Forum Topics DDH DDH Why the big sell off?

Pinned straw:

Last edited 10 months ago

Within minites of the DDH1 board announcing the Perenti acquisition agreement (26 June) the DDH1 share price reached a high of 92 cps before beginning to plummet. Four days later (30th June) the share price closed at 82.5 cps, which was even lower than the share price the day before the acquisition announcement.

The share price seemed to defy the views of both the DDH1 and Petenti Boards who suggested the combined business would create value for both DDH and PRN shareholders. DDH1 shares were said to have an implied value of $1.01 (a premium of 17.4%) based on the 5-day VWAP. The valuation was based on a cash payment of 12.38 cps plus 0.7111 shares in PRN for each DDH share held. So the DDH share price is now closely linked to the PRN share price due to the script heavy acquisition.

I did not expect the share price of both businesses to plummet and I have been trying to work out why. I think the reason for the sell down could be due to private equity firm Oaktree selling down borrowed shares in Perenti. While I’m not certain of this, it does look very suspicious. I guess the reason will become apparent.

I’ve learnt an important lesson this year. Be wary of businesses that have been floated by private equity and where they continue to retain a large stake in the business after listing. Private equity is there for a good time, not a long time! They are always waiting for an opportunity to exit and maximise their profits. Once they have made their money they are ready to move on to their next plaything, even though the business might be well undervalued. They have the capacity to create share price momentum in the wrong direction because they are not buyers, they are sellers! Something I have experience with both Best & Less and DDH1 this year.

Oaktree have been chomping at the bit to exit DDH1 since it listed (see AFR article below). I suspect Oaktree have been very supportive of the deal with Perenti as they see it as an opportunity to exit DDH1 and maximise profits in a year when earnings for DDH1 have been impacted by the wet weather and a slow start to 2H FY2023.

Their are a few things that point to Oaktree’s early exit on the DDH1 acquisition agreement:

  1. Perenti’s call option for 80,178,575 shares in DDH1 currently owned by Oaktree
  2. JPMorgan Chase borrowed 27.5 million shares in PRN on 26 June.

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I suspect the 27.5 million PRN shares were borrowed to sell when the PRN share was close to a 12 month high of $1.29 per share. I don’t know if these shares were borrowed for Oaktree, but it looks suspicious given the heavy sell down (19 million) of shares over the four days following the announcement (ASX 5 day trading volume chart below).

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The big sell down is also at odds with recent director buying (Timothy Longstaff bought 43,500 shares on-market for $50, 014).

Thankfully the selling has tapered off today and the PRN share price is up 6% at time of writing.

Disc: Held IRL and SM.

Oaktree’s white flag indicative of a life on the ASX

(AFR, 26 June 2023)

Oaktree Capital’s DDH1 joins the growing list of PE playthings to be snapped off the ASX. It shows the bourse is often just a temporary home.

It’s one thing putting a private equity investment together, it’s another finding an exit. And it’s the latter that’s the harder part, particularly with IPO markets either closed or suspicious of new listings.

Oaktree Capital did well investing in West Australian driller DDH1, taking a 50 per cent stake in June 2017 soon after the American firm formally set up in Australia by opening an office in Sydney.

The exit’s been a longer journey but can be consigned to Australian deals history as part IPO/part buyout, an increasingly common exit route for private equity sellers. The ASX boards are often just a temporary home for private equity-backed businesses such as DDH1.

Oaktree’s involvement in DDH1 stretches back six years. DDH1 was the leading provider of directional diamond core drilling services – used to extract core rock samples in gold and base metals – and went looking for a deep-pocketed backer to help it expand into other drilling disciplines.

Oaktree took the bait and invested for a half share in June 2017. It backed the “platform” strategy and DDH1 added Strike Drilling in June 2018 and Ranger Drilling in April 2019. Strike was an air core and reverse circulation driller used by exploration companies mostly in WA, while Ranger was a reverse circulation driller serving the Pilbara iron ore industry. With more rigs and more customers, the combined group was bigger and potentially more valuable than the three businesses operating alone.

By December 2020, DDH1 had 96 drill rigs and made most of its money drilling at producing mines or helping with brownfield expansion in WA. Servicing the gold sector accounted for half of its revenue in 2020.

The exit was planned at about the same time, when DDH1 set course for an IPO. It met with fund managers and eventually raised $150 million to list with a $367.5 million enterprise value in March 2021. The deal didn’t fly out the door, but had a big cast of stockbrokers to drum up buyers.

The IPO was a partial exit for Oaktree. The pre-float investors, which included Oaktree, took a combined $109 million off the table and retained a combined 60 per cent stake. About one-third of that (22 per cent of the company) was in Oaktree’s hands, locked up under voluntary escrow.

But listed life proved to be a bit of a slog. DDH1’s revenue and earnings grew strongly, but its share price did not. The stock listed at $1.10 a share, traded down straight away and has spent most of its time below the $1.10 mark in the two years and three months since.

DDH1 was either too small and too illiquid for fund managers (it is not in the S&P/ASX 300), left behind by the market’s flight to bigger and more liquid stocks, or not diverse enough in its revenue base, depending on who you ask. Investors did not reward it for beating its prospectus forecasts, or its acquisition of Swick Mining Services in early 2022.

DDH1 could also not escape the fact that drilling is a bit of a punt for Australian small-cap fund managers, with fundies trading in and out of the likes of Ausdrill (now Perenti) and Boart Longyear for years as a means to play the mining cycle. They see them as boom and bust stocks that you want to own in the boom times.

The other problem was Oaktree’s retained stake, with institutions a bit put off by the potential for a chunky selldown. That’s life on the ASX boards. Oaktree tried to address those concerns last year, while sell-side analysts continually pointed to DDH1’s big discount to its closest listed peer, Canada’s Major Drilling Group.

