar bursting," where the rock support structures crack and material "spoils" or flakes off the sides, compromising the entire support system.
Critical infrastructure suffered extensive damage, particularly the mine's essential pumping system located in the main access declines. Without functioning pumps, the mine faces the additional risk of flooding, further complicating recovery efforts.
The Kakula incident represents a classic case of pillar failure in a shallow mining environment. Operating at less than 500 meters deep, the mine's support pillars primarily deal with "dead weight" from the rock above rather than the elastic rock behavior seen in deeper mines.
According to mining engineer Neil Ringdal: "When pillars burst, you get spoiling… These failures suggest systemic design or operational issues. In shallow mines like Kakula, pillars fail plastically or burst under vertical stress, creating a fundamentally different challenge than deep mining operations."
The nature of the flat, tabular orebody at Kakula requires a board-and-pillar mining approach similar to coal mining methods. However, when pillars begin to fail in such an environment, the consequences can quickly cascade throughout the mining area.
When news of the Ivanhoe and Kakula mining crisis first broke, the two joint venture partners appeared to describe the situation using different terminology, creating some confusion about the actual events underground.
Zijin Mining's initial press release mentioned "spoiling and falls of hanging wall," while Ivanhoe Mines' statement referenced "seismicity and pillar bursts." Though using different technical language, both companies were describing the same fundamental problem: the structural integrity of the mine's support system had been compromised.
This communication disconnect highlighted the challenges of crisis management in joint ventures, especially when partners operate across different languages and technical traditions. The market responded with heightened uncertainty, contributing to Ivanhoe's approximately 20% share price drop following the announcement.
The Kakula incident is not merely another operational disruption but represents a technically significant event that challenges fundamental assumptions about mining methods in this geological setting. The technical aspects of this crisis deserve particular attention as they provide crucial insights into both the causes and potential remediation strategies.
Pillar bursting occurs when rock pillars left to support a mine's roof fail under excessive pressure. Unlike gradual deterioration, these failures happen suddenly and can be violent—releasing stored energy and creating localized seismic events.
In Kakula's case, the pillars exhibited classic signs of brittle failure, suggesting they were underdesigned for the actual stress conditions present. When rock pillars fail at shallow depths, they typically crush under vertical pressure rather than experiencing the sidewall spalling common in deeper mines.
The technical significance lies in how these failures manifested in a relatively shallow mining environment. Most catastrophic pillar failures documented in technical literature occur in deep mines (>1,000m), making Kakula's experience particularly noteworthy for mining engineers and geotechnical specialists.
The geotechnical behavior of Kakula's pillars highlights important distinctions between shallow and deep mining environments:
As Neil Ringdal explained: "Shallow mining deals with dead weight, not elastic rock behavior like deep mines. This fundamentally changes how we approach support design and stability monitoring."
The flat, tabular nature of the Kakula orebody requires a board-and-pillar mining approach similar to coal mining, but with the additional challenge of operating in harder rock with different failure characteristics. This combination of factors creates unique technical challenges that may have been underestimated in the original modern mine planning.
Perhaps the most technically significant aspect of the Kakula incident is the cascading nature of the failures. When pillars begin to fail, they create a domino effect that can rapidly spread through a mining area:
This cascade effect explains why the damage at Kakula was so extensive and why recovery will be particularly challenging. Once the cascade begins, it becomes extremely difficult to arrest the progression of failures without completely withdrawing from the affected areas.
The pumping system damage reported by the company provides evidence of how the failures spread beyond the immediate production areas to affect critical infrastructure. When support pillars fail near main access routes, the consequences can jeopardize the entire mining operation.
Understanding the root causes of the Kakula mine crisis requires examining both technical design factors and operational decisions that may have contributed to the pillar failures. Several potential causes emerge from the available information and expert analysis.
Mining engineers familiar with similar operations suggest several possible contributing factors:
Mining engineer Neil Ringdal notes that a combination of factors typically contributes to such events: "In my experience, these failures rarely have a single cause. It's usually a combination of design assumptions not matching reality, operational decisions that deviate from the plan, and geological surprises that weren't fully accounted for."
Interestingly, the potential for pillar bursting was acknowledged in previous technical documentation for the Kakula mine. The 2023 technical report specifically mentioned:
"The possibility of induced localized seismic response associated with strain bursting and/or pillar bursting."
The report also emphasized:
"The importance of tight filling and correct sequencing during cut mining operations to contain seismicity."
Additionally, it recommended:
"The need for bracket pillars along large fault structures to assist in containing seismic activity."
These acknowledgments suggest that the risk of pillar bursting was known but may have been underestimated in practice. The mention of "tight filling" (backfilling) and "correct sequencing" is particularly notable given that delayed backfilling is one potential contributing factor to the failures.
This highlights an important aspect of mining risk management—the gap between identified risks in technical documentation and the operational implementation of mitigation measures. Even when risks are properly identified, operational pressures can sometimes lead to compromises in how these risks are managed in practice.
The operational impact of the Kakula crisis extends far beyond the immediate disruption, affecting production capabilities, recovery timelines, and long-term mine planning. Understanding the severity requires assessing both the current status and the potential paths to recovery.
