New to strawman, so I am keen to sharing some comparative analysis for some of gold miners in my portfolio and on my watchlist. I have completed some research into explorers, but I don’t include it here as it can become dated extremely quickly.
The information in the table below is aggregated from analysis completed over the last 6-12 months and focus is on producers (or upcoming producers). The primary aim of the analysis was to assist in idea generation, with further deep diving before making decisions to reposition or reduce current holdings. I work in the industry, so I apply my own filters and nuances before making an investment (it's not just the numbers). However, I would love to hear other perspectives or thoughts on the information shared and I must admit I don’t know all of the companies well.
Finally, I have used AI to pull the information together into a single table, as I have looked at different metrics at different times in multiple spreadsheets. I have also used it to update recent information such as share prices and market caps in the process. I have critically reviewed the output, with specific checks for the companies of most interest and it is using a paid subscription which has been very at aggregating the information. All this to say let me know if you spot something that doesn't look right.
Output:
The table comprises of (in my preferred order of value):
1. Resource and reserves and Grade
2. Mining Method & Milling Head Grade
4. Simple DCFs price for each company (no residual value)- as a proxy for AISC & production profile
5. Average 12-month price target (added as a sanity check)
Process explanation:
The reserves and resource information is the oldest, however, I have updated this from time to time. I put this together on a “roughly right” basis, and you can find this information in a lot of company presentations. The table is my personal preference. I recently noted changes in Ora Banda numbers and there may be acquisitions that have not flowed through into the reserves (e.g. I am yet to confirm the if the Spartan acquisition is in the RMS reserves). There are others here doing a lot of drilling or work which could see additional material move into reserves. Therefore, a higher EV/reserves may indicate the market is pricing in reserves growth.
The mining method and milling head grade helps understand the key drivers for the business, potential risk and what I look at next. A couple of these are single asset head grades which are not that helpful for multi-asset companies. I find this useful for the smaller mines or those operating in a mill constrained or mining constrained environment. A mill constrained operation is expected to have higher grade feed whereby operations with milling capacity can still generate positive cashflow feeding lower grade stockpiles. There is a distinction with underground and open pit and the associated mining costs (more expensive for underground).
I run a basic 5-and 10-year DCF for each company using forward production guidance and AISC. I track these in their own workbooks for specific companies and have pulled together this number as a proxy for production profile, AISC and capex expenditure. I don’t use the final number as a company valuation or a price target; however, it is critical to note I have used the same gold price profile across all the companies (excluding those that hedge). In this case the “valuations” produced help understanding timing of cash flows and what risk profile each company has- e.g. is the value being generated by cashflows 5-10 years into the future. At the end of the 10-year DCF I subscribe zero residual value, therefore, this does not represent a valuation for a large company with significant ore reserves. NST for example is not representative.
The Table: A comparative output table to guide to what looks interesting. With nuance on what looks right and what carries risk... But I hope this helps.
Full disclosure I own RMS, GMD, BC8, KCN and NST. I have attempted to remain neutral on what I own and when I get time add the specific valuations in my strawman.
Outside of my current holdings I like CYL and VAU. RXL looks interesting but the refractory ore puts me off. I am put off by a few other things with cheaper looking companies such as management teams, jurisdictions or asset quality/complexity. But enough for now.
Excerpt:

Barrick Gold is generally considered to be the second-largest gold mining company in the world by production, trailing Newmont Corporation, although I had heard earlier this week that they had dropped to #3 - not sure who overtook them however, if indeed that did occur.
Barrick's former boss, Mark Bristow, was a pig-headed (stubborn) man who made a number of mistakes and never admitted to any of them, so he alienated a significant percentage of Barrick's shareholder base, including some large insto investors in the US, and clashed with his own Board, so it was no surprise to me when Barrick announced (with zero notice, on September 29th last year) that Bristow had resigned as President and CEO of Barrick Gold, effective immediately, after nearly seven years leading the company following the 2019 merger with Randgold Resources (Bristow was previously the boss at Randgold and then took over the top job at Barrick after the two companies merged). His departure was abrupt, with then COO Mark Hill appointed as interim CEO immediately, then later, in February this year, Mark Hill was named as the permanent President and CEO of Barrick Gold.
So Mark Hill had been the COO under Mark Bristow, but clearly didn't share the same views, particularly on risk management.
The biggest issue with Bristow at Barrick was probably his handling of the Mali situation where Barrick ultimately lost control of their gold mines in Mali as a result of Bristow refusing to negotiate with Malian "authorities", and that situation led directly to a US$1.04 billion impairment charge reported in the company's Q2 2025 financial results. Not million, BILLION. That's a LOT of money to lose because you're a stubborn, hard-headed bastard.
There was also plenty of concerns about Bristow taking Barrick away from Gold and into other metals (hence the current planned spin out [IPO] of some of Barrick's safer gold assets as mentioned in the Bloomberg article "Takeaways" above, that effectively split the company into safe gold [newco] and riskier gold+non-gold assets), and his willingness to build new mines in some of the riskiest places in the world without a good working relationship with the governments and various departments in those countries that Barrick needed to stay onside with. Mali was one example of that, the massive Reko Diq copper-gold mine in Balochistan, western Pakistan, was another example, but there are others. Point being, Barrick are clearly trying to undo a fair whack of the reputational damage they have suffered under Bristow now that he's no longer in the picture.
Reko Diq has Afghanistan to the immediate north and Iran to the west and south (see map below) - and it's basically desert with bugger-all infrastructure, so it's not a fun place to build a new mine, especially one as big as Bristow wanted Reko Diq to be. It's no wonder that after LYL did all the studies for Reko Diq they declined to participate in the bidding process for the EPCM (build) contract. As Peter De Leo explained to @Strawman in the recent interview / meeting here, LYL completed all of their commitments with regard to Reko Diq but what Barrick (Mark Bristow at that time) wanted to pay for the build was not acceptable to Lycopodium (LYL), so they declined to bid for the project. The project has since faced a number of hurdles but it's not LYL's problem now.

https://discoveryalert.com.au/security-risks-reshaping-mining-strategies-2026/ [8th April 2026]

BY
ON APRIL 8, 2026
The global mining industry has entered an era where traditional risk assessment frameworks prove increasingly inadequate for navigating complex geopolitical environments. Major mining corporations now confront security challenges that transcend conventional operational hazards, requiring sophisticated scenario planning capabilities and dynamic risk management strategies. The intersection of high-value mineral deposits with volatile political landscapes creates unprecedented investment complexities that demand innovative approaches to capital allocation and project development, particularly as executive mining mandates reshape regulatory frameworks.
