Forum Topics Gold as an investment
TommyCruise
Added 4 weeks ago

New to strawman, so I am keen to sharing some comparative analysis for some of gold miners in my portfolio and on my watchlist. I have completed some research into explorers, but I don’t include it here as it can become dated extremely quickly.

The information in the table below is aggregated from analysis completed over the last 6-12 months and focus is on producers (or upcoming producers).  The primary aim of the analysis was to assist in idea generation, with further deep diving before making decisions to reposition or reduce current holdings. I work in the industry, so I apply my own filters and nuances before making an investment (it's not just the numbers). However, I would love to hear other perspectives or thoughts on the information shared and I must admit I don’t know all of the companies well.  

Finally, I have used AI to pull the information together into a single table, as I have looked at different metrics at different times in multiple spreadsheets. I have also used it to update recent information such as share prices and market caps in the process. I have critically reviewed the output, with specific checks for the companies of most interest and it is using a paid subscription which has been very at aggregating the information. All this to say let me know if you spot something that doesn't look right.

Output:

The table comprises of (in my preferred order of value):

1.      Resource and reserves and Grade

2.      Mining Method & Milling Head Grade

4.      Simple DCFs price for each company (no residual value)- as a proxy for AISC & production profile

5.      Average 12-month price target (added as a sanity check)


Process explanation:

The reserves and resource information is the oldest, however, I have updated this from time to time. I put this together on a “roughly right” basis, and you can find this information in a lot of company presentations. The table is my personal preference.  I recently noted changes in Ora Banda numbers and there may be acquisitions that have not flowed through into the reserves (e.g. I am yet to confirm the if the Spartan acquisition is in the RMS reserves). There are others here doing a lot of drilling or work which could see additional material move into reserves. Therefore, a higher EV/reserves may indicate the market is pricing in reserves growth.

The mining method and milling head grade helps understand the key drivers for the business, potential risk and what I look at next. A couple of these are single asset head grades which are not that helpful for multi-asset companies. I find this useful for the smaller mines or those operating in a mill constrained or mining constrained environment. A mill constrained operation is expected to have higher grade feed whereby operations with milling capacity can still generate positive cashflow feeding lower grade stockpiles. There is a distinction with underground and open pit and the associated mining costs (more expensive for underground).  

I run a basic 5-and 10-year DCF for each company using forward production guidance and AISC. I track these in their own workbooks for specific companies and have pulled together this number as a proxy for production profile, AISC and capex expenditure. I don’t use the final number as a company valuation or a price target; however, it is critical to note I have used the same gold price profile across all the companies (excluding those that hedge).  In this case the “valuations” produced help understanding timing of cash flows and what risk profile each company has- e.g. is the value being generated by cashflows 5-10 years into the future. At the end of the 10-year DCF I subscribe zero residual value, therefore, this does not represent a valuation for a large company with significant ore reserves. NST for example is not representative.

The Table: A comparative output table to guide to what looks interesting. With nuance on what looks right and what carries risk... But I hope this helps.

Full disclosure I own RMS, GMD, BC8, KCN and NST.  I have attempted to remain neutral on what I own and when I get time add the specific valuations in my strawman. 

Outside of my current holdings I like CYL and VAU.  RXL looks interesting but the refractory ore puts me off. I am put off by a few other things with cheaper looking companies such as management teams, jurisdictions or asset quality/complexity. But enough for now.

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17

tomsmithidg
Added 4 weeks ago

Excuse my ignorance @TommyCruise , but I just want to check that I'm getting this right.

Your ore reserves table is your estimated total ounces of gold currently available to be mined e.g. ALK has 621,000 ounces, then you are dividing your 'Enterprise Value' by the reserves to get a value per kilo-ounce?

How do you calculate the 'Enterprise Value'? It appears close to but not the same as the market caps.

You obviously have some risk weightings informing you colour schemes. Are you adjusting for extraction and refining costs?

I note that you mention you like CYL, VAU and RXL. A quick glance at your chart gives a shade of green or yellow for each of these in 'discount to price target', 'EV/Reserves' and 'EV/Resource'. So is that your primary metrics?


6

Bear77
Added 4 weeks ago

The EV question is simple @tomsmithidg - Market cap represents the equity value of a company, while Enterprise Value (EV) measures its total value, including debt, preferred shares, and minority interest, minus cash. EV is generally calculated as Market Cap + Total Debt - Cash and Cash Equivalents. Market cap is used for quick market valuation, whereas EV represents the true cost to acquire the company. The way I think about it, EV strips out the cash held, so it's the true value of the company, and a much better comp than market cap.

@TommyCruise I found your comp table interesting, however I reckon if you add in AISC (costs per ounce of gold produced) and Annual Production columns, it would be better, and possibly get rid of the Resources and concentrate on the Reserves since the Reserves are the economically viable (mineable) gold.

Also, including a company like RXL which is still developing their project is an interesting choice. It's hard to compare producers to a developer who has just announced funding for a mill they haven't even started building yet, and who have refractory gold (as you mention in the post, but not in the table).

Your table appears to be doing two things, firstly comparing the share price to an average of broker price targets, and secondly comparing the relative cost of the gold they own that is still underground without really factoring in how much it's likely to cost them to economically mine that gold - except via your 5-year and 10-year DCF models, which are only as good as the inputs, which are not in the table (because they wouldn't fit).

So, as an example, you have KAU (Kaiser Reef) and RXL (Rox Resources) both trading at large discounts to price targets (176% discount and 145% discount respectively) however KAU hardly produce any gold - see here: QUARTERLY PRODUCTION AND CASH BALANCE UPDATE FOR QUARTER ENDING MARCH 2026 and Rox have completed the DFS for Youanmi and made a positive FID (Final Investment Decision) one month ago (March 17, 2026) with their latest announcement (on April 7) being that they have completed the debt component of the project funding - see here: Youanmi-Project-Financing-Completed.pdf - so RXL do NOT produce ANY gold, yet.

So I personally find it difficult to compare producers to project developers based on gold they claim to own based on their drilling and interpretation of those results. There is always an element of interpretation concerning how gold systems exist underground and the truth is in the processing and recoveries but before you get that far the confidence levels can only improve with further drilling between the holes that you've already drilled. As an example, look at what Bellevue (BGL) expected vs how their mill actually performed in their first year of production. Massive difference. Recoveries were lower, head grade was much lower, and mine development did not go to plan either, due to a variety of factors. They seem to be back on track now, but it was not a smooth start-up, and their share price reflected that. And it caused them to raise more capital after production, twice.

BGL commenced first gold production in October 2023 and officially declared commercial production in May 2024.  Since then, the company has announced two significant capital raisings to fund growth, reduce debt, and manage working capital: 

  • July 2024 Capital Raising: Following the transition to a producer, the company launched a $150 million institutional placement to reduce debt and fund a five-year growth plan aimed at increasing production to 250,000 ounces per annum.
  • April 2025 Capital Raising: In April 2025, Bellevue announced a fully underwritten $156.5 million institutional placement at A$0.85 per share. This raise was prompted by a need to close out near-term hedge contracts, bolster working capital, and address lower-than-expected production in the March 2025 quarter.  The April 2025 raising came with a downgrade to production guidance and a scaling back of some growth plans, despite the company having transitioned to a "fully-fledged producer".


Not all gold is the same in terms of the costs of production. Refractory/sulphide ore (such as at RXL's Youanmi GP) will require additional gold processing facility (mill) components to assist with the gold extraction. This means higher mill build costs and my understanding is that refractory ore (as opposed to oxidised ore where the gold is far easier to extract) is more costly to produce on an ongoing basis as well, whether that's due to a greater chemical usage or just more mill components that have to be kept running - all the individual components do wear out and do require preventative maintenance on a regular basis. Obviously it's doable - a lot of the gold that NST produce at KCGM (the Super Pit next to Kalgoorlie) is refractory or sulphide ore, and they are extracting that profitably, but it makes a difference to their costs.

If you look at the lowest cost producers, like EVN, CMM and RMS, the vast majority of their gold requires relatively simple extraction which keeps costs low, although the biggest factor with EVN is the use of copper by-product credits The type of gold is one factor, another is the strip ratio, so with open pits, how much cover do you need to move to get down to the gold. Another issue is whether the gold is thick and wide or thin viens, so waste produced vs gold produced. Another issue is when it's so deep it requires underground (UG) mining, which is always more costly the open pit (OP) mining.

Some of those factors (like OP/UG) are in the table, but how that has been factored into the various broker price targets is not. Or the DCFs. I admire the work, and I reckon it's a good way to go about it if your DCF models are accurate, but I personally don't find DCF models very useful for gold miners, and especially for gold project developers. I'm reminded of the old saying, DCF models are like the Hubble Telescope, one small change and you're in another galaxy.

I don't tend to find DCF models very useful for gold miners because the degree of confidence you can have around the input data is never going to be high, especially the gold price, the costs, the recoveries, etc. Mainly the costs - which change all the time, on an individual basis.

I understand that the 12 month price target average numbers are mostly there for reference purposes or for a sanity check as you put it, however something to keep in mind with broker reports and price targets on gold project developers and small gold miners is that many of those brokers have raised money for these miners / mine developers already, and/or want to be at the top of the list for the next CR, so they are going to naturally be bullish on the company that they want to work for again. Most of the ones who have done CRs for these companies have put a number of their clients into these companies as part of those capital raisings (usually through placements) so they would have been ultra-bullish at the time of the CRs and they can't back-peddle too much on their views too quickly after putting their clients into these companies - they have to stay bullish. So what I'm saying is that these broker price targets have to be taken with a grain or three of salt - they are rarely totally independent and unbiased.

Some of the data needs to be regularly updated, such as the Reserve grade and Mineral Reserve, which feeds into EV/Reserve numbers, which is much more useful than Market Cap/Reserve or Market Cap/Resource because the EV (Enterprise Value) strips out the cash that the company has, so can provide a more Apples vs Apples comp. However despite being useful, those numbers don't tell us what the costs of that miner are or are likely to be in future years.

The biggest determinant of profitability is cost, and in Gold Mining the cost is generally expressed as AISC (all-in sustaining cost), so adding an AISC guidance column would be a good improvement.

For those who may not be aware, Gold Resources represent the total estimated gold in the ground, classified by geological confidence, but not necessarily profitable to mine. Gold Reserves are the subset of resources that are technologically and economically viable to extract. Resources indicate potential; Reserves define current, profitable inventory. For this reason, the Market Cap/Resource and the EV/Resource numbers do not matter to me, it's really the EV/Reserve numbers that are useful and only when you also know what their costs are, or are likely to be. (Source data)

All that said, with the exception of KCN, who I actively avoid (they mine gold in Thailand and were locked out of their Chatree gold mine in Thailand for over six years, from 31 December 2016 until it officially reopened on 17 March 2023 - the Thai government ordered the closure due to local environmental complaints, leading to a long-running legal dispute that was only settled in 2025), you like/hold a lot of what I like/hold, or I did hold and will hold again when my ISA (income stream account) is up and running.

For those who might be following my progress with that, the ISA should be operational within one to two weeks as I was finally able to lodge the sell order for my Infrastructure units in my old CBUS SMSF account on Saturday (the last hurdle to close out the old account, before opening up the new tax-free account). That sell should go through this week, and then the old SMSF can be closed (as it will finally be 100% cash) and the new tax-free ISA can be opened.

I wouldn't touch Kingsgate (KCN) due to very high sovereign risk as well as low gold grades, but other than that your analysis @TommyCruise seems to have led you in the right direction, or a similar direction to me in terms of what you are holding and what you are looking to hold - although RXL is not one I'm looking to hold personally - but never say never, Youanmi has good grades - over 4g/tonne Au - it's just the chemistry that is the issue. And the development risk. And the build and commissioning risk. All of the same risks that Bellevue had. Plus the refractory ore.

I used to susbscribe to a service that provided good data - https://goldnerds.com.au/ and there's another one more recently that I have tried a free subscription to - https://www.goldhub.com.au/offer but I haven't looked at their current annual costs. You can keep your own spreadsheet updated by reading every company announcement and scraping the data yourself, however I did find the GoldNerds spreadsheet to be very good for research idea generation a couple of years ago - and they do 6-month subscriptions, or did then.

These days I have a separate investment thesis for every company I invest in and a lot of it centres around management quality - including management and Board track records in prior roles of doing what they said the would and generating good TSRs, skin in the game, project location, the gold chemistry/geology, strip ratios, etc., i.e. stuff that is not easily entered into a spreadsheet in a form that is easy to compare against peers.

But spreadsheets are useful. They're one tool in a toolkit. But I wouldn't be buying anything just because it looked good in a comp spreadsheet. But as an idea generating tool, it certainly has its uses, if kept up-to-date.

8

TommyCruise
Added 4 weeks ago

Appreciate the questions @tomsmithidg and the useful discussion @Bear77. I'll try adding context that wasn't already covered by the detail above.

The table is definitely a very blunt tool in toolkit and predominately used as a starting point for ideas. Interestingly I added the price targets just before this Straw (I don't use them) and I hid the AISC data as I hadn't kept them up to date for all companies.

With the table itself I adjust for the koz and A$M in the calculation so the values are dollars per ounce figure. The colours are a gradient scale in excel to draw my attention to what looks interesting. From there I do some mental adjustment for the "asset quality" which considers items such as mining method, grade, complexity of mining, refractory ores, management teams (if I know them). @Bear77 has done well explaining these items in detail which has been a great help. Full disclosure, I work in the gold mining industry, so I have a technical filter on all the time. It's also the reason I feel comfortable making an assessment on a startup like RLX (not that I have in this case apart from saying it looks interesting).

