Forum Topics SaaS valuations
mikebrisy
Added 3 years ago

Comparing the Valuations of the ASX SaaS "Royalty" using the "Rule of 40"

With recent results in from the quality SaaS companies valuation ($ALU, $PME, and $WTC reporting; $TNE & $XRO-not reporting), various SM threads over the last week or two have discussed valuations and changes in SP. In this straw I present some comparative analysis. It is an illustration of how I try to use different lenses to "triangulate" my own valuations. 

Generally, I focus my valuation efforts in trying to understand what the future may look like. Like many long-term investors, I believe my edge over the market lies in my long term horizon and unwillingness to be swayed by short-term noise. To do this, I invest a lot of effort in trying to understand how the value of a company changes under different scenarios for the future, including thinking about what is happening in the markets in which it competes and what competitors might do. So the analysis is the post is a departure from that.

However, I also find it helpful to "triangulate" my valuations by looking at various valuation multiples and comparing firms that might be loosely considered as “peers” – whether because they are competing in the same market or because they share other qualities.

For SaaS companies, a long-standing challenge has been to understand their quality and valuation. The challenge arises because many are reinvesting a lot of their profits to scale as they compete for share in large global addressable markets. Just as many have emerged relatively rapidly over the last decade so, I think it is fair to say, it is hard to imagine what their competitive landscapes will look like in another 10 years.

 

Rule of 40 and Value

One of my favourite ratios, is to compare a valuation multiple with what is referred to as the “Rule of 40”.

The “Rule of 40” says that the quality of a growing SaaS firm can be considered according to the extent to which the sum of its % EBITDA Margin + % Revenue Growth exceeds 40. i.e.:

 % Score = EBITDA / Revenue x 100%.  +  % Revenue Growth > 40%, 50%,… etc is good

 Both Aram at $ALU and Richard at $WTC last week referred to this measure in their presentations. It has been used a lot by US analysts in trying to value fast-growing SaaS firms which do not yet generate a meaningful NPAT, which makes the P/E useless.

As a quality measure, the metric has some intuitive merit. A company with a lower EBITDA margin, but a higher revenue growth rate should be expected to grow its cashflows faster (assuming positive operating leverage!), whereas a company with a higher EBITDA margin compensates for a lower revenue growth rate with more of the revenue growth falling to the bottom line. Ideally, you want both metrics to be strong!

I plot this metric against a valuation multiple. The valuation multiple I prefer is EV / EBITDA.

I choose Enterprise Value because this removes the excess cash held on the balance sheet and it is also independent of the capital structure, so it focuses on the operating business.

There are lots of problems with EBITDA, but for companies early on their growth journey, and in particular for capital-light SaaS firms, EBITDA is a good proxy for operating cash flow – the engine of value generation.


The "Peer Group"

The Peer Group I have chosen for today’s analysis are ASX SaaS companies considered leaders in their sector, with all going after large regional or global addressable markets.

·      $ALU

·      $PME

·      $TNE

·      $WTC

·      $XRO

Given discussion here in other straws recently about $XRO (Disc: I have sold out recently), I’ve also thrown in $INTU.

 

The Analysis

On the graph below I have plotted two datapoints for each stock:

Blue: is based on the FY23 results. In the case of companies on different reporting cycles ($TNE and $XRO) I have used FY22, being the latest results. The reference share price used in the EV is the average SP on the date of reporting of results.

Orange: is based on the current forecast period so, FY24 (or FY23 for those yet to report). In this case the SP is the SP at close of 25 August.

In both cases, I have plotted the trend lines through each population.

It follows to expect an upward sloping relationship because the higher the “Rule of 40 score”, the higher the expected valuation multiple.

Because the datasets are limited (n=6), if there is a fundamental relationship between % EV/EBITDA vs “% Rule of 40 Score”, we can’t argue that the trend line is a good indicator. However, I have highlighted a shaded blue band which takes both trend lines into consideration, and proposed a potential “band” in which a correlation might lie.

My next leap of logic is to say that any datapoints lying above the blue band indicate stocks that, given their current margins and growth rate, may be under-valued. And stocks lying below the blue band, by the same logic, are stock that may be over-valued.