This shifting paradigm becomes particularly evident when examining mega-projects in frontier markets, where security considerations can fundamentally alter development timelines and financial projections. The mining sector's traditional emphasis on geological and technical risk factors has expanded to encompass comprehensive security intelligence, cross-border stability analysis, and adaptive operational protocols designed for rapidly changing threat environments.
The announcement that Barrick to slow development at Reko Diq represents a watershed moment in mining industry risk management, highlighting how security considerations now influence investment decisions at the highest corporate levels. Following preliminary security review findings and escalating incidents in Pakistan and surrounding regions, the company implemented comprehensive project reassessment protocols extending through mid-2027. This strategic pause reflects evolving corporate governance standards that prioritise personnel safety and asset protection over accelerated development timelines.
Contemporary mining corporations have developed sophisticated risk evaluation mechanisms that integrate real-time security intelligence with traditional geological and economic assessments. These frameworks incorporate dynamic monitoring systems capable of tracking security incidents across broad geographic regions, analysing threat patterns, and predicting potential escalation scenarios. The Reko Diq security review exemplifies this approach, encompassing comprehensive evaluation of the evolving security situation, capital requirements, project financing options, and timeline optimisation strategies.
The implementation of these enhanced risk frameworks requires substantial investment in specialised personnel, intelligence gathering capabilities, and scenario modelling systems. Mining companies now employ security analysts, regional political experts, and cross-border intelligence specialists as core members of project development teams. Furthermore, this expanded expertise base enables more nuanced understanding of how local conflicts, regional instability, and international tensions can impact mining operations across extended development periods.
Modern security risk assessment also incorporates predictive modelling techniques that evaluate multiple potential scenarios for regional stability over project lifespans extending 20-30 years. These models consider demographic trends, economic development patterns, governance stability indicators, and historical conflict cycles to establish probability ranges for various security outcomes. Consequently, the complexity of these assessments reflects recognition that mining investments represent long-term commitments in environments where security conditions can fluctuate dramatically.
Mining corporations have developed sophisticated capital reallocation mechanisms designed to optimise investment returns while minimising exposure to unacceptable security risks. When projects face extended security reviews, companies implement carefully calibrated spending reduction protocols that preserve project viability without excessive capital exposure. For instance, Barrick's decision to maintain active project management while reducing capital expenditure demonstrates this balanced approach, continuing essential operations while limiting financial risk.
The financial implications of security-driven delays prove substantial across multiple dimensions. Original Phase 1 capital estimates of $5.6-6.0 billion face potential increases of 15-25 percent, while Phase 2 projections of $3.3-3.6 billion remain under comprehensive review. These escalations reflect not only construction cost inflation during delay periods but also enhanced security infrastructure requirements, modified operational protocols, and increased insurance costs reflecting elevated risk assessments.
Capital Impact Analysis During Security Reviews

The Reko Diq project's location in Chagai district of Balochistan, with proximity to Afghanistan and Iran borders, creates exceptional security complexities that distinguish it from mining operations in more politically stable regions. This tri-border positioning exposes the project to overlapping jurisdictional challenges, cross-border security threats, and regional instability dynamics that can rapidly affect operational safety and supply chain integrity.
Balochistan's position at the intersection of three national jurisdictions creates what security specialists term geographic risk concentration, where multiple threat vectors converge in a single operational area. The province's extensive border with Afghanistan and Iran exposes mining operations to spillover effects from regional conflicts, cross-border militant activities, and trafficking networks that exploit porous international boundaries. Moreover, these challenges directly impact critical minerals energy security considerations for global supply chains.
The region's sparse population density and limited government presence compound security challenges by reducing civilian oversight and emergency response capabilities. Chagai district encompasses approximately 44,427 square kilometres with predominantly pastoral and trading communities, creating vast areas with minimal official security infrastructure. This geographic reality requires mining operations to develop comprehensive self-reliant security systems capable of operating independently of local law enforcement capabilities.
Border proximity effects on mining operations include supply chain vulnerabilities where essential equipment and materials must transit potentially unstable crossing points, personnel movement complications requiring coordination with multiple national border agencies, and communication challenges in remote areas with limited infrastructure redundancy. These factors collectively increase operational costs and timeline uncertainty compared to projects in more developed regions.
Historical analysis of the Afghanistan-Iran-Pakistan corridor reveals recurring patterns of cross-border instability, tribal conflicts, and militant activities that create persistent security challenges. The region's complex ethnic and political dynamics, combined with economic factors including smuggling networks and informal taxation systems, establish baseline security conditions that require specialised management approaches.
Complex joint venture structures involving international corporations and state entities face particular governance challenges when security conditions deteriorate rapidly. Decision-making protocols must accommodate different risk tolerances, legal frameworks, and political considerations among partners with varying exposure levels to regional security threats. Barrick's consultation with joint venture partners during the security review process illustrates these collaborative decision-making requirements.
Partnership dynamics during security crises often reveal fundamental differences in risk assessment methodologies between international mining corporations and local governmental or quasi-governmental entities. International companies typically employ conservative security standards reflecting global corporate governance requirements and shareholder protection obligations, whilst local partners may have different perspectives on acceptable risk levels based on regional experience and political considerations.
Stakeholder alignment strategies in high-risk environments require continuous communication protocols, shared intelligence gathering capabilities, and coordinated response planning for various security scenarios. These collaborative frameworks must balance the need for rapid decision-making during crisis situations with the requirement for consensus among partners with potentially conflicting interests and priorities. In addition, understanding the broader geopolitical mining landscape becomes crucial for effective partnership management.
Extended security reviews generate complex financial implications that extend far beyond simple delay costs, encompassing capital escalation, opportunity costs, financing complications, and market valuation effects. The comprehensive nature of these financial impacts requires sophisticated modelling techniques that account for multiple interacting variables over extended time periods.
Mining project delays in frontier markets typically result in significant capital cost escalation due to multiple reinforcing factors. Construction material and equipment costs continue increasing during delay periods, often at rates exceeding general inflation due to supply chain constraints and specialised mining industry demand patterns. Furthermore, labour costs similarly escalate, particularly for skilled technical personnel required for complex copper-gold development projects.