The resource and reserves comment is a good explanation. I also consider this for potential ounce conversion and look for indications of upside in the geology (not a geologist). Looking at this in conjunction with exploration budgets is another handy flag. On top of reserves and the factors around geology impact to mining complexity, I'll look at the mine plan/design itself to gauge any mining related recovery risks or difficulties (or rather lack thereof for an investible company).

The KCN warning is very real, I first bought this in 2007 and was left with a very small holding that sat at the bottom of the portfolio for a long time. Admittedly, this was the only thing that kept me in touch with the company and kept me close enough to cautiously invest on the restart. It's a long story.

I like the companies I own more than the two mentioned. CYL is simpler to understand compared to VAU and RXL is interesting but not one I am looking at buying, for the same reasons as @Bear77.

Appreciate the discussion.

9

BkrDzn
Added 4 weeks ago

@TommyCruise Nice work I run a similar gold sector comp sheet that is far less aesthetically pleasing than yours. I have lesser versions for other metals. Very handy tool to have to identify relative value in a sector as it grows and evolves.

11

Bear77
Added 4 weeks ago

Thanks for the clarifications @TommyCruise - Are you going to put some of your (virtual) 100K to work here on some of those gold producers that you like, or are you waiting for lower levels?

14
Bear77
Added a month ago

10-April-2026: New Management at Barrick, New Strategy:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-09/barrick-is-willing-to-shuffle-assets-as-it-eyes-ipo-this-year

Excerpt:

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Barrick Gold is generally considered to be the second-largest gold mining company in the world by production, trailing Newmont Corporation, although I had heard earlier this week that they had dropped to #3 - not sure who overtook them however, if indeed that did occur.

Barrick's former boss, Mark Bristow, was a pig-headed (stubborn) man who made a number of mistakes and never admitted to any of them, so he alienated a significant percentage of Barrick's shareholder base, including some large insto investors in the US, and clashed with his own Board, so it was no surprise to me when Barrick announced (with zero notice, on September 29th last year) that Bristow had resigned as President and CEO of Barrick Gold, effective immediately, after nearly seven years leading the company following the 2019 merger with Randgold Resources (Bristow was previously the boss at Randgold and then took over the top job at Barrick after the two companies merged). His departure was abrupt, with then COO Mark Hill appointed as interim CEO immediately, then later, in February this year, Mark Hill was named as the permanent President and CEO of Barrick Gold.

So Mark Hill had been the COO under Mark Bristow, but clearly didn't share the same views, particularly on risk management.

The biggest issue with Bristow at Barrick was probably his handling of the Mali situation where Barrick ultimately lost control of their gold mines in Mali as a result of Bristow refusing to negotiate with Malian "authorities", and that situation led directly to a US$1.04 billion impairment charge reported in the company's Q2 2025 financial results. Not million, BILLION. That's a LOT of money to lose because you're a stubborn, hard-headed bastard.

There was also plenty of concerns about Bristow taking Barrick away from Gold and into other metals (hence the current planned spin out [IPO] of some of Barrick's safer gold assets as mentioned in the Bloomberg article "Takeaways" above, that effectively split the company into safe gold [newco] and riskier gold+non-gold assets), and his willingness to build new mines in some of the riskiest places in the world without a good working relationship with the governments and various departments in those countries that Barrick needed to stay onside with. Mali was one example of that, the massive Reko Diq copper-gold mine in Balochistan, western Pakistan, was another example, but there are others. Point being, Barrick are clearly trying to undo a fair whack of the reputational damage they have suffered under Bristow now that he's no longer in the picture.

Reko Diq has Afghanistan to the immediate north and Iran to the west and south (see map below) - and it's basically desert with bugger-all infrastructure, so it's not a fun place to build a new mine, especially one as big as Bristow wanted Reko Diq to be. It's no wonder that after LYL did all the studies for Reko Diq they declined to participate in the bidding process for the EPCM (build) contract. As Peter De Leo explained to @Strawman in the recent interview / meeting here, LYL completed all of their commitments with regard to Reko Diq but what Barrick (Mark Bristow at that time) wanted to pay for the build was not acceptable to Lycopodium (LYL), so they declined to bid for the project. The project has since faced a number of hurdles but it's not LYL's problem now.

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Further Reading:

https://discoveryalert.com.au/security-risks-reshaping-mining-strategies-2026/ [8th April 2026]

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Barrick Slows Reko Diq Development Following Security Review

BY

MUFLIH HIDAYAT

ON APRIL 8, 2026

The global mining industry has entered an era where traditional risk assessment frameworks prove increasingly inadequate for navigating complex geopolitical environments. Major mining corporations now confront security challenges that transcend conventional operational hazards, requiring sophisticated scenario planning capabilities and dynamic risk management strategies. The intersection of high-value mineral deposits with volatile political landscapes creates unprecedented investment complexities that demand innovative approaches to capital allocation and project development, particularly as executive mining mandates reshape regulatory frameworks.

This shifting paradigm becomes particularly evident when examining mega-projects in frontier markets, where security considerations can fundamentally alter development timelines and financial projections. The mining sector's traditional emphasis on geological and technical risk factors has expanded to encompass comprehensive security intelligence, cross-border stability analysis, and adaptive operational protocols designed for rapidly changing threat environments.

How Security Risks Are Reshaping Major Mining Investment Strategies

The announcement that Barrick to slow development at Reko Diq represents a watershed moment in mining industry risk management, highlighting how security considerations now influence investment decisions at the highest corporate levels. Following preliminary security review findings and escalating incidents in Pakistan and surrounding regions, the company implemented comprehensive project reassessment protocols extending through mid-2027. This strategic pause reflects evolving corporate governance standards that prioritise personnel safety and asset protection over accelerated development timelines.

The New Risk Assessment Framework for Frontier Mining Projects

Contemporary mining corporations have developed sophisticated risk evaluation mechanisms that integrate real-time security intelligence with traditional geological and economic assessments. These frameworks incorporate dynamic monitoring systems capable of tracking security incidents across broad geographic regions, analysing threat patterns, and predicting potential escalation scenarios. The Reko Diq security review exemplifies this approach, encompassing comprehensive evaluation of the evolving security situation, capital requirements, project financing options, and timeline optimisation strategies.

The implementation of these enhanced risk frameworks requires substantial investment in specialised personnel, intelligence gathering capabilities, and scenario modelling systems. Mining companies now employ security analysts, regional political experts, and cross-border intelligence specialists as core members of project development teams. Furthermore, this expanded expertise base enables more nuanced understanding of how local conflicts, regional instability, and international tensions can impact mining operations across extended development periods.

Modern security risk assessment also incorporates predictive modelling techniques that evaluate multiple potential scenarios for regional stability over project lifespans extending 20-30 years. These models consider demographic trends, economic development patterns, governance stability indicators, and historical conflict cycles to establish probability ranges for various security outcomes. Consequently, the complexity of these assessments reflects recognition that mining investments represent long-term commitments in environments where security conditions can fluctuate dramatically.

Capital Reallocation Patterns in Response to Regional Instability

Mining corporations have developed sophisticated capital reallocation mechanisms designed to optimise investment returns while minimising exposure to unacceptable security risks. When projects face extended security reviews, companies implement carefully calibrated spending reduction protocols that preserve project viability without excessive capital exposure. For instance, Barrick's decision to maintain active project management while reducing capital expenditure demonstrates this balanced approach, continuing essential operations while limiting financial risk.

The financial implications of security-driven delays prove substantial across multiple dimensions. Original Phase 1 capital estimates of $5.6-6.0 billion face potential increases of 15-25 percent, while Phase 2 projections of $3.3-3.6 billion remain under comprehensive review. These escalations reflect not only construction cost inflation during delay periods but also enhanced security infrastructure requirements, modified operational protocols, and increased insurance costs reflecting elevated risk assessments.

Capital Impact Analysis During Security Reviews

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Why Balochistan's Strategic Location Creates Unique Investment Challenges

The Reko Diq project's location in Chagai district of Balochistan, with proximity to Afghanistan and Iran borders, creates exceptional security complexities that distinguish it from mining operations in more politically stable regions. This tri-border positioning exposes the project to overlapping jurisdictional challenges, cross-border security threats, and regional instability dynamics that can rapidly affect operational safety and supply chain integrity.

Geographic Risk Concentration in Critical Mineral Supply Chains

Balochistan's position at the intersection of three national jurisdictions creates what security specialists term geographic risk concentration, where multiple threat vectors converge in a single operational area. The province's extensive border with Afghanistan and Iran exposes mining operations to spillover effects from regional conflicts, cross-border militant activities, and trafficking networks that exploit porous international boundaries. Moreover, these challenges directly impact critical minerals energy security considerations for global supply chains.

The region's sparse population density and limited government presence compound security challenges by reducing civilian oversight and emergency response capabilities. Chagai district encompasses approximately 44,427 square kilometres with predominantly pastoral and trading communities, creating vast areas with minimal official security infrastructure. This geographic reality requires mining operations to develop comprehensive self-reliant security systems capable of operating independently of local law enforcement capabilities.

Border proximity effects on mining operations include supply chain vulnerabilities where essential equipment and materials must transit potentially unstable crossing points, personnel movement complications requiring coordination with multiple national border agencies, and communication challenges in remote areas with limited infrastructure redundancy. These factors collectively increase operational costs and timeline uncertainty compared to projects in more developed regions.

Historical analysis of the Afghanistan-Iran-Pakistan corridor reveals recurring patterns of cross-border instability, tribal conflicts, and militant activities that create persistent security challenges. The region's complex ethnic and political dynamics, combined with economic factors including smuggling networks and informal taxation systems, establish baseline security conditions that require specialised management approaches.

Joint Venture Governance Under Security Pressure

Complex joint venture structures involving international corporations and state entities face particular governance challenges when security conditions deteriorate rapidly. Decision-making protocols must accommodate different risk tolerances, legal frameworks, and political considerations among partners with varying exposure levels to regional security threats. Barrick's consultation with joint venture partners during the security review process illustrates these collaborative decision-making requirements.

Partnership dynamics during security crises often reveal fundamental differences in risk assessment methodologies between international mining corporations and local governmental or quasi-governmental entities. International companies typically employ conservative security standards reflecting global corporate governance requirements and shareholder protection obligations, whilst local partners may have different perspectives on acceptable risk levels based on regional experience and political considerations.

Stakeholder alignment strategies in high-risk environments require continuous communication protocols, shared intelligence gathering capabilities, and coordinated response planning for various security scenarios. These collaborative frameworks must balance the need for rapid decision-making during crisis situations with the requirement for consensus among partners with potentially conflicting interests and priorities. In addition, understanding the broader geopolitical mining landscape becomes crucial for effective partnership management.

What Are the Financial Implications of Extended Project Reviews?

Extended security reviews generate complex financial implications that extend far beyond simple delay costs, encompassing capital escalation, opportunity costs, financing complications, and market valuation effects. The comprehensive nature of these financial impacts requires sophisticated modelling techniques that account for multiple interacting variables over extended time periods.

Capital Budget Escalation Modelling for Delayed Mega-Projects

Mining project delays in frontier markets typically result in significant capital cost escalation due to multiple reinforcing factors. Construction material and equipment costs continue increasing during delay periods, often at rates exceeding general inflation due to supply chain constraints and specialised mining industry demand patterns. Furthermore, labour costs similarly escalate, particularly for skilled technical personnel required for complex copper-gold development projects.

Security-driven design modifications represent a major source of capital escalation for projects experiencing extended reviews. Enhanced perimeter security systems, upgraded personnel protection facilities, expanded emergency response capabilities, and fortified operational infrastructure all require substantial additional investment beyond original project specifications. These security enhancements often prove non-negotiable requirements for resuming development in deteriorated security environments.

The time value of money calculations for mega-projects experiencing 24+ month delays create substantial financial impacts independent of direct cost escalations. When applied to combined Phase 1 and Phase 2 capital budgets totalling $8.9-9.6 billion, even modest discount rate applications generate hundreds of millions in additional financing costs. Construction cost inflation averaging 3-4 percent annually compounds these effects, potentially adding $534-768 million in escalated costs over a two-year delay period.

Insurance cost escalation represents another significant factor in capital budget increases following security incidents. Political risk insurance, project completion insurance, and personnel coverage all experience premium increases when underwriters reassess regional risk profiles. However, these insurance cost increases often prove permanent rather than temporary, affecting project economics throughout operational lifespans rather than only during development phases.

Opportunity Cost Analysis for Shareholders

Shareholders of companies experiencing extended project delays face substantial opportunity costs as capital remains committed to suspended developments rather than generating returns through alternative investments. Comparative analysis of other copper-gold development projects reveals that investors could potentially achieve superior returns by redirecting capital to operations in more stable jurisdictions with clearer development timelines.

Portfolio optimisation strategies during delay periods require careful balancing of maintaining strategic positions in high-potential projects against pursuing more immediate returns from alternative investments. Mining companies must communicate effectively with shareholders regarding the long-term value preservation rationale for maintaining suspended project positions rather than liquidating assets during uncertainty periods.

The market valuation effects of extended security reviews typically prove more severe than simple delay cost calculations might suggest. Equity markets often apply significant risk premiums to companies with substantial exposure to frontier market projects experiencing security challenges. Consequently, these valuation discounts can persist well beyond resolution of immediate security concerns, reflecting ongoing market scepticism regarding management's ability to successfully navigate complex geopolitical environments.

How Do Security Incidents Impact Mining Project Valuations?

Security incidents create immediate and lasting effects on mining project valuations through multiple transmission mechanisms including market sentiment shifts, credit rating implications, insurance cost increases, and institutional investor behaviour changes. These valuation effects often prove disproportionate to direct operational impacts, reflecting market risk aversion and uncertainty regarding future security conditions.