The Kakula mine has been fully evacuated, with all underground operations suspended indefinitely. This complete halt to production represents a significant disruption to what was previously one of Africa's most productive copper operations.
Critical infrastructure has suffered substantial damage, with the pumping system being particularly affected. Without functioning pumps, groundwater will naturally begin to fill the lower portions of the mine, potentially causing additional damage and complicating recovery efforts.
The company is currently implementing emergency measures to prevent flooding while technical teams assess the full extent of the damage. Alternative pumping solutions are being explored, including the installation of temporary pumping capacity through boreholes from the surface.
Access to large portions of the underground workings remains impossible due to safety concerns, making comprehensive damage assessment challenging. Remote monitoring systems, where still operational, provide limited data on ground movement and water levels.
Based on expert analysis and historical precedents from similar incidents, recovery could require anywhere from 6 to 18 months, depending on the severity of the damage and the selected remediation approach.
Mining engineer Neil Ringdal estimates: "Redevelopment could require 1,000m of new tunnels… Bypassing collapsed zones is time-intensive and could take a year or more to complete."
The recovery timeline will be influenced by several key factors:
Most mining experts consider a phased recovery approach most likely, with initial efforts focused on stabilizing the mine, followed by redevelopment of access routes, and finally a gradual resumption of production with modified mining methods.
The crisis will have both immediate and long-term implications for Kakula's production profile:
The production implications extend beyond the immediate joint venture to the broader copper market, where Kakula had been positioned as a significant source of new supply in the coming years. This disruption could contribute to tighter copper market conditions, particularly if the recovery extends toward the longer end of estimated timeframes.
The financial consequences of the Kakula crisis extend far beyond the immediate operational disruption, affecting investor confidence, resource valuations, and long-term project economics. Understanding these implications requires examining both market reactions and fundamental value impacts.
Ivanhoe Mines' share price dropped approximately 20% following the announcement of the incident, representing billions in market capitalization lost within days. This sharp decline reflects the market's immediate concern about both near-term production losses and potential long-term implications for the mining method and recovery rates.
The market reaction demonstrates a classic pattern of uncertainty pricing, where investors respond to incomplete information by assuming worst-case scenarios. As market analyst Koala noted: "Markets hate uncertainty… Long-term value remains in Kamoa-Kakula's 40-year resource, but investors need clarity on recovery plans before they'll return."
Interestingly, this pattern has historical precedents in mining. Market analyst Mark Turner coined the term "Turner's Law of Mining Press Releases," suggesting that when mining companies release bad news, the reality is often worse than initially portrayed. This skepticism contributes to the market's tendency to react strongly to negative announcements.
A comparison with other mining disruptions suggests the market reaction may be somewhat disproportionate. For example, Glencore's 2018 DOJ probe triggered a $56 billion selloff, yet ultimately settled for less than $2 billion—illustrating how markets often overreact to uncertainty.
The crisis could result in a meaningful reduction in mineable reserves due to several technical factors:
Mining engineers estimate up to a 30% reduction in reserves could occur if pillar sizes need to be significantly increased to ensure stability. This percentage aligns with Neil Ringdal's assessment that: "Conservative redesign could reduce recovery rates by a quarter to a third compared to the original plan."
However, it's important to note that even with reduced recovery rates, the Kamoa-Kakula complex remains one of the world's largest and highest-grade undeveloped copper resources. The fundamental value proposition—exceptional grades in a massive resource—remains intact despite the operational challenges.
The financial impact extends well beyond lost production and includes significant additional costs:
The combined impact on project economics will be substantial, potentially reducing the net present value of the operation by hundreds of millions of dollars. However, given the exceptional grades at Kakula (averaging over 5% copper), the project likely remains economically viable even with higher costs and lower recovery rates.
The Kakula incident exists within a broader context of mining disruptions, particularly in challenging jurisdictions. Comparing this event to other recent disruptions provides valuable perspective on both the severity and potential recovery patterns.
The Ivanhoe and Kakula mining crisis is part of a concerning pattern of unexpected disruptions affecting mining operations across Africa in recent months:
These examples illustrate the diverse range of risks facing mining operations—from security and social challenges to technical failures—and the importance of robust risk management and contingency planning across all aspects of mining.
What distinguishes Kakula from these other disruptions is the fundamental technical nature of the failure, which potentially requires a complete rethinking of the mining method rather than simply resolving an external disruption or replacing damaged equipment.
The situation exemplifies what industry observer Mark Turner has termed "Turner's Law of Mining Press Releases," which suggests that when mining companies release bad news, the reality is often worse than initially portrayed.
This concept, while somewhat cynical, reflects the mining industry's historical tendency to present negative developments in the most favorable light possible while still meeting disclosure requirements. Companies naturally attempt to maintain investor confidence while addressing operational challenges.
--- end of excerpt ---
Source: https://discoveryalert.com.au/news/kakula-mine-2025-incident-pillar-failure/ [30th May 2025]
What's Gone Wrong at Ivanhoe? (with Neil Ringdahl) May 30, 2025 Money of Mine Podcast
One of my cousins also shared his take on the Kakula issues:
https://youtu.be/k3BnjmUsQF8?t=2527
Interesting!