 5befc2566b0368d6c1ad9c010e73bdaf697166.png


The Findings

$WTC:

In the run-up to the FY23 result, $WTC was potentially getting over-valued. (Note: this aligns with my own analysis based on my DCF going into the result!) Given the forecast FY24 EBITDA and the large share price correction, the graphs indicates that the value of $WTC has fallen back within the broad peer group trend. Indeed, the SP close of $71.65 on Friday puts it well below my updated estimate of expected value of $79. (Having sold a portion of my holding recently at $88, I have restored my full portfolio holding at what I consider is once again an attractive price,... independently of this analysis I must emphasise.)  

 

$TNE and $ALU:

Forecasts for both $TNE and $ALU keep both stocks broadly in trend zone – again this aligns with my current valuations of each. $ALU’s response to the recent result does not look over-done. And while $TNE is getting a little toppy again, I don't think it is anywhere near full value.

 

$XRO and $INTU

I’ve plotted both $XRO and its New York-listed competitor $INTU.

In the case of $INTU, despite its strong result on Friday morning and positive recent SP response, it remains squarely within the trend “band”.

$XRO is consistently located well below the blue band, indicating that it may be potentially over-valued based on the current forecast.

So, what would it take to bring $XRO back within the overall trend zone? This would require combined (TDA margin + %Revenue growth) outcomes for FY24 to be c.10-20% better in aggregate than current forecasts at the current shareprice. Alternatively, at the current forecast revenue and EBITDA, for SP to fall back to around $70. Or, some combination of the two.

This analysis aligns with my own risk-reward assessment in DCF modelling of $XRO. For me, there is a question-mark over expected subscriber growth rates in the increasingly competitive international markets of UK, Canada, and USA – where $INTU (among others) is focused. Based on Friday’s result, $INTU is getting good traction internationally. If there are going to be more headwinds on subscriber growth, then $XRO has to do the heavy-lifting on pricing and cost control. The market is expecting both and, so the question mark for me is whether these can deliver the outperformance that is required to justify the valuation.

Of course, an alternative thesis is that the market potential in international cloud accounting is so great that the competitive headwind isn't blowing yet. Of course, that cannot be said for ANZ whether total penetration is high, and if it is true in the USA - then neither the results of $XRO or $INTU in that market support that.

I recognise that I may be forcing the narrative to fit my perceptions, but I only did this analysis this weekend for the first time and I am interested how well the insights align with my own DCF-scenarios modelling – largely, an independent method.

 

$PME

I want to finish with a brief discussion on $PME. $PME – as we all know – is clearly an outlier given its outstanding quality. The graphs shows it to be in a league of its own. If the correlation has any validity, then it indicates that $PME’s valuation may be reasonable. While there might not be the margin of safety to call it a “buy” now, a correction of 10-15% probably moves it far enough outside the trend zone to be of interest. These kinds of swings seem to happen every year.

Of course, we don’t know whether the “true” relationship indicated in this analysis is linear. For example, it could be upward sloping or downward sloping, and with $PME at one extreme of the dataset, even more care should be taken drawing a valuation relationship from the analysis.

In any event, this picture says that $PME's quality justifies its value.


Conclusions

The “Rule of 40” score vs. valuation multiples provides an interesting way to compare the great ASX SaaS firms.

It would, of course, be possible to model a theoretical “fair value” curve on this graph. I haven’t turned my hand to that yet. But maybe that is for the future.

It would be tempting to conclude from this analysis that $XRO is over-valued. But care should be taken on this front. However, recent years have indicated there is now a limit to the subscriber growth it can achieve y-o-y, so ongoing expense control is going to be important, as is pricing. Equally, $XRO has not been able to show that it can create value from acquisitions, whereas $ALU, $INTU and $WTC have all demonstrated success in doing this.

I will update this analysis from time to time, and may augment it by adding some of the quality international SaaS firms to get a better handle on the trend band.

Finally, I am not presenting this as some magic bullet on valuation. Far from it - the analysis is highly limited. The only forward-looking data in the analysis beyond the short-term next Revenue and EBITDA forecasts is implied in the EV - the market's view. So, I would never base a buy, hold or sell decision based on this analysis. To do so would be to just be following the market – which is not how I invest. Nonetheless, it offers food for thought and I am interested in what fellow StrawPeople think.

Disc: I hold $TNE, $ALU and $WTC in my RL ASX portfolio. (I would like to own $PME, and one day maybe will.)

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thunderhead
Added 3 years ago

Great analysis @mikebrisy . One dimension that is hard to capture is the durability or sustainability of the metrics in question. You would go for a company that scores lower on the Rule of 40 if its revenue growth and/or margin growth can be sustained for far longer than its peer/comparison group - but those things are somewhat fuzzy and harder to assess, especially over longer timeframes.