Market Response Mechanisms to Operational Uncertainty

Equity markets typically respond to mining security incidents with immediate share price volatility followed by sustained risk premium applications that can persist for extended periods. The magnitude of these market responses often exceeds reasonable estimates of direct financial impacts, reflecting investor uncertainty regarding management's ability to effectively navigate complex security environments and resume normal operations.

Institutional investor behaviour during security crises reveals systematic risk aversion patterns that affect mining company access to capital markets. Many institutional investment mandates specifically limit exposure to companies with significant operations in regions experiencing active security incidents, creating potential liquidity constraints and financing complications for affected mining corporations. This trend aligns with broader US uranium policy measures that reflect increasing political risk considerations in resource investment decisions.

Credit rating agencies apply sophisticated risk assessment frameworks that incorporate security incident frequency, regional stability trends, and management response effectiveness when evaluating mining company creditworthiness. Extended security reviews often trigger credit rating reviews that can result in downgrades affecting borrowing costs and debt covenant compliance requirements across entire corporate structures.

Market volatility patterns during security incidents typically follow predictable sequences beginning with sharp initial sell-offs, followed by partial recovery phases, and concluding with sustained risk premium applications until security conditions demonstrate clear improvement. Understanding these patterns enables more effective investor communication strategies and market timing considerations for capital raising activities.

Insurance and Risk Transfer Strategies

Political risk insurance markets have evolved sophisticated products designed to protect mining investments against security-related losses, but coverage limitations and exclusions often prove more restrictive than companies initially anticipate. Insurance underwriters employ increasingly sophisticated risk assessment techniques that result in higher premiums and more restrictive coverage terms for projects in unstable regions.

Consortium-based risk sharing models enable mining companies to distribute security risks among multiple stakeholders, reducing individual exposure levels while maintaining project development capabilities. These collaborative structures require careful legal framework development and ongoing coordination mechanisms to ensure effective risk allocation and decision-making processes.

Government guarantee structures in joint venture arrangements can provide partial protection against political risks, but these instruments often prove limited in scope and may not cover security incident-related losses. The effectiveness of government guarantees depends heavily on the financial capacity and political stability of guarantor governments, factors that may correlate with the security risks they are intended to mitigate.

What Alternative Development Scenarios Could Emerge?

Mining companies facing extended security reviews have developed innovative approaches to maintaining project momentum whilst minimising risk exposure. These alternative development scenarios encompass phased construction strategies, enhanced technology integration, and modified operational protocols designed to reduce vulnerability whilst preserving long-term project value.

Phased Development Optimisation Under Constraint

Modular construction approaches enable mining operations to minimise on-site exposure during unstable security periods whilst maintaining development progress through off-site fabrication and preparation activities. These strategies involve constructing major project components in secure locations for later transportation and assembly, reducing both personnel exposure and asset vulnerability during high-risk periods.

Remote operation capabilities have advanced significantly in recent years, enabling mining operations to maintain productive capacity with substantially reduced on-site personnel requirements. Advanced automation systems, remote monitoring technologies, and drone-based surveillance capabilities allow companies to continue essential operations whilst minimising human exposure to security threats. These developments reflect broader mining industry innovation trends transforming operational approaches.

Technology integration for enhanced security monitoring encompasses sophisticated sensor networks, satellite surveillance systems, and predictive analytics platforms capable of identifying potential security threats before they materialise into incidents. These technological solutions provide early warning capabilities that enable proactive response measures rather than reactive crisis management.

Phased development strategies also involve careful sequencing of capital deployment to minimise sunk costs during security reviews whilst maintaining project development momentum. Companies can focus initial investments on secure infrastructure development, off-site preparation activities, and technology system implementation that provide value regardless of security condition changes.

Strategic Partnership Restructuring Options

Enhanced local stakeholder integration represents a critical strategy for improving project security through community alignment and regional support development. Mining companies increasingly recognise that robust community partnerships provide more effective long-term security than purely defensive security measures, creating shared interests in project success and stability.

Military-civilian cooperation frameworks in some jurisdictions provide structured approaches to security management that leverage official security capabilities whilst maintaining appropriate civilian operational control. These arrangements require careful legal and political navigation to ensure compliance with international standards and corporate governance requirements.

Community investment amplification strategies during security review periods can strengthen local support networks whilst maintaining project visibility and stakeholder engagement. Companies like Barrick continue investing in existing community programmes despite reduced development activity, recognising that sustained community relations prove essential for long-term project viability.

Which Global Copper Projects Benefit from Reko Diq's Delay?

Extended delays at major copper development projects create competitive advantages for alternative copper sources through accelerated investment flows, enhanced market positioning, and supply chain rebalancing opportunities. Mining companies with projects in more stable jurisdictions often experience increased investor interest and accelerated development timelines when competing projects face security-related delays.

Competitive Positioning Analysis

When major copper projects face delays, competing developments often experience accelerated investment and development timelines as capital and market attention shift to more stable jurisdictions.

Alternative copper development projects in politically stable regions benefit from increased investor attention and potentially accelerated financing as capital markets seek exposure to copper price appreciation without accepting elevated political risks. This dynamic creates competitive advantages for projects that previously struggled to attract investment due to relative disadvantages in resource quality or development costs. For instance, Barrick's recent Reko Diq update has highlighted these competitive dynamics in the copper sector.

Established copper producers in stable jurisdictions may experience enhanced market positioning as supply concerns increase due to delayed new production from projects like Reko Diq. These positioning improvements can translate into improved long-term supply agreements, enhanced pricing power, and increased market valuations reflecting scarcity premiums.

Regional supply chain advantages emerge for copper projects located in areas with established infrastructure, reliable logistics networks, and stable regulatory environments. These advantages become more pronounced when competing projects face supply chain vulnerabilities due to security concerns or geographic isolation in unstable regions.

Supply Chain Rebalancing Opportunities

Consuming nations increasingly prioritise supply security alongside cost considerations when establishing long-term copper sourcing strategies. Delays at major projects in unstable regions accelerate this rebalancing toward suppliers in more reliable jurisdictions, even when this involves accepting higher costs or lower quality resources.

Strategic reserve building by major copper-consuming countries reflects growing recognition that supply security considerations warrant premium pricing for reliable sources. This trend benefits established suppliers and projects in stable regions whilst creating additional challenges for developments in frontier markets experiencing security concerns.

Alternative supply source development receives accelerated investment and policy support as governments and corporations seek to reduce dependence on potentially unreliable suppliers. These acceleration efforts often involve enhanced financing terms, expedited permitting processes, and strategic partnership arrangements designed to encourage rapid development in preferred jurisdictions. However, security concerns affecting mining projects continue to influence global supply chain strategies.

How Are Community Relations Being Maintained During the Slowdown?

Maintaining positive community relationships during operational slowdowns proves critical for preserving long-term social licence and ensuring successful project resumption when security conditions improve. Mining companies must balance reduced operational activity with continued community engagement and investment to prevent relationship deterioration during extended delay periods.

Social Investment Continuity Strategies

Barrick to slow development at Reko Diq whilst maintaining community commitments demonstrates recognition that community relationship maintenance requires sustained investment regardless of operational status. These programmes often provide essential services and economic opportunities for local communities that become dependent on mining company support for healthcare, education, and infrastructure development.

Local employment preservation during reduced operations involves creative workforce management strategies that maintain essential personnel whilst reducing overall staffing levels. Companies often prioritise retaining local employees over expatriate staff during slowdown periods, recognising that local workforce relationships prove essential for successful operational resumption.

Community programme sustainability frameworks require careful financial planning to ensure continued funding availability throughout extended delay periods. These frameworks must account for reduced project cash flows whilst maintaining programme effectiveness and community impact levels that preserve stakeholder relationships.

Transparent communication regarding project status and future intentions helps maintain community confidence despite operational uncertainty. Regular stakeholder meetings, progress updates, and clear communication regarding security concerns and resumption conditions help prevent speculation and maintain constructive dialogue with community leaders.

Long-term Social Licence Preservation

Trust-building mechanisms during operational pauses require sustained engagement and demonstration of long-term commitment despite current operational limitations. Mining companies must continuously reinforce their intention to resume operations whilst acknowledging legitimate security concerns and timeline uncertainties.

Cultural sensitivity maintenance in reduced-activity scenarios involves continued participation in local customs, religious observances, and community events that demonstrate respect for local traditions and sustained commitment to community integration. These activities often prove more important during difficult periods than during normal operations.

Social licence preservation strategies must account for potential competition from other economic development initiatives that may emerge during mining project delays. Communities may explore alternative economic opportunities during extended mining delays, requiring companies to maintain competitive community investment levels to preserve future operational viability.

What Does This Mean for Pakistan's Mining Sector Development?

The Barrick to slow development at Reko Diq situation carries implications extending beyond the immediate project to Pakistan's broader mining sector development prospects, international investment attractiveness, and resource development strategy implementation. These broader implications affect government policy responses, regional economic planning, and future investment promotion strategies.

National Resource Development Strategy Implications

Pakistan's mineral sector investment attractiveness faces potential negative impacts from high-profile project delays, particularly when these delays relate to security concerns that may affect multiple regions or project types. International investors often apply broad risk assessments to entire countries rather than evaluating projects individually, creating spillover effects from specific project challenges.

Government response mechanisms to maintain investor confidence become critical during high-profile project delays. These responses may include enhanced security provision commitments, revised regulatory frameworks designed to address investor concerns, and promotional activities highlighting successful projects in other regions or sectors.

Infrastructure development continuity despite project delays requires careful government planning to ensure that transportation, power, and communication infrastructure developments continue even when anchor mining projects experience delays. These infrastructure investments often prove essential for future mining development regardless of specific project timelines.

Regional economic diversification strategies may receive increased emphasis during mining project delays as governments and communities seek alternative economic development pathways that reduce dependence on single large-scale projects. These diversification efforts can provide economic resilience whilst maintaining readiness for mining development resumption.

Regional Economic Development Considerations

Balochistan provincial economic planning must accommodate potential extended delays at Reko Diq whilst maintaining development momentum in other sectors and regions. This planning requires careful resource allocation balancing immediate economic needs against long-term mining development preparation requirements.

Alternative economic development pathway exploration becomes more urgent during mining project delays as communities and governments seek immediate economic opportunities that can provide employment and development benefits whilst mining projects remain suspended. These alternatives may include agriculture development, small-scale manufacturing, or service sector initiatives.

Cross-border cooperation implications for regional stability encompass both challenges and opportunities as security concerns affect international investment whilst potentially creating incentives for enhanced regional security cooperation. Improved tri-border security coordination could benefit multiple economic development initiatives beyond mining projects.


When Might Development Resume and Under What Conditions?

Predicting mining project resumption timelines requires analysis of multiple interacting factors including security condition improvement, market dynamics, regulatory developments, and corporate strategic priorities. The Barrick to slow development at Reko Diq situation illustrates the complexity of these resumption decisions and the multiple variables that influence timing considerations.

Security Threshold Establishment for Project Restart

Measurable security improvement benchmarks provide objective criteria for evaluating conditions suitable for development resumption. These benchmarks typically include incident frequency reduction targets, regional stability indicators, and law enforcement capability assessments that demonstrate sustainable security improvements rather than temporary fluctuations.

Stakeholder confidence restoration requirements encompass multiple constituencies including shareholders, joint venture partners, local communities, and government entities. Restoration strategies must address each stakeholder group's specific concerns and demonstrate sustainable risk mitigation measures that provide reasonable assurance of continued operational viability.

Government stability indicators for investment resumption extend beyond immediate security concerns to encompass broader political stability, policy continuity, and regulatory predictability factors that affect long-term investment viability. These indicators help distinguish between temporary security fluctuations and more fundamental political instability that may require extended delay periods.

International security assessment validation through third-party risk evaluation services provides objective verification of security condition improvements and helps establish credible benchmarks for resumption decisions. These assessments often prove essential for satisfying insurance requirements and board governance standards for major capital deployments.

Market Timing Considerations for Project Reactivation

Copper price environment optimisation for restart decisions involves sophisticated market analysis considering global supply-demand balances, economic growth projections, and competing project development timelines. Higher copper prices can justify enhanced security investments and risk acceptance levels that enable earlier project resumption.

Global supply-demand balance influence on timing reflects the reality that tight copper markets create stronger incentives for overcoming security challenges and accepting elevated risk levels compared to periods of oversupply when delay costs prove more acceptable. Market fundamentals thus directly influence risk tolerance and resumption timeline decisions.

Competitive landscape evolution during delay periods affects project value propositions and market positioning when development eventually resumes. Companies must monitor competing project progress, technological developments, and market structure changes that may alter project competitiveness during extended delay periods.


Disclaimer: This analysis is based on publicly available information and involves forward-looking statements regarding security conditions, market developments, and project timelines that are inherently uncertain. Readers should conduct independent research and consult qualified advisors before making investment decisions. Mining investments in frontier markets involve substantial risks including political instability, security threats, regulatory changes, and market volatility that can result in significant losses.


--- end of article ---

Source: https://discoveryalert.com.au/security-risks-reshaping-mining-strategies-2026/ [8th April 2026]


Also:

https://discoveryalert.com.au/mark-bristow-resignation-barrick-mining-2025/ [1st October 2025]

Mark Bristow’s Abrupt Departure from Barrick Mining Explained

BY

MUFLIH HIDAYAT

ON OCTOBER 1, 2025

What Led to Mark Bristow's Abrupt Resignation from Barrick Mining?

The mining industry was taken by surprise when Mark Bristow, CEO of Barrick Gold Corporation, announced his resignation effective September 30, 2025. After nearly seven years at the helm, Bristow's sudden departure raised questions throughout the industry about the circumstances behind this unexpected leadership change.