by Jack Farchy and Mark Burton, Mon, March 24, 2025 at 6:45 PM GMT+10:30 [4 min read]
(Bloomberg) — One of the highest-profile copper (HG=F) bulls is back predicting new price records, as Donald Trump’s threat of tariffs drains global stocks and creates what he sees as unprecedented opportunities for trading profit.
Kostas Bintas became one of the best-known metals traders during his years building Trafigura Group’s copper book into the world’s largest, before his departure in late 2023. Now spearheading a push into metals at energy trader Mercuria Energy Group Ltd., he is again calling for copper to surge to record highs, up by as much as a third from current levels.
The huge amounts of metal being drawn into the US will leave the rest of the world — and crucially, top consumer China — perilously short, Bintas said in an interview.
“We think there is something exceptional happening in the copper market,” he said. “Is it unreasonable to expect a copper price of $12,000 or $13,000? I’m struggling to put a number on it because this has never happened before.”

Bintas was one of the first of a growing chorus of traders and investors to predict that copper was about to enter a multiyear bull market in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, and that rising demand for electrification would outpace supply growth. At Mercuria, he’s teamed up with another prolific bull: former Goldman Sachs Group Inc. metals strategist Nick Snowdon, who roughly a year ago was forecasting average prices of $15,000 a ton in 2025.
Still, copper bulls have been disappointed on several occasions, most recently last year when prices surged to a record high above $11,000 a ton, only to falter as Chinese buyers stepped back from the market.
Now the dislocations caused by Trump’s threat of copper tariffs have changed the market dynamic. While the US has yet to impose broad tariffs on copper imports, domestic prices have soared to over $1,500 a ton above the rest of the world, creating a huge incentive for traders to ship every spare ton to the US.
“In terms of the margins per ton, I’ve never seen a better trading opportunity,” Bintas said.
The shift of inventory to the US means the Chinese copper market will be left with insufficient stocks, Bintas said. Chinese buyers — who account for more than half of global demand — will be forced to compete with the US market. At the same time, the large volumes of scrap copper that typically flow out of the US have effectively dried up.

“China has been successful historically in rejecting high prices,” said Bintas. “This is the first time in recent history that another market is taking tons away from the Chinese market. That’s why it’s uncharted territory.”
Mercuria estimates that about 500,000 tons of copper is heading to the US, most of which is already on the way. That compares with normal monthly imports of about 70,000 tons. Traders are shipping metal to opportunistically profit from the large price differential, as well as frontloading already-planned shipments in order to clear customs before any potential tariffs are imposed.
Mercuria itself has 85,000 to 90,000 tons en route to the US. Bloomberg reported previously that some traders have been redirecting shipments from Asian customers to the US.
Bintas isn’t alone in his bullish call. Investment funds have lifted their net bullish positions in LME copper to the highest since last May, according to exchange data. David Lilley, chief executive of hedge fund Drakewood Capital Management Ltd., predicts that the pull of copper to the US will leave Chinese buyers facing “much more aggressive competition for metal.”