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mikebrisy
Added 3 years ago

@thunderhead good point. That's why in defining the peer group, I assessed that all candidates have the potential to grow strongly for at least a decade and, maybe, even two.

For example, in my deep dive earlier this year I concluded that even if $WTC grows strongly for another two decades it will likely only account for c. 5% of the global logistics software market. In the case of $PME, if it sustains 25% growth annual growth for 10 years, its probably hitting 15-25% of global medical imaging software market, which might be harder to pull off, but is conceivable if it has the leading product.

However, your point is well made. To value these businesses that are growing strongly into large global markets you have to form a point of view about their long term trajectories and competitive success. I always ground such a view by asking "what have they achieved over the last three years" (or 5 years, becuase the whole pandemic has really messed around with the ability of a lot of firms executive - up and down.)

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RobW
Added 5 years ago

Hi Chagsy

The Rule of 40 is quite prevalent in the USA. I did an exercise several months back where  i looked at a basket of SAAS Companies ranging from the tech darlings on the ASX to some of the newer prospects (again ASX). So those that had cracked profitability after years of investment in R&D in pursuit of growth as well as those chasing growth at considerable cost (investment). Used an even weighting between Revenue Growth and EBITDA growth (even if the growth was positive off a negative base). So a natural dilution of heady Revenue  growth numbers which in most cases, cannot be sustained. Best if measured over past 3 to 5 years. Done graphically, actually depicts the Company's journey.

Once ranked, seemed to align quite well on what I perceived ( in other words subjective) to be a fair investment grading for each Company on a relative basis. Maybe I can re-create at the end of the reporting season. Just need to decide on the basket. 

Rokewa

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GnomeofZurich
Added 5 years ago

I've recently been searching for a straightforward method of screening SaaS companies for further research and came across the Rule of 40.  This rule states that a healthy SaaS company's recurring revenue growth (ARR%) plus its profit margin (EBITDA%) should be equal to or greater than 40%

The Rule of 40 can be applied to both startups and late-stage software companies.  Startups will typically have low or negative profit margins but a high growth rate as it seeks to maximise customer acquisition and establish dominance in its niche.  More mature SaaS companies are the opposite; generally good profit margins but lower growth rates.  Whatever the combination, the magic number is 40%. 

Using the Rule of 40, I've screened a number of software stocks on the ASX with a market cap less than $1B using the previous 12 months (LTM) financials.  Because many of these companies are still either early stage or just a bit past that, I'm very hawkish on the cash burn and its translation into revenue and therefore I've substituted EBITDA for FCF Margin.  Here's the top 5 picks, with a few familiar faces to Strawman members (listed as Company, Rule of 40 percentage):

  1. Netlinkz (NET), 1,096%          
  2. Envirosuite (EVS), 564%
  3. Tesserent (TNT), 455%
  4. archTIS (AR9), 218%
  5. Pointerra (3DP), 134%

Based on those numbers, there's certainly plenty of incentive to build a thesis for investment.

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Chagsy
Added 5 years ago

Hi GoZ and strawpeople

Great work on screening SaaS companies.

I am currently working my way through a similar process for many other SaaS companies I follow. Even with all this time in quarantine (9/7 to go!) it is taking longer than I thought, and there is no way I will be able to keep it after normal life returns to normal. It would be great if like-minded and interested persons could pool resources; a strawman premium SaaS special interest working party! Well, I guess this already exists in the valuation and straws for the companies!

As per my post on IHR bull case post, here's what I am attempting to do, with comments of the merits/difficulties of each:

- Rule of 40. Defined as the growth rate +/- cash burn or revenue. A modification I also came across for earlier stage companies is the weighted version (revenue growth rate x 1.33 + EBITDA margin x 0.67). I read somewhere that the rule of 40 probably applies to more established, later stage SaaS companies. My limited experience is that this tends to over value growth. Growth tends to be much higher in the early stages: it is much easier to go from one to two customers (100% increase in ARR) than to go from 100 - 200. The modified version seems to increase this bias on growth, rather than decrease it.

- the 5 variables valuation method: various criteria explored in more depth later

EV/EBITDA market sentiment as per initial post = somewhere between 12 - 19

x ARR

x Growth rate using trailing 12 month (TTM) revenue

x Net renewal rate (NRR)

x Gross margin (GM)

= valuation (Market Cap)

then divide by number of shares on issue to get share price valuation.