The Timing and Announcement

Bristow's resignation was particularly notable for its abrupt nature, with the board announcing it would take effect immediately. Mark Hill, a company veteran who has overseen Barrick's Latin American and Asia Pacific regions since joining in 2006, was swiftly appointed as interim President and CEO.

The board wasted no time initiating a global search for a permanent successor, signaling both urgency and a desire for fresh leadership. What made the timing even more intriguing was that Newmont, Barrick's chief competitor, announced their planned CEO transition on the exact same day.

Industry analysts noted that the abrupt nature of Bristow's departure is uncommon in the mining sector, where leadership transitions typically involve months of preparation and overlap to ensure operational continuity. The lack of a transition period suggests potential disagreements at the executive level.

Bristow's Legacy at Barrick

Bristow joined Barrick in 2019 following the strategic merger between Barrick and Randgold Resources, which he had founded and led previously. His tenure was marked by significant accomplishments, particularly the successful integration of these two mining giants.

Under his leadership, Barrick transformed into a stronger global gold and copper producer with enhanced operational efficiencies across multiple jurisdictions. Bristow was particularly influential in developing sustainable mining operations across Africa, leveraging his extensive experience from his time at Randgold.

His leadership style—characterized by frequent site visits and hands-on management—brought a distinctive operational focus to Barrick that contrasted with the more centralized approach of his predecessors. This approach initially helped revitalize operations and improve relationships with host governments, though recent African mining challenges had tested this strategy.

Despite these achievements, Board Chairman John Thornton's statement emphasized the need for "the right leader to fully capitalize on Barrick's world-class assets and capabilities, and to driving improved performance, growth and shareholder value"—language that suggests the board was seeking a different strategic direction.

How Does the Mali Dispute Factor into Bristow's Departure?

The ongoing situation in Mali stands out as a significant factor potentially influencing Bristow's departure, representing one of the most challenging geopolitical issues faced by Barrick during his tenure.

The Loulo-Gounkoto Conflict

For nearly three years, Barrick has been embroiled in an escalating dispute with Mali's military government over profit-sharing arrangements at the Loulo-Gounkoto gold complex, one of the company's most productive assets in West Africa.

The conflict reached critical points in January 2025 when Barrick halted operations at the complex, and then dramatically escalated in June 2025 when Mali's military government—which had seized power in a 2021 coup—took control of the mine.

This forceful appropriation represents a severe case of resource nationalism that has become increasingly common in several African mining jurisdictions. For Barrick, the loss of operational control triggered significant financial repercussions, including a US$1.04 billion impairment charge reported in the company's Q2 2025 financial results.

The proximity of this mine seizure to Bristow's departure—just three months apart—suggests that the board may have had concerns about how the situation was managed, particularly given Bristow's reputation for government relations in African mining contexts.

Financial Implications

Despite the challenges in Mali, Barrick has maintained its 2025 production guidance of 3.15-3.5 million ounces of gold and 200,000-230,000 tonnes of copper. This projection demonstrates the company's operational resilience but does not diminish the significant financial impact of losing control of the Loulo-Gounkoto complex.

The Mali situation exemplifies the growing geopolitical risks facing multinational mining companies in certain jurisdictions. Mining industry observers note that resource nationalism has been rising globally, with governments increasingly seeking larger stakes in resource projects, especially in countries experiencing political transitions or economic pressures.

For investors, the Mali dispute raised concerns about Barrick's risk management strategies and its ability to protect assets in politically volatile regions. These concerns likely contributed to shareholder pressure on the board regarding leadership.

What Performance Issues May Have Influenced the Board's Decision?

While the Mali situation represents a specific crisis point, broader performance concerns likely contributed to the board's decision to seek new leadership for Barrick.

Share Price Underperformance

Although specific data points were not disclosed in the company's statements, industry analysts have noted that Barrick's stock has underperformed compared to industry peers in recent years. This relative underperformance created growing pressure from shareholders for improved returns and a clearer path to value creation.

The board's statement specifically emphasized finding leadership "to drive improved performance, growth and shareholder value"—language that signals dissatisfaction with current trajectories. In the highly competitive gold mining sector, where investors have multiple options for exposure to gold prices analysis, relative performance against peers becomes particularly important for maintaining investor confidence.

Strategic Direction Concerns

Bristow's approach to growth and capital allocation may have differed from the board's evolving vision for Barrick's future. Questions about the company's acquisition strategy, project development timeline, and capital return policies could have created tension between the CEO and directors.

While Barrick had completed the integration of Randgold successfully, the company faced increasing questions about its next phase of growth. Competitors had been making strategic moves to reposition their portfolios, raising questions about Barrick's long-term strategy beyond operational optimization.

Operational Challenges

Beyond the highly visible Mali situation, operational efficiency metrics across Barrick's global portfolio may have fallen short of expectations. The development timeline of key projects, including the promising Fourmile gold project in Nevada, could have faced delays or cost pressures contributing to board concerns.

Barrick's competitive positioning against other major gold producers like Newmont has been a consistent focus for investors and analysts. With Newmont making significant strategic moves following its acquisition of Newcrest, questions about Barrick's strategic response may have intensified.

Who is Mark Hill and What Changes Might He Bring?

As Barrick navigates this leadership transition, attention turns to interim CEO Mark Hill and what his leadership might mean for the company's direction.

Hill's Background and Experience

Mark Hill brings nearly two decades of company experience to the role, having joined Barrick in 2006. His most recent position overseeing Latin American and Asia Pacific operations has given him extensive knowledge of Barrick's global portfolio and operational challenges.

His long tenure with the company suggests he is deeply familiar with Barrick's culture, strategic priorities, and operational approach. This institutional knowledge will be valuable in maintaining continuity during the transition period while the board searches for a permanent replacement.

While less publicly visible than Bristow, Hill has developed extensive experience managing complex mining operations across multiple jurisdictions with varying regulatory environments, community expectations, and operational challenges.

Interim Leadership Priorities

As interim CEO, Hill faces several immediate priorities. Stabilizing operations following Bristow's sudden departure will be paramount to maintaining investor confidence and operational momentum.

Addressing the ongoing Mali situation will require diplomatic skill and strategic thinking. While the impairment has been recorded, questions remain about potential recovery of assets or negotiation of a new arrangement with Mali's government.

Maintaining Barrick's production targets for the remainder of 2025 will be crucial for market confidence. The continued development of the Fourmile gold project in Nevada represents an important growth opportunity that requires ongoing attention and investment.

Supporting the board's search for permanent leadership while keeping the organization focused on operational excellence will require careful balance. As an internal candidate, Hill brings continuity but may also represent an opportunity to subtly shift strategies in areas where the board has indicated dissatisfaction.

How Does This Compare to Newmont's Leadership Transition?

The contrast between Barrick's abrupt leadership change and Newmont's carefully planned succession, announced on the same day, highlights different approaches to governance and transition management in the gold mining industry.

Contrasting Transition Approaches

Newmont announced that CEO Tom Palmer will step down on December 31, 2025, following a structured transition plan. Palmer, who like Bristow became CEO in 2019, will remain as a strategic advisor until his retirement in March 2026, ensuring a smooth handover.

Natascha Viljoen, currently serving as Newmont's President and COO, will become the company's first female CEO on January 1, 2026. This represents a significant milestone for gender diversity in mining leadership and suggests Newmont's commitment to developing internal talent for succession.

The orderly nature of Newmont's announcement contrasts sharply with the immediate effect of Bristow's departure from Barrick. Industry observers note that Newmont's approach represents best practices in succession planning, providing clarity to investors, employees, and other stakeholders.

Industry Leadership Trends

The simultaneous leadership changes at the world's two largest gold mining companies signal a significant moment of transition in the industry. Both companies are moving beyond their post-merger integration phases into new strategic eras.

Newmont's appointment of Viljoen highlights the increasing focus on diversity in mining leadership. While the industry has traditionally lagged in gender representation at executive levels, this appointment may accelerate changes across the sector.

The contrasting succession approaches may reflect different board governance philosophies and company cultures. Newmont's structured process suggests long-term succession planning, while Barrick's abrupt change indicates a potential response to immediate concerns.

Both transitions come at a time when the gold mining industry faces significant challenges, including rising costs, declining ore grades, increasing regulatory pressures, and growing stakeholder expectations regarding environmental and social performance.

What Challenges Will Barrick's Next CEO Face?

Whoever ultimately takes the permanent CEO position at Barrick will inherit both significant assets and substantial challenges requiring immediate attention.

Short-Term Priorities

Resolving the Mali situation—or mitigating its financial impact—will remain a critical priority. Whether through diplomatic channels, legal proceedings, or financial arrangements, finding a path forward in Mali will be essential for rebuilding investor confidence.

Maintaining operational continuity across Barrick's global portfolio will require focused leadership during this transition. Key operations in Nevada, Dominican Republic, Papua New Guinea, and across Africa will need consistent management attention to meet production targets.

Rebuilding investor confidence and improving share performance will likely be an immediate focus. Clear communication about strategic direction, operational improvements, and capital allocation priorities will be essential for restoring market confidence.

Developing a clear strategic vision that differentiates Barrick from competitors will help establish the new CEO's leadership. This may include positions on industry consolidation strategies and balancing gold and copper production strategies.

Long-Term Strategic Decisions

Portfolio optimization will be an ongoing consideration, potentially including divestments of non-core assets or acquisitions to strengthen the company's position in key jurisdictions. The balance between geographic diversification and concentration in low-risk jurisdictions will require careful analysis.

Capital allocation decisions between growth projects, dividends, and share repurchases will directly impact shareholder returns and market perception. Finding the right balance that satisfies both growth-oriented and income-focused investors remains challenging.

The relative emphasis on gold versus copper production will shape Barrick's long-term value proposition. While gold remains the company's primary focus, copper offers exposure to electrification trends and potentially different value drivers.

Navigating increasing resource nationalism in key jurisdictions will require sophisticated government relations strategies and risk management approaches. The Mali situation demonstrates the potential consequences of management risk warning signs being overlooked.

Addressing rising production costs and declining ore grades industry-wide will necessitate continued operational excellence and potentially new technological approaches. Cost inflation has become a significant challenge across the mining industry.

ESG and Sustainability Challenges

Meeting increasingly stringent environmental standards will require continued investment in sustainable practices and technologies. Climate change commitments, water management, and biodiversity impacts will face growing scrutiny.

Managing community relations in complex operating environments demands consistent engagement and benefit-sharing approaches. Social license to operate has become as important as regulatory permits in many jurisdictions.

Implementing effective climate change mitigation strategies while maintaining production efficiency presents technical and financial challenges. The mining industry faces particular pressure regarding its carbon footprint and energy usage.

Balancing traditional mining practices with sustainability innovations will be necessary to meet evolving stakeholder expectations. New technologies and approaches may offer solutions but require significant investment and operational changes.

How Might This Affect Barrick's Market Position?

The leadership transition creates both risks and opportunities for Barrick's competitive positioning in the gold mining industry.

Investor Reaction and Share Performance

Initial market uncertainty following the abrupt leadership change will likely cause some volatility in Barrick's share price as investors assess the implications. This period of uncertainty may create buying opportunities for investors who see long-term value in Barrick's asset portfolio.

The potential for share price recovery under new leadership with a fresh strategy represents a significant opportunity. A clear articulation of strategic direction and early operational wins could rebuild investor confidence relatively quickly.

Investors will focus intensely on Q3/Q4 2025 results for signs of operational stability during the transition. Meeting or exceeding production and cost guidance will be particularly important for maintaining market confidence.

Analyst coverage and recommendations may shift during this period of uncertainty. The board's ability to attract a high-caliber permanent CEO will significantly influence analyst sentiment and long-term outlook.

Competitive Landscape

Potential shifts in competitive dynamics between Barrick and Newmont could reshape the gold mining landscape. With both companies under new leadership by 2026, strategic priorities and competitive positioning could evolve significantly.

Smaller gold producers may see this transitional period as an opportunity to gain market share or position themselves as acquisition targets. Industry evolution trends suggest continued consolidation in the sector as companies seek scale and efficiency.

The leadership change could impact potential industry consolidation and M&A activity. Previous speculation about a potential Barrick-Newmont combination may evolve under new leadership at both companies.

Relationships with joint venture partners and host governments may require reinforcement during the transition. Hill's interim leadership will need to provide continuity in these critical relationships while setting the stage for the permanent CEO.

Production and Growth Outlook

Barrick's ability to maintain its 2025 production guidance despite the leadership change demonstrates underlying operational strength. This resilience provides some confidence that the transition need not disrupt production targets.

A potential reassessment of growth projects and exploration priorities may occur under new leadership. Capital allocation decisions and project prioritization could shift, particularly for early-stage projects.

The development timeline for the promising Fourmile gold project in Nevada will be watched closely by investors as an indicator of strategic continuity. This project represents one of Barrick's most significant organic growth opportunities in a low-risk jurisdiction.

Focus on maximizing value from existing assets during the transition period represents a pragmatic approach. Operational optimization and efficiency improvements can deliver value while longer-term strategic decisions await permanent leadership.

What Does This Mean for the Gold Mining Industry?

The simultaneous leadership changes at the world's two largest gold mining companies signal broader transitions across the industry.

Industry-Wide Leadership Trends

A generational shift in mining leadership is occurring across major companies, with new executives bringing different perspectives on technology, sustainability, and stakeholder engagement. This transition may accelerate industry evolution in several key areas.

The increasing focus on operational excellence over aggressive expansion reflects changing investor expectations in the mining sector. After a period of challenging returns from major capital projects, investors are demanding discipline and returns.