Security-driven design modifications represent a major source of capital escalation for projects experiencing extended reviews. Enhanced perimeter security systems, upgraded personnel protection facilities, expanded emergency response capabilities, and fortified operational infrastructure all require substantial additional investment beyond original project specifications. These security enhancements often prove non-negotiable requirements for resuming development in deteriorated security environments.
The time value of money calculations for mega-projects experiencing 24+ month delays create substantial financial impacts independent of direct cost escalations. When applied to combined Phase 1 and Phase 2 capital budgets totalling $8.9-9.6 billion, even modest discount rate applications generate hundreds of millions in additional financing costs. Construction cost inflation averaging 3-4 percent annually compounds these effects, potentially adding $534-768 million in escalated costs over a two-year delay period.
Insurance cost escalation represents another significant factor in capital budget increases following security incidents. Political risk insurance, project completion insurance, and personnel coverage all experience premium increases when underwriters reassess regional risk profiles. However, these insurance cost increases often prove permanent rather than temporary, affecting project economics throughout operational lifespans rather than only during development phases.
Shareholders of companies experiencing extended project delays face substantial opportunity costs as capital remains committed to suspended developments rather than generating returns through alternative investments. Comparative analysis of other copper-gold development projects reveals that investors could potentially achieve superior returns by redirecting capital to operations in more stable jurisdictions with clearer development timelines.
Portfolio optimisation strategies during delay periods require careful balancing of maintaining strategic positions in high-potential projects against pursuing more immediate returns from alternative investments. Mining companies must communicate effectively with shareholders regarding the long-term value preservation rationale for maintaining suspended project positions rather than liquidating assets during uncertainty periods.
The market valuation effects of extended security reviews typically prove more severe than simple delay cost calculations might suggest. Equity markets often apply significant risk premiums to companies with substantial exposure to frontier market projects experiencing security challenges. Consequently, these valuation discounts can persist well beyond resolution of immediate security concerns, reflecting ongoing market scepticism regarding management's ability to successfully navigate complex geopolitical environments.
Security incidents create immediate and lasting effects on mining project valuations through multiple transmission mechanisms including market sentiment shifts, credit rating implications, insurance cost increases, and institutional investor behaviour changes. These valuation effects often prove disproportionate to direct operational impacts, reflecting market risk aversion and uncertainty regarding future security conditions.
Equity markets typically respond to mining security incidents with immediate share price volatility followed by sustained risk premium applications that can persist for extended periods. The magnitude of these market responses often exceeds reasonable estimates of direct financial impacts, reflecting investor uncertainty regarding management's ability to effectively navigate complex security environments and resume normal operations.
Institutional investor behaviour during security crises reveals systematic risk aversion patterns that affect mining company access to capital markets. Many institutional investment mandates specifically limit exposure to companies with significant operations in regions experiencing active security incidents, creating potential liquidity constraints and financing complications for affected mining corporations. This trend aligns with broader US uranium policy measures that reflect increasing political risk considerations in resource investment decisions.
Credit rating agencies apply sophisticated risk assessment frameworks that incorporate security incident frequency, regional stability trends, and management response effectiveness when evaluating mining company creditworthiness. Extended security reviews often trigger credit rating reviews that can result in downgrades affecting borrowing costs and debt covenant compliance requirements across entire corporate structures.
Market volatility patterns during security incidents typically follow predictable sequences beginning with sharp initial sell-offs, followed by partial recovery phases, and concluding with sustained risk premium applications until security conditions demonstrate clear improvement. Understanding these patterns enables more effective investor communication strategies and market timing considerations for capital raising activities.
Political risk insurance markets have evolved sophisticated products designed to protect mining investments against security-related losses, but coverage limitations and exclusions often prove more restrictive than companies initially anticipate. Insurance underwriters employ increasingly sophisticated risk assessment techniques that result in higher premiums and more restrictive coverage terms for projects in unstable regions.
Consortium-based risk sharing models enable mining companies to distribute security risks among multiple stakeholders, reducing individual exposure levels while maintaining project development capabilities. These collaborative structures require careful legal framework development and ongoing coordination mechanisms to ensure effective risk allocation and decision-making processes.
Government guarantee structures in joint venture arrangements can provide partial protection against political risks, but these instruments often prove limited in scope and may not cover security incident-related losses. The effectiveness of government guarantees depends heavily on the financial capacity and political stability of guarantor governments, factors that may correlate with the security risks they are intended to mitigate.
Mining companies facing extended security reviews have developed innovative approaches to maintaining project momentum whilst minimising risk exposure. These alternative development scenarios encompass phased construction strategies, enhanced technology integration, and modified operational protocols designed to reduce vulnerability whilst preserving long-term project value.
Modular construction approaches enable mining operations to minimise on-site exposure during unstable security periods whilst maintaining development progress through off-site fabrication and preparation activities. These strategies involve constructing major project components in secure locations for later transportation and assembly, reducing both personnel exposure and asset vulnerability during high-risk periods.
Remote operation capabilities have advanced significantly in recent years, enabling mining operations to maintain productive capacity with substantially reduced on-site personnel requirements. Advanced automation systems, remote monitoring technologies, and drone-based surveillance capabilities allow companies to continue essential operations whilst minimising human exposure to security threats. These developments reflect broader mining industry innovation trends transforming operational approaches.
Technology integration for enhanced security monitoring encompasses sophisticated sensor networks, satellite surveillance systems, and predictive analytics platforms capable of identifying potential security threats before they materialise into incidents. These technological solutions provide early warning capabilities that enable proactive response measures rather than reactive crisis management.
Phased development strategies also involve careful sequencing of capital deployment to minimise sunk costs during security reviews whilst maintaining project development momentum. Companies can focus initial investments on secure infrastructure development, off-site preparation activities, and technology system implementation that provide value regardless of security condition changes.
Enhanced local stakeholder integration represents a critical strategy for improving project security through community alignment and regional support development. Mining companies increasingly recognise that robust community partnerships provide more effective long-term security than purely defensive security measures, creating shared interests in project success and stability.
Military-civilian cooperation frameworks in some jurisdictions provide structured approaches to security management that leverage official security capabilities whilst maintaining appropriate civilian operational control. These arrangements require careful legal and political navigation to ensure compliance with international standards and corporate governance requirements.
Community investment amplification strategies during security review periods can strengthen local support networks whilst maintaining project visibility and stakeholder engagement. Companies like Barrick continue investing in existing community programmes despite reduced development activity, recognising that sustained community relations prove essential for long-term project viability.