While the discount is still big – Major Drilling last traded at 5.2 times forecast EBITDA and 12.4 times earnings per share versus DDH1 at 2.7 times EBITDA and 6.3 times earnings per share – Oaktree and DDH1’s board and founder shareholders have called time on life as a separately listed company. It was the best of a bunch of potential deals studied, DDH1 chief executive Sy van Dyk said on Monday, and a way to fix the aforementioned problems.

Oaktree offered options over its 19.99 per cent stake to Perenti as a form of deal protection, proving it’s keen to see the transaction take place.

The scrip-heavy deal valued MA Moelis-advised DDH1 at a 17.4 per cent premium to the five-day volume weighted average price. Oaktree is expected to own 5.7 per cent of the combined group, while the wider DDH1 shareholder base will own 29 per cent stake of Perenti.

UBS-advised Perenti and DDH1 fronted shareholders and analysts on a call on Monday morning. Their pitch was about synergies and creating the biggest ASX-listed mining services play by market capitalisation and a company that could potentially be included in the all-important S&P/ASX 200. Both companies’ CEOs said the early reaction was positive.

The combined market capitalisation is $1.3 billion, which is astonishingly small for the title of Australia’s biggest listed mining services play, given the size of the mining sector and the miners’ appetite for drillers, mining contractors and the like. NRW Holdings is the No. 1 listed mining services group today with a $1.1 billion market capitalisation.

As for Oaktree, it will no longer have a seat on the mining services group’s board. It is not technically gone, but is clearly on the outer. That Oaktree overhang will become Perenti’s problem.

The situation is just another in a growing list of former PE-backed IPOs sold to a trade or financial buyer within only a few years of listing. Others include Healthscope, Spotless Group, MYOB, Asaleo Care, Cover-More, Pepper, Veda, Virtus Health, Scottish Pacific, APN Outdoor and Vitaco. Others in the pipeline include Silk Laser Clinics and Estia Health, both under offer from potential acquirers.

Each has their own reasons, but at the end of the day it’s all about value.

That list says IPOs may help create exits or partial exits for private equity owners, but the floats themselves do not always set the company up for its long-term future. Often the ASX boards are just a temporary home until stars align for a strategic buyer or a new cashed-up private equity player to try to make its own pot of money.

ENDS.

BkrDzn
10 months ago

@Rick It is typical for a bidder using script to see its SP decline post deal. However, another lesson you'll learn is M&A arb trades.

There are funds out there that just invest in M&A arbitrage, which aims to lock in the spread of a M&A deal. In the case of this deal, there was an initial 17.4% spread to capture which reflects the premium of the bid.

The mechanics of an M&A arb like this, you borrow and short PRN (the bidder using script) whilst simultaneously going long DDH (the target). The price you buy and short at locks in the spread/return on the deal. Should the deal close, the DDH stock the fund is long converts into PRN shares which are then used to close out the short position in PRN, thus realising the spread/return. From deal announcement, M&A arb traders will keep shorting PRN (bidder) and buying DDH (target) until the spread collapses to a level that reflects time value of money and the residual risk associated with potential deal break. In this specific deal, the initial spread has been bid down to ~3% and with the estimated completion of the deal being October (say ~3.5mths), this represents an annualised ~10% return for M&A arbs.

I note DDH has large volumes in the same profile since the bid itself. Occam's razor; the borrow and volume in PRN is not "suspicious" but a most likely a function of a new type of investor coming into the register of both stocks post deal.

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Rick
10 months ago

That makes sense @BkrDzn. While I might have suspected the wrong reason for the shorting, I did notice the arbitrage and added DDH over the days following the announcement. I started to get worried when there seemed to be no end of the shorting late last week. Thank you for explaining @BkrDzn. Another lesson learnt! :)

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Solvetheriddle
10 months ago

@BkrDzn very good summary and i suspect precisely right in this case. rests on the deal being a sure thing for these guys.

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edgescape
10 months ago

Thought this was an interesting scenario so I thought I'd add to this with some back of envelope calcs

As @BkrDzn mentioned, there definitely was a bit of arb present.

Apologies for being cryptic in my calcs, will explain further if required. The debt was taken from Capital IQ. May be wrong though as I see DDH owning 30% of the merged co.

Ed1: Just noticed I did not use the VWAP but the price before the announcement 1.27.

Ed2: Corrected version gives now shows DDH holders own 29.47% of mergeco.

Ed3: Redone with the explanation and corrected formula mistake.

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Rick
10 months ago

I think I follow @edgescape, but I would really appreciate you explanation to go with the calcs.

thanks, Rick

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edgescape
10 months ago

The idea is to get the assets, debt and equity of both firms and try to convert using the exchange ratio of 0.71 prn shares and 0.12 cash.

The 0.71 prn for one ddh gets added to the current prn shares.

The cash component gets subtracted from the total assets. Synergies get added to assets.

For debt I grabbed the EV and minus the equity.

They made it easy by giving the ddh ownership for the mergeco.

Will try to explain more detail when I try to do the Develop takeover of ESS once I have time. That one is more complicated since i haven't done one with a capital raising and need to do some research

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Rick
10 months ago

Thanks @edgescape thats a help, but I think I’m up for the Arb101 course! :)

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edgescape
10 months ago

No worries. Here's a basic link I found

https://analystprep.com/study-notes/cfa-level-2/corporate-finance-cfa-level-2/bid-evaluation/

There are also some exercises here but it does not use the exchange ratio in the ann, rather it gives percentages.

https://www.fightfinance.com/?t=takeover

I also had to correct the calculation. I accidentally did Asset + Debt for Equity when it should be Asset-Debt



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