Growing importance of technological innovation and digital transformation is reshaping mining operations and executive priorities. New leadership may accelerate adoption of technologies that improve safety, efficiency, and environmental performance.

Evolution of CEO skill sets now includes greater emphasis on stakeholder management and ESG expertise. The technical mining expertise that once dominated leadership requirements now shares importance with stakeholder engagement capabilities.

Market Implications

Potential impact on gold price if production guidance changes across major producers could create market volatility. While individual company changes may have limited effect, collective shifts in output projections could influence gold prices.

Shifting investor preferences between major producers may create opportunities for portfolio rebalancing. Investment flows between gold producers often reflect perceived management quality and strategic clarity as much as asset quality.

Changing dynamics between producers, juniors, and exploration companies may emerge as strategic priorities evolve. New leadership may take different approaches to partnerships, joint ventures, and early-stage project development.

Evolving relationships between mining companies and host governments remain a critical factor for industry performance. New leadership approaches to government engagement and benefit sharing could reshape these important relationships.

Future of Gold Mining Leadership

Increasing emphasis on diverse leadership teams will likely accelerate across the industry following Newmont's appointment of its first female CEO. Diversity in background, expertise, and perspective is increasingly recognized as valuable for navigating complex challenges.

Growing importance of technological and sustainability credentials for mining executives reflects changing industry priorities. Future leaders will need to demonstrate competence in digital transformation and environmental management alongside traditional mining expertise.

Rising significance of geopolitical expertise and risk management capabilities reflects the complex jurisdictional challenges facing global mining companies. The Mali situation demonstrates the potential consequences of geopolitical risk management failures.

Evolution of corporate governance practices in the mining sector continues as boards respond to changing investor expectations. The contrasting succession approaches at Barrick and Newmont highlight different governance philosophies that will be evaluated by market performance.


FAQ: Mark Bristow's Departure from Barrick Mining

When did Mark Bristow join Barrick Mining?

Bristow became Barrick's CEO in 2019 following the merger with Randgold Resources, a company he founded and led prior to the combination. His leadership was instrumental in successfully integrating the two companies and establishing the post-merger strategic direction.

Who is replacing Mark Bristow at Barrick?

Mark Hill has been appointed as interim President and CEO. Hill currently oversees Barrick's Latin American and Asia Pacific regions and has been with the company since 2006, bringing nearly 20 years of experience with Barrick's operations. The board has initiated a global search for a permanent successor.

What is happening with Barrick's operations in Mali?

Barrick's Loulo-Gounkoto gold complex in Mali has been at the center of a dispute with the country's military government, which has demanded a larger share of profits. Operations were halted in January 2025, and the Malian government seized control of the mine in June 2025, leading to a US$1.04 billion impairment charge in Barrick's second-quarter results.

How has this situation affected Barrick financially?

Barrick reported a US$1.04 billion impairment charge in its second-quarter 2025 results due to the loss of operational control at Loulo-Gounkoto. Despite this significant write-down, the company maintains its overall production guidance for the year, indicating the strength of its remaining portfolio.

Is Barrick still meeting its production targets?

Despite the challenges, Barrick maintains its 2025 production guidance of 3.15-3.5 million ounces of gold and 200,000-230,000 tonnes of copper. This suggests that while the Mali situation represents a significant setback, the company's overall operational performance remains on track.

What changes are happening at Newmont?

Newmont announced that CEO Tom Palmer will step down on December 31, 2025, to be succeeded by Natascha Viljoen, who will become the company's first female CEO on January 1, 2026. Palmer will remain as a strategic advisor until his retirement in March 2026, ensuring a smooth leadership transition.


--- end of article ---

Source: https://discoveryalert.com.au/mark-bristow-resignation-barrick-mining-2025/ [1st October 2025]

As I mentioned earlier, Mark Hill has now been confirmed (in Feb, 2026) as the permanent replacement for Mark Bristow so Mark Hill is no longer just the acting boss, he is now the boss of Barrick, and they are making changes.

7
Bear77
Added a month ago

06-Apr-2026 (Easter Monday evening): Couple of posts on gold miner costs and other stuff ended up in the wrong forum (mostly because of me) so I'm copying some of them into this one.

This first one is about how higher diesel prices might impact miners, and I ended up talking only about gold miners of course, however it's certainly interesting to see just how terrible ChatGPT is at answering a simple question: List and compare the latest ASIC (cost) guidance provided by Northern Star Resources (NST), Evolution Mining (EVN), Capricorn Metals (CMM), Ramelius Resources (RMS), Genesis Minerals (GMD) and other large Australian gold miners.

Chatty got everything wrong, particularly their respective ASIC (cost) guidance - it wasn't even close!

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You can read the original posts (that are copied below) here: https://strawman.com/forums/topic/4591

The following post was to answer a query by @tomsmithidg - "Interesting reading there @Bear77. I'd imagine that diesel is a pretty big input cost for miners, how much impact do you reckon that is going to have on costs and consequently profits?"

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Very much company-specific IMO @tomsmithidg - because some are reliant on diesel for basic power generation, often the more remote sites that haven't invested in solar farms or other renewable generation plus energy storage assets. Some use contractors for the actual mining, and some, like NST and GMD do their own mining using their own teams, so all of that mobile equipment that runs on diesel - and not all of it does, some, particularly a fair bit of underground kit, is now electric, i.e. battery operated - but the equipment that does run on diesel won't always be a direct cost of the mine owners, although they do pay for it indirectly.

Most mining contractors have provisions in their contracts these days that allows them to recoup additional costs such as what we are seeing with the recent spike up in diesel prices and supply issues in some areas as well apparently - I experienced a small taste of that on the way back from WA to Adelaide a couple of weeks ago in the Maui motorhome with only one roadhouse in Ceduna selling diesel and only from the truck bays down the side of the servo as the main out-front bowsers were all tagged out because that diesel tank was empty. All of the other servos in Ceduna and a bunch of servos in Esperance were completely out of diesel - the one we found that did have diesel (in Esperance) were rationing and we were only allowed to buy 50 litres. We were lucky that every roadhouse back across the Nullarbor did have diesel, especially that 1,000 km stretch from Balladonia to Ceduna where service stations are often 180km to 200km apart.

But back to mining, most contractors have learned from prior busts and other various issues that they need to have their contracts structured so they won't move from profitable to unprofitable due to input costs that are outside of their own control, so only the dumb ones or the ones with a high risk tolerance are going to be feeling the pinch personally at the moment; well their cashflow will be affected, as there is often a delay between those additional costs being incurred and those costs being recouped via the mine owner, if and when such provisions do exist within contracts, but as long as they have plenty of cash to cover such delays they should be OK.

But in terms of us investing in the actual mine owners and discussing how higher diesel prices affect them, I would say that the vast majority of miners will be affected negatively in various ways, but some of them a lot worse than others, with the worst affected likely to be those who rely on diesel generators for AC Power generation for their mills and associated infrastructure, site offices, worker accomodation and facilities, etc.

The least affected are probably going to be those who have grid power, or their own renewable energy generation assets plus energy storage assets - Bellevue Gold, BGL, is one example of a company that have invested a lot into such assets, and in terms of the largest gold miners, Northern Star Resources (NST) has significantly expanded its renewable energy generation assets in recent years, primarily through long-term partnerships with Zenith Energy, aiming for 35% reduction in Scope 1 and 2 emissions by 2030. And Evolution Mining (EVN) has also focused its renewable energy strategy on major partnerships, power purchase agreements (PPAs), as well as the planned repurposing of its Mt Rawdon mine rather than owning large-scale renewable generation assets directly. 

Key details regarding EVN's renewable energy initiatives include:

  • Mt Rawdon Pumped Hydro Project (Queensland): This is Evolution's premier renewable energy asset. The company is developing a proposed pumped hydro energy storage facility at its Mt Rawdon site as part of its post-mining closure strategy. The project is designed to store up to 20,000 megawatt hours (MWh) of energy and can potentially function as a key power station. This is Jake Klein's main focus now that he's retired from front line management at EVN, Jake is now the non-executive Chair of EVN rather than his previous role as Executive Chair - he'll always be the company's founder and the man who built the company of course but his primary responsibility at EVN now is to manage the Mt Rawdon transition from mine to pumped hydro energy storage asset - and to oversee governance and the Board as the non-exec Chair.
  • Solar Power Agreements: Evolution has reduced its Scope 2 emissions through a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) for the Cowal Gold Mine in New South Wales, sourcing power from a solar farm to meet part of its energy needs.
  • Decarbonisation Targets: The company has a target of >30% renewable energy use by 2030 and is targeting net-zero emissions by 2050.
  • Renewable Energy Progress: By the end of FY25, Evolution reported an estimated ~16% reduction in emissions against its FY20 baseline, partly enabled by renewable power sourcing. 

EVN's bottom line with regard to renewable energy is that they are transitioning their operations, particularly in Queensland, to low-emission sources while pursuing the Mt Rawdon Pumped Hydro project as a commercial energy asset for long-term use.

So, the effects will vary across minesites and across miners, but there will certainly be negative effects for sure, the quantum of those will just vary a fair bit depending on the circumstances of each miner and their assets.

On the flip-side you have to look at their margins and how large those margins are. For an unhedged gold miner that is fully exposed to the spot price, most of them still have huge profit margins.

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The gold price has recently briefly dipped below A$6,500 & US$4,500 per ounce, as shown above, but we're back above those levels now and the gold price is rising more than falling over recent days so it shouldn't be too long before it's back at new all-time highs again.

However, even if you factor in an A$6,000/ounce gold price, some $783/ounce below where it is right now as I type this, that's more than double what most of these gold miner's AISC (costs) are, so if their diesel costs double or triple, that only makes up a percentage of their costs, so their AISC doesn't double or triple, it goes up by a much smaller amount, and they can live with that when they are usually selling gold for more than twice what it costs them to produce it.

I won't discuss NST now too much in relation to their costs because they're in a unique situation of being half way through the expansion of their largest asset (KCGM, a.k.a. the Super Pit and its Fimiston Mill) to more than twice its previous capacity and having a primary crusher failure at that very same flagship KCGM operation, which has recently led to multiple production downgrades. The market is concerned with what they perceive to be persistent mechanical issues, specifically with the aging Fimiston mill - which this massive capacity upgrade will fix once it's completed, but that's over 12 months away; basically they're rebuilding the mill but much bigger, while keeping the old one running during the construction and commissioning of various phases of the new mill build at the same site - so it's tricky and they've got a few plates spinning in the air and one of those dropped and smashed, and it was a decent sized plate. So these recent production downgrades have "crashed" the NST share price and severely dented market confidence, so let's leave them aside - I'm bullish on them because they have a massive growth pipeline, with Hemi being the next big project after KCGM - but they do have high costs right now - they're still highly profitable, but not AS profitable as some of their peers at this point in time.

So EVN, the next biggest Australian goldy after NST, have low costs but that is assisted by two of their mines having negative costs (negative AISC) as shown below - due to copper byproduct credits reducing the costs to a negative number:

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That was from Google - I also asked Chatty to list the costs of those miners and any other large Australian gold miners that it could think of:

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I didn't ask ChatGPT to be careful but it suggested nonetheless that the above was a "careful, up-to-date summary". And here we go with the massive limitations of cheap (free) AI tools - Check out the following exchange between me and Chatty:

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I said "Yes" and it gave me python code and said I didn't have the necessary access for it to create the chart itself. I didn't take that any further.

Even after all of that, I know those numbers are NOT accurate. In fact not one single AISC number in that summary is correct!

Chatty has NST @ A$1,500 to $1,550 AISC above, however Google confirms that "As of January 20, 2026, Northern Star Resources (ASX: NST) revised its FY26 cost guidance upward to an All-in Sustaining Cost (AISC) of A$2,600-2,800 per ounce, up from previous estimates of A$2,300-2,700/oz. This upward revision was driven by lower forecasted production and higher royalties." I know NST lowered production guidance again in March as I mentioned earlier but I haven't checked if they revised cost guidance up again. It doesn't really matter. Regardless, NST's costs are more than A$1,000/ounce higher than what ChatGPT is claiming.

Further, when I ask about EVN, Google tells me that Based on the December 2025 quarterly report and subsequent half-year results (1H FY26), Evolution Mining (ASX: EVN) has updated its FY26 Cost Guidance (AISC) to A$1,640 – A$1,760 per ounce and that updated guidance represented a 6% improvement on their original guidance due to strong cost control and higher by-product credits, despite short-term operational impacts from a weather event at Ernest Henry. That's low costs, but Chatty has an even lower AISC listed above for EVN.

Again, Google has higher costs than Chatty does for CapMetals: An AISC of A$1,530 - A$1,630 per ounce - although, again, that's at the lower end of costs for Australian gold miners at this point in time.

The most striking error is Chatty naming WGX as the lowest cost gold producer with AISC of A$1,250 to $1,300/ounce. Google says their costs are MUCH higher than that: A$2,600 – A$2,900 per ounce, more than double what ChatGPT is claiming and it places WGX alongside NST as the equal highest cost producers out of that group.

Nah, hold the train, RRL's latest guidance is for an AISC of A$2,610 – $2,990 per ounce (according to Google) so they're a smidge higher still.

FWIW, Google says that GMD recently maintained their FY26 AISC guidance at A$2,500 – A$2,700 per ounce and RMS is claiming their FY26 AISC should be between A$1,700 – A$1,900 per ounce.

So we've got EVN, CMM and RMS as the lowest cost gold producers, with all-in sustaining costs (AISC) ranging from A$1,530 to A$1,900/ounce of gold produced and we've got NST, WGX, GMD and RRL guiding for AISC of between A$2,500 and A$2,990, basically A$3,000/ounce at the top end. So even the higher cost producers from that list of 7 of Australia's largest gold producers are selling their gold for more than double what it costs them to dig it up, process it, and turn it into gold bars.