Extended delays at major copper development projects create competitive advantages for alternative copper sources through accelerated investment flows, enhanced market positioning, and supply chain rebalancing opportunities. Mining companies with projects in more stable jurisdictions often experience increased investor interest and accelerated development timelines when competing projects face security-related delays.
When major copper projects face delays, competing developments often experience accelerated investment and development timelines as capital and market attention shift to more stable jurisdictions.
Alternative copper development projects in politically stable regions benefit from increased investor attention and potentially accelerated financing as capital markets seek exposure to copper price appreciation without accepting elevated political risks. This dynamic creates competitive advantages for projects that previously struggled to attract investment due to relative disadvantages in resource quality or development costs. For instance, Barrick's recent Reko Diq update has highlighted these competitive dynamics in the copper sector.
Established copper producers in stable jurisdictions may experience enhanced market positioning as supply concerns increase due to delayed new production from projects like Reko Diq. These positioning improvements can translate into improved long-term supply agreements, enhanced pricing power, and increased market valuations reflecting scarcity premiums.
Regional supply chain advantages emerge for copper projects located in areas with established infrastructure, reliable logistics networks, and stable regulatory environments. These advantages become more pronounced when competing projects face supply chain vulnerabilities due to security concerns or geographic isolation in unstable regions.
Consuming nations increasingly prioritise supply security alongside cost considerations when establishing long-term copper sourcing strategies. Delays at major projects in unstable regions accelerate this rebalancing toward suppliers in more reliable jurisdictions, even when this involves accepting higher costs or lower quality resources.
Strategic reserve building by major copper-consuming countries reflects growing recognition that supply security considerations warrant premium pricing for reliable sources. This trend benefits established suppliers and projects in stable regions whilst creating additional challenges for developments in frontier markets experiencing security concerns.
Alternative supply source development receives accelerated investment and policy support as governments and corporations seek to reduce dependence on potentially unreliable suppliers. These acceleration efforts often involve enhanced financing terms, expedited permitting processes, and strategic partnership arrangements designed to encourage rapid development in preferred jurisdictions. However, security concerns affecting mining projects continue to influence global supply chain strategies.
Maintaining positive community relationships during operational slowdowns proves critical for preserving long-term social licence and ensuring successful project resumption when security conditions improve. Mining companies must balance reduced operational activity with continued community engagement and investment to prevent relationship deterioration during extended delay periods.
Barrick to slow development at Reko Diq whilst maintaining community commitments demonstrates recognition that community relationship maintenance requires sustained investment regardless of operational status. These programmes often provide essential services and economic opportunities for local communities that become dependent on mining company support for healthcare, education, and infrastructure development.
Local employment preservation during reduced operations involves creative workforce management strategies that maintain essential personnel whilst reducing overall staffing levels. Companies often prioritise retaining local employees over expatriate staff during slowdown periods, recognising that local workforce relationships prove essential for successful operational resumption.
Community programme sustainability frameworks require careful financial planning to ensure continued funding availability throughout extended delay periods. These frameworks must account for reduced project cash flows whilst maintaining programme effectiveness and community impact levels that preserve stakeholder relationships.
Transparent communication regarding project status and future intentions helps maintain community confidence despite operational uncertainty. Regular stakeholder meetings, progress updates, and clear communication regarding security concerns and resumption conditions help prevent speculation and maintain constructive dialogue with community leaders.
Trust-building mechanisms during operational pauses require sustained engagement and demonstration of long-term commitment despite current operational limitations. Mining companies must continuously reinforce their intention to resume operations whilst acknowledging legitimate security concerns and timeline uncertainties.
Cultural sensitivity maintenance in reduced-activity scenarios involves continued participation in local customs, religious observances, and community events that demonstrate respect for local traditions and sustained commitment to community integration. These activities often prove more important during difficult periods than during normal operations.
Social licence preservation strategies must account for potential competition from other economic development initiatives that may emerge during mining project delays. Communities may explore alternative economic opportunities during extended mining delays, requiring companies to maintain competitive community investment levels to preserve future operational viability.
The Barrick to slow development at Reko Diq situation carries implications extending beyond the immediate project to Pakistan's broader mining sector development prospects, international investment attractiveness, and resource development strategy implementation. These broader implications affect government policy responses, regional economic planning, and future investment promotion strategies.
Pakistan's mineral sector investment attractiveness faces potential negative impacts from high-profile project delays, particularly when these delays relate to security concerns that may affect multiple regions or project types. International investors often apply broad risk assessments to entire countries rather than evaluating projects individually, creating spillover effects from specific project challenges.
Government response mechanisms to maintain investor confidence become critical during high-profile project delays. These responses may include enhanced security provision commitments, revised regulatory frameworks designed to address investor concerns, and promotional activities highlighting successful projects in other regions or sectors.
Infrastructure development continuity despite project delays requires careful government planning to ensure that transportation, power, and communication infrastructure developments continue even when anchor mining projects experience delays. These infrastructure investments often prove essential for future mining development regardless of specific project timelines.
Regional economic diversification strategies may receive increased emphasis during mining project delays as governments and communities seek alternative economic development pathways that reduce dependence on single large-scale projects. These diversification efforts can provide economic resilience whilst maintaining readiness for mining development resumption.
Balochistan provincial economic planning must accommodate potential extended delays at Reko Diq whilst maintaining development momentum in other sectors and regions. This planning requires careful resource allocation balancing immediate economic needs against long-term mining development preparation requirements.
Alternative economic development pathway exploration becomes more urgent during mining project delays as communities and governments seek immediate economic opportunities that can provide employment and development benefits whilst mining projects remain suspended. These alternatives may include agriculture development, small-scale manufacturing, or service sector initiatives.
Cross-border cooperation implications for regional stability encompass both challenges and opportunities as security concerns affect international investment whilst potentially creating incentives for enhanced regional security cooperation. Improved tri-border security coordination could benefit multiple economic development initiatives beyond mining projects.
Predicting mining project resumption timelines requires analysis of multiple interacting factors including security condition improvement, market dynamics, regulatory developments, and corporate strategic priorities. The Barrick to slow development at Reko Diq situation illustrates the complexity of these resumption decisions and the multiple variables that influence timing considerations.
Measurable security improvement benchmarks provide objective criteria for evaluating conditions suitable for development resumption. These benchmarks typically include incident frequency reduction targets, regional stability indicators, and law enforcement capability assessments that demonstrate sustainable security improvements rather than temporary fluctuations.