So far, this has the advantage of being relatively easy to calculate. 

Disadvantages are that not all companies report on the metrics that are required to perform it. I have contacted a number of companies to get this info and have ebeen met with variable responses (silence, full co-operation or at least helpful information, "we dont report on that metric"). It is possible to make informed guesses on some of them, without skewing the result to crazily. I am hopeful this is going to be more accurate for early stage SaaS companies than a DCF where a change in the terminal velocity of a few percent can cause the valuation to halve or double. But nothing is perfect! 

- EV/EBITDA of x10 - x18 might be about right (market currently applying a multiple of between x13 to x 19, depending on where you look)  

- EV/S x 6 - x 8 used to be about right but have blown out to double that in last 12 months:  its relatively simple to get this from yahoo finance or similar (I do not subscribe to a financial data provider). But I find that a lot of them are erroneous so tend to calculate them myself. I use TTM revenue.

Bessemer efficiency coefficient: defined as growth% + %Free cash flow margin (FCF/revenues). Aim is to be >40. Devised by one of the best VC companies, so surely its got be good, right? Not sure if this is just making a hard way of calculating the above ! Am going to try it out with this reporting season.

- Churn, Net retention rate: am sure anyone who has done any background reading on SaaS companies understands the impact of churn. It's basically the same as the law of compound interest (insert Einstein quote here). The difference of a few percent makes a huge difference over the years. Churn can be reported in customers or dollars. Clearly the customers can be large or small so dollars is more helpful. The inverse of churn is the retention rate. So perhaps the best metric is the dollar net retention rate. If a customer increases the number of modules a SaaS company offers, then the NRR with be over 100%. This is obviously fantastic. If this is reported it is great, can sometimes get this

-ARPU and % increase in ARPU - Average revenue per user. Kind of measures the same as above. Want to see the ARPU increase over time which shows the "land and expand" is working.

- Gross Margin % -  is a major determinant of the unit economics or efficiency of the company. It tends to improve over time, early startup SaaS companies can often GM of 30-40 %. Damstra runs at 74%, Dropsuite 67%, Xero's has slowly increased over the years to 86%, whilst Volpara reports an astounding 91% (but has other problems).

- LTV:CAC = lifetime value of customer to customer acquisition cost, LTV/CAC Ratio = [(Revenue Per Customer – Direct Expenses Per Customer) / (1 – Customer Retention Rate)] / (No. of Customers Acquired / Direct Marketing Spending) Its nice when they report this, I dont fancy doing that calculation. Often can be found in broker's reports though. Another main determinant of unit economics. Measures how efficienctly they are adding new business. should be > 3.

- months to recover CAC - how long does it take to recover the cost of the acquiring a new customer? Should be under 12 months. Not often reported. Can be inferred from ARPU, number of customers added per period and cash burn (particularly if broken down and sales/marketing spend itemised)

- Cash burn, amount of debt and cash on hand - whens the next cap raise? They all end up running out of money at some point in the early days. Usually after a good report and SP run up there will be a cap raise. I try and get an indication of how soon and likely it will be, from how quickly they are running out of money. If they are nearly empty, the terms of the raise tend to be worse, with a larger discount to market price, which worsens dilution. 

 

Well that's about it, on the financial data and metrics side of thing. Clearly, this doesnt include the qualitative side of things. That's the fun easy stuff that as an essentially lazy investor I like to think about most. There are lots of posts on that stuff elsewhere so will not add much to this, other than to mention that some estimation of the total addressable market (TAM) is is another good number to have in your head or spreadsheet.

If anyone has anything else that they like to look at, I would be most grateful if you could contribute to this forum.

Best of luck "premia"

and hoping you are staying safe and sane

C

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Chagsy
Added 5 years ago

Seems my EV/ebitda multiple for valuing early SaaS and tech firms was a bit outdated. I was using 12.6x whereas this year it is more like 19:

                                Avg EV/EBITDA

All                                 19.1x

US only                        29.3x

$10m - $50m               19.0x

$50m - $100m             18.8x

$100m - $200m           19.9x

 

I will update my own records and valuations for my portfolio over the coming days and also edit the IHR valuation to reflect what the market is offering, using the described method.

This does not mean that these companied are worth paying a multiple of 19x, but that is what the market is pricing them at.

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