So they can absorb higher costs, including significantly higher diesel costs.

But that's just a quick analysis of gold miner margins, and this thread isn't even supposed to be about gold miners, so what am I doing?!? Well, I've slipped back into my circle of competency I guess and attempted to analyse the higher diesel price impacts on an area I'm more familiar with. When it comes to Aussie miners outside of gold miners, I have far less insight unfortunately, but I guess it still comes down to margins, so those with higher margins can more easily wear higher costs, and those with much thinner margins could be in trouble, especially if the increased costs stay higher for longer.

That's all I've got for now. Hope some of it was helpful to somebody. At least I now know that ChatGPT is worse than useless.

---

Here's a great post by @SudMav on the same topic:

I know you didn't ask me specifically, however from my understanding of the sector is that the impacts of the diesel situation are on a case by case scenario, and dependent on the company in question and their current stage in the mining cycle, their infrastructure (grid powered, solar, generator) and type of mining activity that is being undertaken.

While for a different purpose, i came across https://www.atse.org.au/media/5z0nb2dj/atse-decarbonising-diesel-industries-report-final.pdf when I was doing some reading on the impacts of diesel on my investments - which helped me understand the impacts a bit better on the companies I hold. An excerpt from the document below includes a good breakdown of the uses of diesel across multiple industries, along with proportionate usage from the mining industry.

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Using the table above and the company I posted about yesterday Savannah Goldfields as an example, they only reported a fuel cost of $70k last half, which is likely to operate their vehicles and power their accommodation. That however is not the full picture as fuel costs are also embedded within a number of their mining activities such as transport of materials (the increase cost of shifting their ore 80km from Agate Creek to the mill) and subsequently the seller, blasting to mine the ore from the pit, crushing the ore for processing and any future exploration endeavours they need to fund.

Personally I think SVG's transport costs will be more than double (due to a combination of the increased price, increased activities and the further travel to the Agate creek mine in the future), and I have factored this into my cost calculations which are broken down on a $/tonne throughput for their operations.

I hope this helps you work out how the increased cost impacts the companies that you hold.

----------------------------------------------------------------

On a separate note, the exec summary and commentary in the report regarding fuel security and the fact that people have been saying since 2020 that Australia’s heavy reliance on imported diesel undermines both its fuel security and its capacity for energy independence.

"Australia imports nearly 29 billion litres of diesel annually, reflecting a heavy dependence on international fuel markets and diminishing domestic refining capacity. This reliance presents national security vulnerabilities due to geopolitical risks and potential supply chain disruptions."

Who could have possibly seen this coming... lol

---

And here's another excellent contribution, this one being specifically about RMS, by @Slideup:

@tomsmithidg just to add to what @Bear77 and @SudMav have written, the effect of the jump in diesel prices is going to be very company specific. For example RMS initially jumps out as a company that is going to be highly impacted by diesel costs given their hub and spoke mine model and the transport of ore to central mills. However, they have been savvy over the last few years and have been hedging the costs of some of their diesel. They currently have 3.9million litres at a cost of $0.78/L out til March 2027. They say this is a small portion but it definately helps and gives them some breathing room during the acute phase of this shock.

These guys have also added a hybrid (solar/gas with battery storage component) power plant at the Mt magnet mine partly as a response to their carbon reduction initiatives, but will now provide benefits in terms of the fuel input costs to generate electricity. So overall they will be partly insulated, but I am estimating that the diesel prices itself might add up to $200/ounce to their AISC costs, but given the price of gold they will still be making excellent margin per ounce. I think we will get good detail on this in the next quarterly.

The big risk for RMS or many miners is what happens in a scenario of fuel rationing, as I can't really see a good rationale for a gold miner to be given priority to limited fuel.

---

11

Bear77
Added a month ago

Tues 7-Apr-2026: To further clarify RMS' position with regard to diesel - beyond what @Slideup shared here with us over the weekend (see above this post in this thread for that, or click here), Ramelius have devoted half a page in their March Quarter Update today to that very issue:

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Source: Page 2 of RMS-March-2026-Quarter-Update.pdf

10

tomsmithidg
Added a month ago

@Bear77 your contributions are always exceptional mate, thanks again. @SudMav and @Slideup thanks to you guys too.

8

SudMav
Added a month ago

I’ll be heading into Resources Rising Stars in Adelaide today. Not sure how many from the forum will be attending but happy to meet any strawfolk who are there. DM me if you are going.

11

thetjs
Added a month ago

Won't be attending @SudMav but keen to hear your thoughts on any of the presentations!

7

Bear77
Added a month ago

I did attend the RRS (Resources Rising Stars) event at the Adelaide Convention Centre today (Thursday 10th April) and it was good to catch up with @SudMav and put a face to the name. It was AFL-themed, in line with this being the "Gather Round" in Adelaide this week, and I didn't make it much past the half way point of the 4th quarter, leaving after GG8 (Gorilla Gold's CEO Charles Hughes) presented.

There were plenty of takeaways, but at a high level (without getting into the weeds too much) here are some thoughts based on my notes:

  • If I wanted some pure silver exposure, or increased silver exposure, Andean Silver (ASL) would be worthy of further research I reckon, even though their project is in Chile. I have a bid in for a Chilean gold explorer and project developer, Tesoro Gold (TSO), and it's the only buy order that I had in the market for my speccy portfolio that did not go through today - the TSO SP actually went up by +6.19%, surprisingly, and I had a low-ball bid in. So I don't mind Chile as a mine / mining project location / destination. TSO is developing mining projects in the Coastal Cordillera region of Chile, basically down the Chilean west coast, close to infrastructure, and they have Mark Connelly as their Board Chair, which is a big plus in my book (see here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8dlKD9Tb68) Mark is also the Chair of CYL, AAR, SRZ & ERM and there's a bunch of companies that he has been involved with previously, usually as Chairman or in a management capacity, that have been acquired. ERM (Emmerson Resources) has a recommended takeover offer on the table right now (I sold out of them a few months ago before that takeover landed unfortunately). I hold AAR (Astral Resources) in my speccy PF, and I added SRZ (Stellar Resources) this morning (from a buy trade I lodged last night); SRZ is a tin play that have a decent deposit (Heemskirk) alongside Metals X's Renison Tin Mine in Western Tasmania (Australia’s largest tin mine), [correction: Renison is actually owned by the Bluestone Mines Tasmania Joint Venture (BMTJV), a 50/50 partnership between a subsidiary of Metals X Limited (MLX) and YT Parksong Australia Holding Pty Ltd (a subsidiary of the Yunnan Tin Group of China).] And I usually hold Catalyst Metals (CYL) in my SMSF (and do intend to hold them in my ISA). I sold out of them (CYL) yesterday (Wednesday 8th April) when I liquidated my entire SMSF once again based on my expectation that the market's euphoria yesterday was probably unsustainable and likely overdone. That SMSF was all cash at the end of Feb and into March until I got a call from CBUS saying they couldn't open my income stream account (ISA) until the trading window opened for the sale of the $45 K worth of CBUS Infrastructure Fund units that I held (the only thing I was unable to cash out of myself) - which will be some time this month (April) - so half way through my WA Motorhome Trip I started trading again using that cash, because gold company share prices had fallen so much, and I only fully exited the last of those trades yesterday, all at a profit luckily, so I'm back out of CYL again for now - CYL closed at $6.96 yesterday, up +11% for the day, but they got up to $7/share earlier in the day. So, yeah, having Mark Connelly as a non-exec Chair is a big plus IMO, so that's pushed me to look closely at TSO (and put a low-ball bid in for a $5K starter position). I haven't looked closely enough at ASL yet however. But their presso today has sparked my interest.
  • Auravelle Metals (AUV) are also worthy of further investigation, too early stage for me at this point, but alongside mines and tenements owned by BC8 and HRZ, so if AUV find something decent, there could be some M&A in their future.
  • For pure Manganese exposure here in Australia, Trek Metals (TKM) look quite good. Their CEO, Derek Marshall even brought a lump of it in which came from the outcropping deposit (i.e. above ground) - so that people could actually handle a chunk of manganese and feel the weight of it - I didn't do the booth circuit, just watched the presentations - well, most of them.
  • The Great Boulder Resources (GBR) presentation by their MD, Andrew Paterson, reminded me of why I did invest in them last year, and that I probably shouldn't have exited so soon. They are finding plenty of gold, the grades are good, and they have WGX, NMG and MEK as neighbours, so while I DO hold NMG and MEK (not WGX), I reckon GBR probably deserves a spot back in my SPF, if I can make room for them. If memory serves, my earlier concerns were more about the type of gold and the processing required, as the grades and quantity of gold is fine - I need to revisit my earlier thesis and see why I thought it was busted when I moved on (out of them) a few months back.
  • Peninsula Energy (PEN) looks like an excellent Uranium play, particularly as Australia does not have a uranium market and the US does, and PEN produce their uranium in the US.
  • Alex Dorsch, MD of Chalice (CHN) made a very convincing argument for CHN, particularly their palladium, and that they have plenty of government support. I need to do more work on CHN; I haven't looked at them for a few years but their Gonnevile Palladium-Nickel-Copper project, only 70 km North of Perth does sound very good, or at least it did today.
  • The Barton Gold (BGD) presentation by their MD, Alexander Scanlon, was interesting not least because I'd always thought of BGD as a gold company and I hadn't considered the high grade silver that they have. Alex also outlined their strategy of consolidating the area, and then focusing on developing Tunkillia (gold) first - it struck me as a team that knows what they're doing and are executing well on their strategy.
  • The Astral Resources (AAR) presentation was very good, and reinforced to me why I hold AAR shares. My main takeaway from that one was to expect a Mandilla Resource upgrade within the next 2 to 3 weeks, and that there should be some decent drilling / assay newsflow for the next little while.

... I gotta go - people have arrived for dinner - I'll continue this later...

  • OK, I'm back. Marc Ducler, the MD of AAR also mentioned that the Mandilla DFS is due in the September quarter this year and they are expecting to make the FID on Mandilla by the end of this calendar year. And that there is also significant potential for underground development beneath the planned open-pit, with recent deep diamond drilling confirming that mineralisation remains open at depth. I'm a happy holder of AAR (in my SPF; Speccy Portfolio).
  • Bellavista Resources (BVR) is a company I knew nothing about prior to today, and I guess that's why you attend these things, to learn stuff you did not know. BVR management and Board are ex-DEG (De Grey Mining, i.e. the Hemi deposit, acquired last year by NST), and BVR just acquired the "world-class" (I heard that term a lot today) 2.8Moz Pickle Crow Gold Project in Canada from Firefly Metals (FFM). FFM's CEO, Darren Cooke (who is ex-NST himself) said they didn't have the "bandwidth" to develop both projects at the same time so he's happy to have divested Pickle Crow to Bellavista and to have ended up with a heap of Bellavista (BVR) shares as part of that deal so FFM shareholders can still participate in the upside of Pickle Crow. Google tells me that FFM sold their 70% interest in the Pickle Crow Gold Project for up to A$86.1 million (to BVR), primarily in a scrip-based deal. The deal includes 60 million upfront Bellavista shares (valued at A$47.4m) and 50 million performance rights (valued up to A$38.7m), with cash options for specific development/production milestones. I intend to buy FFM in my ISA once it's up and running - I previously did hold them in my SMSF - coz I can't find a better world-class copper development asset anywhere, at least not via an ASX-listed company. FFM's Green Bay Copper-Gold project in Newfoundland, Canada, is a terrific find, and it just keeps getting bigger and better. So I will hold FFM in my ISA but I can't hold BVR there because they aren't in the ASX300 Index (they're not even in the All Ords yet), and that's one of the fund rules, so if I do buy some BVR it's going to have to be in my SPF instead, and that's already got 14 companies in it, so it's looking full.
  • Minerals 260 (MI6) was one of the most compelling presentations of the day, and I am now forced to have a much more thorough look at MI6. They've recently been added to the ASX300, so I'll be able to hold them in my ISA. They've got a lot of land, and a lot of gold, they're cashed up, fully funded through to FID, and they're clearly driven. They know what they're doing and they're not wasting any time doing it. I had previously ruled them out as a prospective investment because they looked too expensive and too hyped, but like a lot of gold project developers, their share price did succumb to gravity recently, a bit, from a high of 73 cps down to 58 cps, however they've already bounced back and they made a new all-time intra-day high of 77.5 cps today before closing at 74.5 cps - which is their highest ever closing share price, so maybe I wasn't the only one there today who thought that their MD, Luke McFadyen, made a brilliant case for why people should grab some exposure to MI6 despite their excellent run already, because there was (in his opinion) plenty of upside left in the company. I'll likely want to buy on a pullback, but that might also mean I never hold the stock. You can't pat all the fluffy dogs.
  • Greenvale Energy (GRV) is another uranium company, except I'd not heard of this one, and their MD, Alex Cheeseman, gave an entertaining presentation. They're chasing a number of uranium targets here in Australia but while they'd like to become uranium producers one day, they stress that the market is overseas so they would be catering to international uranium demand, because there's bugger all demand for uranium here in Australia. So much riskier than PEN, both because of where they are, and because of the stage they're at. Personally, if I was going to invest in uranium, it would be through PEN, not an explorer and wanna-be project developer like GRV.
  • Ian Bamborough, the MD of Saturn Metals (STN) made another sensible pitch for why Apollo Hill is going to be a profitable large scale gold heap leach operation. They have low grades, but a lot of gold, all together with a very low strip ratio, and very simple chemistry required to extract the gold, so very much amenable to heap leaching, as happens a lot more in the Northern Hemisphere. It's logical but not very exciting. My own concern is that they have significant insto ownership, including North American instos, and if any of those substantial holders get cold feet and want to back out, it's going to put a fair amount of downward pressure on the share price. You can make the same argument for any company with plenty of institutional ownership, but it's worse when they're a project developer and any number of things can go wrong during the development of the project, the build, the commissioning, and the operation of the project. In short, I see limited upside in STN compared to a number of others that I do hold or would like to hold, and more downside risk than I am comfortable with personally.
  • Firefly Metals (FFM) is one I mentioned above when talking about Bellavista (BVR), and I've discussed the many benefits of their Green Bay Copper-Gold project here on SM before. The short version is that Newfoundland is very mining friendly, there is heaps of infrastructure on their doorstep including a port and cheap hydro power, and it's a brilliant deposit with both high grade VMS (Volcanogenic Massive Sulphide) lenses and the large-scale copper-rich Footwall Zone (FWZ), which is a broad copper stringer zone, so two different types of mineralisation, rarely found together at this sort of scale. I will be a holder of FFM once my ISA (income stream account) is up and running later this month.
  • E79 Gold Mines (E79) is a great little junior gold explorer and their CEO, Ned Summerhayes, only talked about one of their projects today, being their recently acquired Cue Gold project which is in WA's Murchison region wedged between tenements owned by Westgold (WGX) and tenements owned by Ramelius (RMS), who are both mid-tier to large Australian gold miners. Neither are in the same class as NST or EVN, but they're in the group below those two majors. E79 is much, much, MUCH smaller however, a real junior with a market cap of only around $10 million, but have a look at where their Cue project is in relation to Great Fingall, which WGX have recently fired back up again:


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The pink tenements are RMS, the green tenements are WGX, and the blue tenements are Caprice Resources (CRS). Never heard of Caprice Resources? Nor had I until a few weeks ago, however I got interested in them when I noticed that @BkrDzn had added some to his Strawman portfolio on 2nd March, and then added more on 2nd April. I added $5K of CRS to my speccy portfolio this morning (trade lodged last night and executed at the open this morning) after having a look at them last night. I already held E79. CRS did not present today at the RRS conference.

And Cue (shown above) is just one of E79's projects. They also own land alongside KAL's tenements east of Kalgoorlie, which they call their Laverton South gold project, and that E79 land actually runs right up to the edge of KAL's Lighthorse gold discovery (as shown below) - and Ramelius (RMS) once again own a lot of land around there which includes RMS' Rebecca and Lake Roe gold deposits which they (RMS) plan to develop once they finish developing their Dalgaranga assets in the Murchison (or at least Never Never & Pepper to start with).

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So methinks there's some M&A in E79's future if they find anything decent, possibly they get acquired by KAL, even more probably by WGX or RMS, and my money would be on RMS, because RMS are cashed up, have a large unused line of credit for making acquisitions, buying E79 would be pocket change for RMS, and because RMS own tenements that share boundaries with E79's tenements at both E79's Cue project and at E79's Laverton South project (shown above). Unlike RMS, KAL & WGX only own adjoining tenements at one of those two projects

  • Novo Resources Corporation (NVO) is an early stage gold and copper explorer who don't have anything solid to hang their hat on yet, however they are 10% owned by NST - NST did own 8.53% of NVO, but it's now 10% after a recent placement according to Mike Spreadborough, NVO's executive Co-Chairman today. Mike is interesting - he's been a senior manager at some of Australia's largest mining companies and now he's heading up this little $9 million outfit (yep, their market cap is just $9 million). Spreadborough has a mining engineer background with over 20 years' experience in mining lead, zinc, uranium, copper, gold and iron ore. He has held roles across the scope of the industry from business and project development to operations and exploration. In recent times he held the position of CEO of Metals X Limited, MD & CEO of Nusantara Resources and Non-Executive Director of CleanTeQ Holdings. He has also held positions as the General Manager - Mining for WMC, Vice President - Mining for BHP Billiton at the Olympic Dam Mine and the General Manager - Coastal Operations for Rio Tinto, responsible for port operations and the Pannawonica mine site. Previous to those roles he also held the positions of Chief Operating Officer for Inova Resources Ltd (formerly Ivanhoe Australia) and Sandfire Resources (SFR). And now he's at NVO who I struggle to get interested in. Sure, they have NST with a blocking stake (10%) that gives NST right of refusal on any takeover attempt, but that's probably just good business seeing as NVO and NST have a JV called the Engina Project immediately south of NST's Hemi Gold project in the Pilbara region of WA. That JV was originally between NVO & DEG, but NST acquired DEG last year, so the JV is now between NVO & NST. It could amount to something, but it hasn't yet. Wake me up when they have found something worth discussing.
  • Centaurus Metals (CTM) sounds like they have a promising nickel project over in Brazil, but two things turn me off: 1. It's nickel. And 2: They're talking about FID by the end of 2028, if everything goes to plan. We could all be learning Mandarin by then. The biggest positive is that it's going to be low cost apparently, capable of going up against Indonesian Nickel in terms of costs. Timeframe is too long for mine.
  • Gorilla Gold (GG8) - after this one I left the room and went home - despite there being another 5 companies that had not yet presented (MEX, OCN, TOR, AKA and COD - actually those last two were just exhibitors, not scheduled to present) followed by a panel discussion that included Hedley Widdup and Bill Beament - as I walked out to the lifts I saw Bill sitting outside on a bench scrolling through something on his phone - he was probably checking out the market's positive response to his Develop achieves steady-state production at Woodlawn announcement (DVP was up +4.36% to $5.51). I'd taken in enough new info for one day. Anyway, GG8: Nothing new to what I've already written here on SM about GG8 - I still hold them in my SPF and they are still drilling like mad people at their main projects (Comet Vale & Mulwarrie) 50 km north (NNW) of Kal, with one of those projects (Mulwarrie) being just 8km away from Ora Banda's Davyhurst mill, as shown below:


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The fact that they are always highlighting how many operating gold mills they have close by still suggests to me that GG8 are most likely hoping to get acquired before they have to build their own mill. Either that or they would like to get their gold toll treated at one or more of those mills. But overall I reckon they're geologists who live for the discoveries.

There was once a time when I thought Genesis (GMD) might have a crack at GG8 to consolidate or merge GG8's assets with GMD's Zoroastrian and Aphrodite gold deposits which came with the St Barbara assets that Genesis acquired a couple of years ago but are too far south (too close to Kalgoorlie) to be considered within that Leonora to Laverton area that Raleigh Finlayson at Genesis is so fond of and wants to further consolidate. The latest mutterings are that Genesis consider Zoroastrian and Aphrodite to be non-core assets that they would be happy to divest at the right price. So where does that leave GG8? Probably still drilling more than 15 other gold project developers put together would be, and expanding their Resources. One thing about GG8, if there's gold in their ground, it's very unlikely to go unnoticed. They do like to drill, a lot! Which is exactly what you want a company in their position to do.

I should mention that Genesis (GMD) still own 6.36% of GG8 - they did hold more but their position has been diluted by various CRs that GG8 have done that GMD did not participate in. I don't think it means much. GMD don't need the money, so they're not selling, and it's not enough to block anyone else from taking over GG8, so it's probably not important.

I'm holding GG8 in my SPF and still feel they belong there as one of the better explorers and project developers. You don't make new discoveries, or increase the size of existing ones unless you drill, and they are drilling. So they are always cum-drilling-assay-results. So, not boring. Sometimes releasing results that are a little underwhelming, but never boring.

So I'm not planning to sell out of GG8 any time soon. But never say never. What I hold today could change tomorrow. Depends on what I feel are the best set of companies to hold at any given time, and days like today where a bunch of new companies present, can often result in my investable universe expanding a little more. I'll sleep on it.

11

SudMav
Added a month ago

First up the main highlight for me was to finally meet up with @Bear77 in person, and it was great to shoot the breeze and learn a bit more about how he approaches the companies he invests in, and what to look for.

I feel like Bear’s writeup is pretty spot on with my thinking on most things, however I did skip a few sessions to have a break and do a bit of scuttlebutt talking to the MD’s, asking some novice level questions and seeing if the leadership team were generally likeable people.

For someone who has not yet been to one of these events, I would highly recommend going along. I got to speak to a few MD’s of companies and found a few more interesting names to add to the watchlist.

I also highly recommend the interview with Mark Connelly on Money of Mine, as he provides some really good behind the scenes insights from a board perspective.

I’ll start my post off with a point of difference from Bear77, and will focus first on what I learnt from the roundtable session with the industry folks:

  • Geopolitics is becoming more prevalent, and some of the roundtable expect that more of these price floors will be implemented given the increased focus on national security from the US.
  • The market appears to underestimate the lead time and difficulties in bringing new resource supply to the market to meet demand shortfalls.
  • The gold selloff and recovery earlier this month aligned with similar behaviour that occurred during Covid and the GFC.
  • The chance of a stagflation event is increasing, especially if the war in Iran persists.
  • With companies like Reece passing on their increased costs to end users, its likely that builders with fixed price contracts could be at risk of financial challenges.
  • Capital supply is getting a bit tighter, and the willingness for funding will adjust based on the market sentiments and opportunities at hand.
  • Bill Beament shared some insights based on a recent update received from Trafigura on fuel supply. Currently crude is not making in through Hormuz and creating a supply shortage for the refineries. The price of fuel is not dropping even after the excise reduction (especially diesel) as Australia is paying overs to guarantee fuel supply. I'm sure @Strawman will cringe, but the panel commended the government and agreed that the reduction in the fuel excise is shielding customers from an even bigger inflation shock.
  • BYD is planning to supercharge its production, and is looking to significantly increase its lithium demand over the next 5 years to meet estimated production needs.
  • One of the main risks to the industry is from a resourcing perspective, and its challenging to find delivery and mine operating staff in the current environment.
  • The demand for grid integrated power or renewable energy infrastructure is likely to increase over the coming years for mining operations.

 

 As a relative newbie to the sector, here’s some observations and insights I also got from interactions with the MD’s on the day:

  • Attending these conferences is critical. While the information written on the slides are helpful, the 3D models or comments in session that get you to focus on things that may not immediately stand out when reading the presentation slides.
  • There could be an opportunity investing in companies that are developing but not yet producing, as they are hopefully going to miss out on the diesel supply issues in the shorter term.
  • Some of the MD’s and staff in the small cap companies hold multiple hats, as they are trying to keep their staff lean to focus their capital spend on exploration to meet the  
  • While grade and resource matter, a capable board with a proven track record is also part of the puzzle that needs to be balanced.
  • The current diesel price is likely to have an impact on the final NPV calculations of any companies who are looking to put a Feasibility Study in the short term.
  • There are a few companies who have had to shift their proposed processing site or storage facilities in their feasibility studies, as the drilling results continue to find high grade ore.
  • Some of the smaller companies are quite clever with their drilling, and liaise with neighbouring small cap companies to help bundle work and reduce costs.


I've started putting together my comments on the companies, but wont get a chance to finish tonight. I have posted my raw initial observations tonight, and when I get around to it I will try add any further info/insights on the companies that Bear77 has not already shared.

16

SudMav
Added 4 weeks ago

After what feels like an eternity, I have got around to finalising my notes from the day. I have tried to keep the thoughts authentic and separate from what @Bear77 has already raised in his post, so if its short then its already been covered.

Auravelle: Agree its worth a review. 26% inside ownership. Located very close proximity to the Barton Gold challenger mill (currently in care and maintenance but work being progressed to restart) who are discussed later.

Trek: The company had a really cool video on the opportunity and bringing the ore in was a great differentiator from the others (wow it was heavy as hell). Very high-grade Manganese (44%) from the rock sampling done to date. Discussions with the MD highlighted that the wet season will impact their drilling campaign, and they will need at least 2 seasons of drilling to help firm up the resources. Probably not for me right now.

Great Boulder: A compelling presentation and one of the companies that immediately stood out as one of the highlights from the first round of presentations. $12m cash and 22km of targets to drill. 3 rigs drilling and trying to expand resources. I tried to meet the MD at the booth but never got a chance to discuss. On my watchlist and will be doing some more reading.

Chalice: Another promising pitch from a well capitalised company, who are funded up until FID and have Tim Goyder as a 6% holder. Recently appointed some former Anglo staff to the board. The selling point was that palladium could increase in use across electronics due to the conductivity. 21 year mine life and very low AISC compared to the peers. Added to my watchlist.

Javelin: Another name I had never heard of who are about to restart their Eureka Gold project (50km from Kargoolie) in Q2 via a 50% profit sharing arrangement with MEGA to mine the JORC  resources on site. Javelin will retain 70% of any future ounces greater than what is already there. Proceeds will go to further advancing further exploration at Eureka and the former RMS Coogee mine south of Kargoolie. $4m cash at bank with a $28m market cap. Javelin to receive prepayments of $250k per month over the 18 month period once ore processing commences, Discussions underway with Kargoolie operators, however no third-party tolling arrangements have been agreed to date. Probably watch for now until details of a third party agreement are known.

Strickland: Probably just scrapes in as a smaller company, with their Tier 1 gold project in Serbia. 8.6moz of gold at 1.3 g/t and a very low EV/oz ($55), likely attributed to the jurisdiction. The company is funded to PFS in mid 2027 and has already got Zijin as a strategic shareholder given their mining presence in eastern Serbia. Drilling underway to firm up numbers for PFS. While they mentioned Serbia is very pr-mining, this one is way too far out of my circle of competence for now.