Stakeholder confidence restoration requirements encompass multiple constituencies including shareholders, joint venture partners, local communities, and government entities. Restoration strategies must address each stakeholder group's specific concerns and demonstrate sustainable risk mitigation measures that provide reasonable assurance of continued operational viability.
Government stability indicators for investment resumption extend beyond immediate security concerns to encompass broader political stability, policy continuity, and regulatory predictability factors that affect long-term investment viability. These indicators help distinguish between temporary security fluctuations and more fundamental political instability that may require extended delay periods.
International security assessment validation through third-party risk evaluation services provides objective verification of security condition improvements and helps establish credible benchmarks for resumption decisions. These assessments often prove essential for satisfying insurance requirements and board governance standards for major capital deployments.
Copper price environment optimisation for restart decisions involves sophisticated market analysis considering global supply-demand balances, economic growth projections, and competing project development timelines. Higher copper prices can justify enhanced security investments and risk acceptance levels that enable earlier project resumption.
Global supply-demand balance influence on timing reflects the reality that tight copper markets create stronger incentives for overcoming security challenges and accepting elevated risk levels compared to periods of oversupply when delay costs prove more acceptable. Market fundamentals thus directly influence risk tolerance and resumption timeline decisions.
Competitive landscape evolution during delay periods affects project value propositions and market positioning when development eventually resumes. Companies must monitor competing project progress, technological developments, and market structure changes that may alter project competitiveness during extended delay periods.
Disclaimer: This analysis is based on publicly available information and involves forward-looking statements regarding security conditions, market developments, and project timelines that are inherently uncertain. Readers should conduct independent research and consult qualified advisors before making investment decisions. Mining investments in frontier markets involve substantial risks including political instability, security threats, regulatory changes, and market volatility that can result in significant losses.
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Source: https://discoveryalert.com.au/security-risks-reshaping-mining-strategies-2026/ [8th April 2026]
https://discoveryalert.com.au/mark-bristow-resignation-barrick-mining-2025/ [1st October 2025]
BY
ON OCTOBER 1, 2025
The mining industry was taken by surprise when Mark Bristow, CEO of Barrick Gold Corporation, announced his resignation effective September 30, 2025. After nearly seven years at the helm, Bristow's sudden departure raised questions throughout the industry about the circumstances behind this unexpected leadership change.
Bristow's resignation was particularly notable for its abrupt nature, with the board announcing it would take effect immediately. Mark Hill, a company veteran who has overseen Barrick's Latin American and Asia Pacific regions since joining in 2006, was swiftly appointed as interim President and CEO.
The board wasted no time initiating a global search for a permanent successor, signaling both urgency and a desire for fresh leadership. What made the timing even more intriguing was that Newmont, Barrick's chief competitor, announced their planned CEO transition on the exact same day.
Industry analysts noted that the abrupt nature of Bristow's departure is uncommon in the mining sector, where leadership transitions typically involve months of preparation and overlap to ensure operational continuity. The lack of a transition period suggests potential disagreements at the executive level.
Bristow joined Barrick in 2019 following the strategic merger between Barrick and Randgold Resources, which he had founded and led previously. His tenure was marked by significant accomplishments, particularly the successful integration of these two mining giants.
Under his leadership, Barrick transformed into a stronger global gold and copper producer with enhanced operational efficiencies across multiple jurisdictions. Bristow was particularly influential in developing sustainable mining operations across Africa, leveraging his extensive experience from his time at Randgold.
His leadership style—characterized by frequent site visits and hands-on management—brought a distinctive operational focus to Barrick that contrasted with the more centralized approach of his predecessors. This approach initially helped revitalize operations and improve relationships with host governments, though recent African mining challenges had tested this strategy.
Despite these achievements, Board Chairman John Thornton's statement emphasized the need for "the right leader to fully capitalize on Barrick's world-class assets and capabilities, and to driving improved performance, growth and shareholder value"—language that suggests the board was seeking a different strategic direction.
The ongoing situation in Mali stands out as a significant factor potentially influencing Bristow's departure, representing one of the most challenging geopolitical issues faced by Barrick during his tenure.
For nearly three years, Barrick has been embroiled in an escalating dispute with Mali's military government over profit-sharing arrangements at the Loulo-Gounkoto gold complex, one of the company's most productive assets in West Africa.
The conflict reached critical points in January 2025 when Barrick halted operations at the complex, and then dramatically escalated in June 2025 when Mali's military government—which had seized power in a 2021 coup—took control of the mine.
This forceful appropriation represents a severe case of resource nationalism that has become increasingly common in several African mining jurisdictions. For Barrick, the loss of operational control triggered significant financial repercussions, including a US$1.04 billion impairment charge reported in the company's Q2 2025 financial results.
The proximity of this mine seizure to Bristow's departure—just three months apart—suggests that the board may have had concerns about how the situation was managed, particularly given Bristow's reputation for government relations in African mining contexts.
Despite the challenges in Mali, Barrick has maintained its 2025 production guidance of 3.15-3.5 million ounces of gold and 200,000-230,000 tonnes of copper. This projection demonstrates the company's operational resilience but does not diminish the significant financial impact of losing control of the Loulo-Gounkoto complex.
The Mali situation exemplifies the growing geopolitical risks facing multinational mining companies in certain jurisdictions. Mining industry observers note that resource nationalism has been rising globally, with governments increasingly seeking larger stakes in resource projects, especially in countries experiencing political transitions or economic pressures.
For investors, the Mali dispute raised concerns about Barrick's risk management strategies and its ability to protect assets in politically volatile regions. These concerns likely contributed to shareholder pressure on the board regarding leadership.
While the Mali situation represents a specific crisis point, broader performance concerns likely contributed to the board's decision to seek new leadership for Barrick.
Although specific data points were not disclosed in the company's statements, industry analysts have noted that Barrick's stock has underperformed compared to industry peers in recent years. This relative underperformance created growing pressure from shareholders for improved returns and a clearer path to value creation.
The board's statement specifically emphasized finding leadership "to drive improved performance, growth and shareholder value"—language that signals dissatisfaction with current trajectories. In the highly competitive gold mining sector, where investors have multiple options for exposure to gold prices analysis, relative performance against peers becomes particularly important for maintaining investor confidence.
Bristow's approach to growth and capital allocation may have differed from the board's evolving vision for Barrick's future. Questions about the company's acquisition strategy, project development timeline, and capital return policies could have created tension between the CEO and directors.