Global copper prices have already risen sharply, with benchmark LME prices up 14% so far this year to $10,010 a ton on Monday, and US futures on Comex, inflated by the tariff threats, nearing a record high.
The global market is showing some signs of tightness, but not yet indicating the extreme squeeze that Bintas is predicting. On the Shanghai Futures Exchange, copper has moved into the widest backwardation in more than a year, with nearby contracts trading above later-dated ones in an indication of tight supplies. Copper premiums in China have been rising since the end of February, although they remain at modest levels by historical standards.
Of course, the prediction for a surge higher in copper prices could be undercut if worries that a trade war could cause a global economic slowdown prove accurate.
Mercuria is unconcerned about that risk, predicting that global demand will outstrip supply by 320,000 tons this year, which, together with the draw of stock to the US, could drain a large share of the inventories outside the US.
What’s more, the tariff threat has caused exports of copper scrap from the US to dry up. About a third of global copper production comes from scrap, and the flow of scrap often acts as a market buffer, rising when prices are high and falling when they are low.
“Already through February, US scrap exports have gone to negligible levels,” said Snowdon, who is head of metals research at Mercuria. “You’re seeing an under-appreciated shock on the global copper market through this scrap channel.”
--- ends ---
I hold Evolution Mining (EVN.asx). They mine copper and gold.

That's EVN's 3 Year Chart. They have really accelerated up in the past year.
Another way to play copper is through Sandfire Resources (SFR), which I do not hold:

Sandfire is Australia's only pure-play copper producer with decent scale (size) now that OZ Minerals (was OZL) has been taken over by BHP. Anywhere else you're either buying into much smaller companies (so less commodity exposure) or else you are buying into diversification into other commodities, not just copper.
I have held SFR in the past, their MD/CEO at that time, Karl Simich was a bit prickly, getting pissed off with analysts on company earnings calls and so forth, and I was worried he was hell-bent on empire building and was buying too many overseas projects too often - at that time - so the main concern was he was doing too much at the same time and there were a few things that could go wrong, so I stepped off the ride. Having a look at them again this evening, their SP has certainly been heading north east at a good clip, and Karl apparently stepped down from the top job at Sandfire in October 2022, and their new MD & CEO, Brendan Harris, is not a name I know.
Commsec tells me: Mr Harris has experience as an exploration geologist, equity analyst and senior executive with BHP and South32. He has been a member of South32s executive management team since its demerger from BHP in 2015. Most recently, he has held the role of Chief Human Resources and Commercial Officer at South32, with responsibility for global commodity marketing, procurement and human resources. He has also previously served as BHPs Global Head of Investor Relations and, prior to joining BHP in 2010, held various roles in investment banking including as Executive Director at Macquarie Securities, where he led the Metals & Mining Research team. Good-O! Sounds like he has experience.
Commsec has SFR's current trailing PE ratio as 28.44. ASX says it's 37.96. They're not small - Sandfire's market cap is just over $5 Billion - and they are producing copper from multiple mines across different countries, Western Australia (DeGrussa), Botswana (Motheo), and Spain (MATSA).
Even if they are already expensive, and they do look expensive to me already, they're producers, so if the copper price DOES go nuts Sandfire's share price IS going higher still. Something to ponder.
12-July-2022: Haven't used this forum thread for a while - however, I came across the following today - penned by Henry Jennings of MarcusToday and included in their newsletter today - and thought this might be a good place to put it, with some additional comments (about S32).

The chart includes the share price performance (in 2022 year to date) of Sunrise Energy Metals (SRL), Mincor Resources (MCR), Jervois Global (JRV), Centaurus Metals (CTM), Panoramic Resources (PAN), Nickel Industries (NIC), plus the price movement over the same period of Nickel, Gold, Zinc, Cobalt, Lead, Silver, Copper and Tin.
I would add another base metals company to that list - South32:

They are also down since January 1st. South32 (S32) produce nickel, copper, zinc, and they are also one of the world's major producers of silver at their Cannington mine. Sometimes it's worth looking at the larger and more diversified miners as well as the smaller ones who are less diversified by commodity produced.
As you can see there, when base metal prices are rising, the S32 share price rises as well. It's an easy way to get exposure to these metals if you're bullish on them.