Barton Gold: An economist run company that I had never heard of, with an interesting pitch, 21% inside ownership and a bold long term strategy. They didn’t want to focus on reopening challenger mill initially, however the current gold price is too compelling not to do a DFS. Expecting to have Challenger back operational in early 2027. Proximity to existing infrastructure is a major plus, with the main arterial roads and rail between SA and Perth/Darwin running through their Tarcoola site. Agree with Bear that they seem to be a well-oiled machine, who have done what they can with wheeling and dealing to substantial shareholder dilution (only 50m shares since IPO in 2021). They will however likely need some equity funding to obtain the $400m capex, which would be a 200% dilution at the current price. On the watchlist.

Astral: I managed to have a chat with Marc regarding Astral and he appeared to be a no bullshit straight shooter. I asked about their ability to get funding through to production at Mandilla. He was also the only MD/CEO I spoke to that highlighted the future uncertainty around debt with Iran/Private Equity. In our chat and the presentation he mentioned that they expect circa $50m from the Joint Venture at Think Big, bringing cash up to around $126m. Marc seemed very confident they would be able to raise the remaining $100m to build the mill via debt funding (through Taylor Collison).

I also had the luxury of being at the booth with a gentlemen who previously was the caretaker of the Spargoville site in the past. Marc and the other gentlemen had an interesting discussion about the future site prospects which seemed generally positive, and the history of the site, initially purchased from the adjoining owner to reduce the waste transportation costs. He also touched on the fact that the DFS was pushed back from Q2 to Q3 as they now have to relocate the infrastructure (again) following the recent Spargoville drilling results.

Other than the upgrades Bear mentioned, what stood out for me was the fact that the Theia underground mining will now be considered in the DFS that will be released later this year. I had a speccy position in this late last year and will probably be jumping back in at weakness over the next few months.

Bellavista Resources (BVR): Not much to add on what Bear had to say. Found out interestingly that they have the same core investor backing to FFM and a few other companies that presented at the RRS event, all of which tended to be able to attract pretty impressive leaders on their boards. You won’t find a preso on the day for BVR, as they just talked to a shorter version of the release on 2 February.

$22m cash following the cap raise earlier in the year and an EV circa $50m for a 2.8moz underground mining asset with 7.2g/t gold. Bellavista are looking to do near surface drilling around the site to help demonstrate its not just an underground mine opportunity. Adding to the watchlist.

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Alicanto: Another company that was related to the Firefly Metals and Bellevue Gold company, with their board stacked with former employees with a decent background. Westgold spun the Mt Henry site off to Alicante which included scrip which gave them 20% ownership in the company. Existing reserves of 915koz of gold at 1.2 g/t. Approx 20km from the Norseman project for Pantoro Gold, with no drilling for a long time.

They recently raised $18m for a 1% Royalty, with the potential to increase to a 2% if they put in another $10m in the future. In return, Alicanto also got 4m Stria shares (valued at $3.1m). Funding to go towards further drilling, which will start to take place in Q4 2026. Circa 69m in performance rights and options which could add another 50% to the market capitalisation. Added to my watchlist

Minerals 360: One of the top presentations for the day. 8% inside ownership, along with a recent market investment from Franco Nevada. Not much to add, but definitely on the watchlist.

Greenvale: While I missed the start, I did see the end of the presentation, where he went into a bit of detail about the Torbonite opportunity, and the eco certification work they are doing to get certification for Bitumen. Not up my alley due to the Uranium focus.

Saturn:The highlight of this presentation was the 3D modelling that Ian was able to bring up on screen. The benefit of having this was that he could easily demonstrate the low waste generated as there isn’t much dirt where there isn’t gold present. Expecting 88% gold recovery at a 4mm crush for fresh rock, with oxide and transitional at 86%. PFS had a 2.3 year payback at $4300 or 1.3years @ $6,200.

Will be a consistent earner due to the way that the current pit design is structured. Estimated $470m to build the heap leach facility in the PFS. Further drilling in the iris trend along with Infill Drilling is likely to expand the overall resources and reduce risk for DFS. I will be watching to see how the DFS goes but watching for now as a lot could happen between now and 2028 production.

Firefly Metals: I think Bear77 undersold this one, as this was definitely a compelling pitch and in my top 3 presentations for the day. $251m cash which should fund them up to DFS and Early Works. 8% inside ownership. Low power costs due to hydro power in the area. Lots of drilling being undertaken as well to further expand the gold/copper resources. Good strategic location for the mine, which is located in close proximity to a town, port and workforce. On the watchlist and need to do some reading on this one.

E79: Ned Summerhayes is not your typical confident CEO who lays on the sales pitch, and you could see from his presentation he was getting excited about the geology of the site. 11% insider ownership $3.5m in cash. I was able to have a chat with Ned for quite a long time in the morning before the presentations started, and I really liked the way that he was thinking. As a $10m market cap company, he was very level headed about the opportunities in the market, and was open about the deal being negotiated for many years before it eventually landed. Ned was very generous with his time and was happy to answer geology related questions that didn’t even relate to his site.

What sold me on this one to take my speccy investment was the decision process and strategic shifts that they have been undertaking. Offloading the Jungar Flats site to focus on Mountain Home and Cue is the much better return on the limited cash they have. Drilling will commence later this year once they reach an agreement with the native title owners.

Havilah Resources: Interesting  presentation which showed their focus on finding good assets, and the 3P strategy of Prospect, Prove and Partnerships. They then try to reach a successful deal to offload the asset and move onto the next site. The Sandfire deal was pretty exciting for the company, and could be another big payday for Havilah. Havilah received $31.5m cash and 4.6m Sandfire shares for Stage 1 payment. Not much else in the presentation but may warrant some further reading given this was one of the top picks by one of the roundtable members.

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Gateway Mining: A strong board with 10% ownership, and experience working together on Strickland metals. The Yandal project has a 70km greenstone belt over two shears, one of which has not been explored to date. The main camp is located 50km of the NST Yandal operation centre. Company has $19m in cash to undertake significant drilling to further expand on their 400koz resource.

Novo: Dual listed explorer who has $11m in cash and EV of $37.7m. Like Bear the main thing of interest to me was the ownership from NST and the Creasy Group. The group has 9 active from Gold, Antimony and copper, with their main focus on Belltopper gold. The company has $10m in deferred payments are due to IMC in December 2026. Not sure what it was but the presentation didn’t really get me all excited about the company, and didn’t really get much from Michael at the booth.

Akira: Very small company with high inside ownership and two projects in the Laverton/Lenora area. $4m cash at hand and 1.1bn shares issued and no JORC resources. Their Pennyweight Point site has recently had some good drill results, and their Kookynie project is adjacent to the Genesis minerals gold project.

I enjoyed the booth discussion I had with these guys at the booth, and Stave Vallance appears to have good relationships with drilling companies. The business is run with a very small staffing profile, with many staff having more than 2 hats. I have lots of similar speccy plays in my portfolio, so will probably just watch and see once they have done their next wave of drilling.

Centaurus: Interesting project to become one of the lowest cost nickel producers due to their hydro power access. 15 year operational mine life from open pit mining, with further years added if they can go underground. 2 year build time for the mill, with operations commencing in 2028-29. More promising companies in the short term.

Gorilla Gold: The plan to drill 150,000m this year was the main thing that stood out for me, with  a 50/50 split between growth and infill drilling. Other than that, nothing insightful to add that hasn’t been covered by Bear77.

Torque: Interesting proposition and I felt like Craig did a good job presenting the materials. The main story was the full overhaul of the board that is underway to bring the former spartan team back together with a view to further expand on the 250koz gold at 3.1 g/t in South Kalgoorlie. The company has 3 projects, however only the Paris Creek/HHH was discussed in the presentation.

Three drill rigs are on site (2 RC and 1 Diamond) to progress their aggressive exploration strategy at Paris Creek. $16m in cash to fund this exploration. Metallurgical testing for their site is showing high recovery rates. Will be adding this to the watchlist to see where the board wants to take this one.


Presentations I didn’t get to see: Andean Silver, Sky Metals, Oceana Metals, Minerals Exploration, Peninsula Energy.

15
BkrDzn
Added 2 months ago

Decent risk that the gold trade could be over as its on the nose to break through support. Liquidation in commodities has been acute. Obvs inflation/rates a driving risk factor but potentially another one is Gulf states and other "trade surplus" countries that are losing revenues are liquidating gold. This is something to watch for as if the central bank buying trend is over for some time, I think that could be it for gold.

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14

lastever
Added 2 months ago

@BkrDzn Grateful for all your informed posting here. Do you have an opinion about diesel prices affect on developers? I noticed that PacGold quietly took a one month pause on one of their projects.

13

BkrDzn
Added 2 months ago

Diesel is mostly fine for now from what I hear and will be a significant cost impact. A lot of mine sites run gas gen or gas/solar hybrids (More vouching for WA) which reduces impact.

For PGO, it delays some drilling as limited fuel needed for running the plant and re-crush.

I think if proper shortages emerge, it may end up more binary in terms of turning mining on or off than just throttling down mining rates.

Its all very hard with many possible outcomes.

14

Schwerms
Added 2 months ago

Those were me thoughts, preserve the diesel to run the new crusher and feed it, get the gold leaching.

The 1 month delay is annoying but could be worse in the grand scheme of things.

Wait for TACO to hopefully happen soon

13

BkrDzn
Added 2 months ago

FWIW. IRL I have been trimming across my portfolio and say so as its hard to execute on here like in IRL.

Trimming conviction winners and cutting lose smaller lazy trades or catalyst light plays like developers. Anything not funded well is also risky.

Rate risk is high and that breaks markets. Commodities are starting to struggle more as well, outside of energy. Directionality risk seems to be to the downside. Directionality is more important that perceptions of value in these situations and that can be a big trap in gold atm.

As I think as its too hard to call any way, making hedging options limited an probably ineffective, and with no desire to chase energy, cash is the place to be. I also have done well this FY so part of me doesn't want to give up the good work either, thus de-risking also provides a sanity check.

Anyway, I probably called a low waiting to this point to be more aggressive in de-risking.

18

BkrDzn
Added 2 months ago

As an update. the two black line are ones I have used regularly before and the purple is one I have seen many start using. Less touch points that the other. Could be a little relief rally given the intensity of the downside move but be mindful this is the last potential support until the lower US$4000oz range. Prior support likely becomes resistance in the event of a relief rally. With that, gold (and commodities ex-energy) feels like a capital preservation focus than a return generating focus. (Edit for typos).

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12

BkrDzn
Added 2 months ago

Updating for overnight price action.

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12

Foxlowe
Added 2 months ago

Gold Didn’t Crash — Liquidity Did

Plenty of noise this week trying to explain a move that didn’t need explaining. I believe the truth is simpler: gold didn’t crash — liquidity did.

1. This wasn’t fundamentals

A 20% flush in a couple of days is leverage being cleared. Volatility spikes, margins rise, weak hands get taken out. Fast, clean, temporary. Anyone who has traded long enough should recognise the pattern. Sometimes we’re too close to see the forest.


2. The central bank bid isn’t fixed

One line mattered:

“Gulf states losing revenues are liquidating gold.”

Surpluses turn into deficits quickly when energy rolls over. When liquidity is needed, gold gets sold. It doesn’t break the long‑term case. It does break the idea of a permanent floor.


3. Volatility isn’t a message

Humans try to attach meaning to everything. Most of the time, there isn’t any. When leverage gets flushed, volatility spikes. That’s the mechanism. The risk is reading too much into it. Volatility reflects positioning, not fundamentals.


4. The index rebalance drove the equity behaviour

NST into the ASX20, several names into the ASX100, a wave into the ASX300. Forced buying and passive flow. Equities held trend because the sector wasn’t trading gold — it was trading index mechanics.


5. The emerging producers told the real story

MEK, NMG, BC8, CYL held up because they’re priced on execution, not narrative. Cashflow inflection beats macro. When liquidity gets flushed, the operators hold their ground. The storytellers don’t.


6. The takeaway

Gold didn’t break. The narrative did. Separate liquidity from fundamentals and you stop reacting to noise. Some people are still trying to explain what happened. That’s history. Take the learnings and move on.

DISC: hold multiple gold stocks

23

BkrDzn
Added 2 months ago

To say gold didn't crash, liquidity did is a bit silly as these things are driven by flows (i.e. liquidity). The price went down as there are more sellers than buyers. One of those sellers was reported to be Turkiye. Reporting in gold is lagging so risk is if others in the region that are impacted by a blow out in their trade balances are pushed to do the same for liquidity.

The CB/SWF bid has been one of the few sustainable fundamental factors in gold. It is important and is a factor associated with liquidity. Rates/inflation are the next key risk factor that can influence gold atm.

Gold made its lowest close this month. Bounce off the 200dma met resistance at the 100dma. Retest of the 200dma is likely now. How it behaves at that level will give a better indication of if a low is being made or if we are halfway through the "party". Updated chart for posterity.

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16

Chagsy
Added 2 months ago

Gold became a meme stock. Hot retail money chasing momentum.

Gold is behaving much like digital gold in a risk on environment lol !

The geopolitical situation we are in should be highly bullish and yet….

Funny old world we live in.

(don’t hold any gold or gold stocks and not looking to enter at these prices)

14

BkrDzn
Added a month ago

Despite the initial puke out on Trump saying they're doing kick-ons in Iran, gold bounced back to reclaim the 100dma which is positive but remains stuck at resistance from prior support lines. I had done some minor tactical adding in names (CRS and LNQ) later in the week, just to wrongly satisfy an urge to "chase".

Obs the main risk is more of the same (ongoing war and energy disruption) could force more liquidations as reports in the last few weeks suggest countries impacted from the energy shock sell for liquidity support. Plus elevated inflation/rates is a headwind.

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18