While Barrick had completed the integration of Randgold successfully, the company faced increasing questions about its next phase of growth. Competitors had been making strategic moves to reposition their portfolios, raising questions about Barrick's long-term strategy beyond operational optimization.
Beyond the highly visible Mali situation, operational efficiency metrics across Barrick's global portfolio may have fallen short of expectations. The development timeline of key projects, including the promising Fourmile gold project in Nevada, could have faced delays or cost pressures contributing to board concerns.
Barrick's competitive positioning against other major gold producers like Newmont has been a consistent focus for investors and analysts. With Newmont making significant strategic moves following its acquisition of Newcrest, questions about Barrick's strategic response may have intensified.
As Barrick navigates this leadership transition, attention turns to interim CEO Mark Hill and what his leadership might mean for the company's direction.
Mark Hill brings nearly two decades of company experience to the role, having joined Barrick in 2006. His most recent position overseeing Latin American and Asia Pacific operations has given him extensive knowledge of Barrick's global portfolio and operational challenges.
His long tenure with the company suggests he is deeply familiar with Barrick's culture, strategic priorities, and operational approach. This institutional knowledge will be valuable in maintaining continuity during the transition period while the board searches for a permanent replacement.
While less publicly visible than Bristow, Hill has developed extensive experience managing complex mining operations across multiple jurisdictions with varying regulatory environments, community expectations, and operational challenges.
As interim CEO, Hill faces several immediate priorities. Stabilizing operations following Bristow's sudden departure will be paramount to maintaining investor confidence and operational momentum.
Addressing the ongoing Mali situation will require diplomatic skill and strategic thinking. While the impairment has been recorded, questions remain about potential recovery of assets or negotiation of a new arrangement with Mali's government.
Maintaining Barrick's production targets for the remainder of 2025 will be crucial for market confidence. The continued development of the Fourmile gold project in Nevada represents an important growth opportunity that requires ongoing attention and investment.
Supporting the board's search for permanent leadership while keeping the organization focused on operational excellence will require careful balance. As an internal candidate, Hill brings continuity but may also represent an opportunity to subtly shift strategies in areas where the board has indicated dissatisfaction.
The contrast between Barrick's abrupt leadership change and Newmont's carefully planned succession, announced on the same day, highlights different approaches to governance and transition management in the gold mining industry.
Newmont announced that CEO Tom Palmer will step down on December 31, 2025, following a structured transition plan. Palmer, who like Bristow became CEO in 2019, will remain as a strategic advisor until his retirement in March 2026, ensuring a smooth handover.
Natascha Viljoen, currently serving as Newmont's President and COO, will become the company's first female CEO on January 1, 2026. This represents a significant milestone for gender diversity in mining leadership and suggests Newmont's commitment to developing internal talent for succession.
The orderly nature of Newmont's announcement contrasts sharply with the immediate effect of Bristow's departure from Barrick. Industry observers note that Newmont's approach represents best practices in succession planning, providing clarity to investors, employees, and other stakeholders.
The simultaneous leadership changes at the world's two largest gold mining companies signal a significant moment of transition in the industry. Both companies are moving beyond their post-merger integration phases into new strategic eras.
Newmont's appointment of Viljoen highlights the increasing focus on diversity in mining leadership. While the industry has traditionally lagged in gender representation at executive levels, this appointment may accelerate changes across the sector.
The contrasting succession approaches may reflect different board governance philosophies and company cultures. Newmont's structured process suggests long-term succession planning, while Barrick's abrupt change indicates a potential response to immediate concerns.
Both transitions come at a time when the gold mining industry faces significant challenges, including rising costs, declining ore grades, increasing regulatory pressures, and growing stakeholder expectations regarding environmental and social performance.
Whoever ultimately takes the permanent CEO position at Barrick will inherit both significant assets and substantial challenges requiring immediate attention.
Resolving the Mali situation—or mitigating its financial impact—will remain a critical priority. Whether through diplomatic channels, legal proceedings, or financial arrangements, finding a path forward in Mali will be essential for rebuilding investor confidence.
Maintaining operational continuity across Barrick's global portfolio will require focused leadership during this transition. Key operations in Nevada, Dominican Republic, Papua New Guinea, and across Africa will need consistent management attention to meet production targets.
Rebuilding investor confidence and improving share performance will likely be an immediate focus. Clear communication about strategic direction, operational improvements, and capital allocation priorities will be essential for restoring market confidence.
Developing a clear strategic vision that differentiates Barrick from competitors will help establish the new CEO's leadership. This may include positions on industry consolidation strategies and balancing gold and copper production strategies.
Portfolio optimization will be an ongoing consideration, potentially including divestments of non-core assets or acquisitions to strengthen the company's position in key jurisdictions. The balance between geographic diversification and concentration in low-risk jurisdictions will require careful analysis.
Capital allocation decisions between growth projects, dividends, and share repurchases will directly impact shareholder returns and market perception. Finding the right balance that satisfies both growth-oriented and income-focused investors remains challenging.
The relative emphasis on gold versus copper production will shape Barrick's long-term value proposition. While gold remains the company's primary focus, copper offers exposure to electrification trends and potentially different value drivers.
Navigating increasing resource nationalism in key jurisdictions will require sophisticated government relations strategies and risk management approaches. The Mali situation demonstrates the potential consequences of management risk warning signs being overlooked.
Addressing rising production costs and declining ore grades industry-wide will necessitate continued operational excellence and potentially new technological approaches. Cost inflation has become a significant challenge across the mining industry.
Meeting increasingly stringent environmental standards will require continued investment in sustainable practices and technologies. Climate change commitments, water management, and biodiversity impacts will face growing scrutiny.
Managing community relations in complex operating environments demands consistent engagement and benefit-sharing approaches. Social license to operate has become as important as regulatory permits in many jurisdictions.
Implementing effective climate change mitigation strategies while maintaining production efficiency presents technical and financial challenges. The mining industry faces particular pressure regarding its carbon footprint and energy usage.
Balancing traditional mining practices with sustainability innovations will be necessary to meet evolving stakeholder expectations. New technologies and approaches may offer solutions but require significant investment and operational changes.
The leadership transition creates both risks and opportunities for Barrick's competitive positioning in the gold mining industry.
Initial market uncertainty following the abrupt leadership change will likely cause some volatility in Barrick's share price as investors assess the implications. This period of uncertainty may create buying opportunities for investors who see long-term value in Barrick's asset portfolio.
The potential for share price recovery under new leadership with a fresh strategy represents a significant opportunity. A clear articulation of strategic direction and early operational wins could rebuild investor confidence relatively quickly.
Investors will focus intensely on Q3/Q4 2025 results for signs of operational stability during the transition. Meeting or exceeding production and cost guidance will be particularly important for maintaining market confidence.
Analyst coverage and recommendations may shift during this period of uncertainty. The board's ability to attract a high-caliber permanent CEO will significantly influence analyst sentiment and long-term outlook.
Potential shifts in competitive dynamics between Barrick and Newmont could reshape the gold mining landscape. With both companies under new leadership by 2026, strategic priorities and competitive positioning could evolve significantly.
Smaller gold producers may see this transitional period as an opportunity to gain market share or position themselves as acquisition targets. Industry evolution trends suggest continued consolidation in the sector as companies seek scale and efficiency.
The leadership change could impact potential industry consolidation and M&A activity. Previous speculation about a potential Barrick-Newmont combination may evolve under new leadership at both companies.
Relationships with joint venture partners and host governments may require reinforcement during the transition. Hill's interim leadership will need to provide continuity in these critical relationships while setting the stage for the permanent CEO.
Barrick's ability to maintain its 2025 production guidance despite the leadership change demonstrates underlying operational strength. This resilience provides some confidence that the transition need not disrupt production targets.
A potential reassessment of growth projects and exploration priorities may occur under new leadership. Capital allocation decisions and project prioritization could shift, particularly for early-stage projects.
The development timeline for the promising Fourmile gold project in Nevada will be watched closely by investors as an indicator of strategic continuity. This project represents one of Barrick's most significant organic growth opportunities in a low-risk jurisdiction.
Focus on maximizing value from existing assets during the transition period represents a pragmatic approach. Operational optimization and efficiency improvements can deliver value while longer-term strategic decisions await permanent leadership.
The simultaneous leadership changes at the world's two largest gold mining companies signal broader transitions across the industry.
A generational shift in mining leadership is occurring across major companies, with new executives bringing different perspectives on technology, sustainability, and stakeholder engagement. This transition may accelerate industry evolution in several key areas.
The increasing focus on operational excellence over aggressive expansion reflects changing investor expectations in the mining sector. After a period of challenging returns from major capital projects, investors are demanding discipline and returns.
Growing importance of technological innovation and digital transformation is reshaping mining operations and executive priorities. New leadership may accelerate adoption of technologies that improve safety, efficiency, and environmental performance.
Evolution of CEO skill sets now includes greater emphasis on stakeholder management and ESG expertise. The technical mining expertise that once dominated leadership requirements now shares importance with stakeholder engagement capabilities.
Potential impact on gold price if production guidance changes across major producers could create market volatility. While individual company changes may have limited effect, collective shifts in output projections could influence gold prices.
Shifting investor preferences between major producers may create opportunities for portfolio rebalancing. Investment flows between gold producers often reflect perceived management quality and strategic clarity as much as asset quality.
Changing dynamics between producers, juniors, and exploration companies may emerge as strategic priorities evolve. New leadership may take different approaches to partnerships, joint ventures, and early-stage project development.
Evolving relationships between mining companies and host governments remain a critical factor for industry performance. New leadership approaches to government engagement and benefit sharing could reshape these important relationships.
Increasing emphasis on diverse leadership teams will likely accelerate across the industry following Newmont's appointment of its first female CEO. Diversity in background, expertise, and perspective is increasingly recognized as valuable for navigating complex challenges.
Growing importance of technological and sustainability credentials for mining executives reflects changing industry priorities. Future leaders will need to demonstrate competence in digital transformation and environmental management alongside traditional mining expertise.
Rising significance of geopolitical expertise and risk management capabilities reflects the complex jurisdictional challenges facing global mining companies. The Mali situation demonstrates the potential consequences of geopolitical risk management failures.
Evolution of corporate governance practices in the mining sector continues as boards respond to changing investor expectations. The contrasting succession approaches at Barrick and Newmont highlight different governance philosophies that will be evaluated by market performance.
Bristow became Barrick's CEO in 2019 following the merger with Randgold Resources, a company he founded and led prior to the combination. His leadership was instrumental in successfully integrating the two companies and establishing the post-merger strategic direction.
Mark Hill has been appointed as interim President and CEO. Hill currently oversees Barrick's Latin American and Asia Pacific regions and has been with the company since 2006, bringing nearly 20 years of experience with Barrick's operations. The board has initiated a global search for a permanent successor.
Barrick's Loulo-Gounkoto gold complex in Mali has been at the center of a dispute with the country's military government, which has demanded a larger share of profits. Operations were halted in January 2025, and the Malian government seized control of the mine in June 2025, leading to a US$1.04 billion impairment charge in Barrick's second-quarter results.
Barrick reported a US$1.04 billion impairment charge in its second-quarter 2025 results due to the loss of operational control at Loulo-Gounkoto. Despite this significant write-down, the company maintains its overall production guidance for the year, indicating the strength of its remaining portfolio.
Despite the challenges, Barrick maintains its 2025 production guidance of 3.15-3.5 million ounces of gold and 200,000-230,000 tonnes of copper. This suggests that while the Mali situation represents a significant setback, the company's overall operational performance remains on track.
Newmont announced that CEO Tom Palmer will step down on December 31, 2025, to be succeeded by Natascha Viljoen, who will become the company's first female CEO on January 1, 2026. Palmer will remain as a strategic advisor until his retirement in March 2026, ensuring a smooth leadership transition.
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Source: https://discoveryalert.com.au/mark-bristow-resignation-barrick-mining-2025/ [1st October 2025]
As I mentioned earlier, Mark Hill has now been confirmed (in Feb, 2026) as the permanent replacement for Mark Bristow so Mark Hill is no longer just the acting boss, he is now the boss of Barrick, and they are making changes.
06-Apr-2026 (Easter Monday evening): Couple of posts on gold miner costs and other stuff ended up in the wrong forum (mostly because of me) so I'm copying some of them into this one.
This first one is about how higher diesel prices might impact miners, and I ended up talking only about gold miners of course, however it's certainly interesting to see just how terrible ChatGPT is at answering a simple question: List and compare the latest ASIC (cost) guidance provided by Northern Star Resources (NST), Evolution Mining (EVN), Capricorn Metals (CMM), Ramelius Resources (RMS), Genesis Minerals (GMD) and other large Australian gold miners.
Chatty got everything wrong, particularly their respective ASIC (cost) guidance - it wasn't even close!
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You can read the original posts (that are copied below) here: https://strawman.com/forums/topic/4591
The following post was to answer a query by @tomsmithidg - "Interesting reading there @Bear77. I'd imagine that diesel is a pretty big input cost for miners, how much impact do you reckon that is going to have on costs and consequently profits?"
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Very much company-specific IMO @tomsmithidg - because some are reliant on diesel for basic power generation, often the more remote sites that haven't invested in solar farms or other renewable generation plus energy storage assets. Some use contractors for the actual mining, and some, like NST and GMD do their own mining using their own teams, so all of that mobile equipment that runs on diesel - and not all of it does, some, particularly a fair bit of underground kit, is now electric, i.e. battery operated - but the equipment that does run on diesel won't always be a direct cost of the mine owners, although they do pay for it indirectly.
Most mining contractors have provisions in their contracts these days that allows them to recoup additional costs such as what we are seeing with the recent spike up in diesel prices and supply issues in some areas as well apparently - I experienced a small taste of that on the way back from WA to Adelaide a couple of weeks ago in the Maui motorhome with only one roadhouse in Ceduna selling diesel and only from the truck bays down the side of the servo as the main out-front bowsers were all tagged out because that diesel tank was empty. All of the other servos in Ceduna and a bunch of servos in Esperance were completely out of diesel - the one we found that did have diesel (in Esperance) were rationing and we were only allowed to buy 50 litres. We were lucky that every roadhouse back across the Nullarbor did have diesel, especially that 1,000 km stretch from Balladonia to Ceduna where service stations are often 180km to 200km apart.
But back to mining, most contractors have learned from prior busts and other various issues that they need to have their contracts structured so they won't move from profitable to unprofitable due to input costs that are outside of their own control, so only the dumb ones or the ones with a high risk tolerance are going to be feeling the pinch personally at the moment; well their cashflow will be affected, as there is often a delay between those additional costs being incurred and those costs being recouped via the mine owner, if and when such provisions do exist within contracts, but as long as they have plenty of cash to cover such delays they should be OK.
But in terms of us investing in the actual mine owners and discussing how higher diesel prices affect them, I would say that the vast majority of miners will be affected negatively in various ways, but some of them a lot worse than others, with the worst affected likely to be those who rely on diesel generators for AC Power generation for their mills and associated infrastructure, site offices, worker accomodation and facilities, etc.
The least affected are probably going to be those who have grid power, or their own renewable energy generation assets plus energy storage assets - Bellevue Gold, BGL, is one example of a company that have invested a lot into such assets, and in terms of the largest gold miners, Northern Star Resources (NST) has significantly expanded its renewable energy generation assets in recent years, primarily through long-term partnerships with Zenith Energy, aiming for 35% reduction in Scope 1 and 2 emissions by 2030. And Evolution Mining (EVN) has also focused its renewable energy strategy on major partnerships, power purchase agreements (PPAs), as well as the planned repurposing of its Mt Rawdon mine rather than owning large-scale renewable generation assets directly.
Key details regarding EVN's renewable energy initiatives include:
EVN's bottom line with regard to renewable energy is that they are transitioning their operations, particularly in Queensland, to low-emission sources while pursuing the Mt Rawdon Pumped Hydro project as a commercial energy asset for long-term use.
So, the effects will vary across minesites and across miners, but there will certainly be negative effects for sure, the quantum of those will just vary a fair bit depending on the circumstances of each miner and their assets.
On the flip-side you have to look at their margins and how large those margins are. For an unhedged gold miner that is fully exposed to the spot price, most of them still have huge profit margins.

The gold price has recently briefly dipped below A$6,500 & US$4,500 per ounce, as shown above, but we're back above those levels now and the gold price is rising more than falling over recent days so it shouldn't be too long before it's back at new all-time highs again.
However, even if you factor in an A$6,000/ounce gold price, some $783/ounce below where it is right now as I type this, that's more than double what most of these gold miner's AISC (costs) are, so if their diesel costs double or triple, that only makes up a percentage of their costs, so their AISC doesn't double or triple, it goes up by a much smaller amount, and they can live with that when they are usually selling gold for more than twice what it costs them to produce it.
I won't discuss NST now too much in relation to their costs because they're in a unique situation of being half way through the expansion of their largest asset (KCGM, a.k.a. the Super Pit and its Fimiston Mill) to more than twice its previous capacity and having a primary crusher failure at that very same flagship KCGM operation, which has recently led to multiple production downgrades. The market is concerned with what they perceive to be persistent mechanical issues, specifically with the aging Fimiston mill - which this massive capacity upgrade will fix once it's completed, but that's over 12 months away; basically they're rebuilding the mill but much bigger, while keeping the old one running during the construction and commissioning of various phases of the new mill build at the same site - so it's tricky and they've got a few plates spinning in the air and one of those dropped and smashed, and it was a decent sized plate. So these recent production downgrades have "crashed" the NST share price and severely dented market confidence, so let's leave them aside - I'm bullish on them because they have a massive growth pipeline, with Hemi being the next big project after KCGM - but they do have high costs right now - they're still highly profitable, but not AS profitable as some of their peers at this point in time.
So EVN, the next biggest Australian goldy after NST, have low costs but that is assisted by two of their mines having negative costs (negative AISC) as shown below - due to copper byproduct credits reducing the costs to a negative number:

That was from Google - I also asked Chatty to list the costs of those miners and any other large Australian gold miners that it could think of:

I didn't ask ChatGPT to be careful but it suggested nonetheless that the above was a "careful, up-to-date summary". And here we go with the massive limitations of cheap (free) AI tools - Check out the following exchange between me and Chatty:










I said "Yes" and it gave me python code and said I didn't have the necessary access for it to create the chart itself. I didn't take that any further.
Even after all of that, I know those numbers are NOT accurate. In fact not one single AISC number in that summary is correct!
Chatty has NST @ A$1,500 to $1,550 AISC above, however Google confirms that "As of January 20, 2026, Northern Star Resources (ASX: NST) revised its FY26 cost guidance upward to an All-in Sustaining Cost (AISC) of A$2,600-2,800 per ounce, up from previous estimates of A$2,300-2,700/oz. This upward revision was driven by lower forecasted production and higher royalties." I know NST lowered production guidance again in March as I mentioned earlier but I haven't checked if they revised cost guidance up again. It doesn't really matter. Regardless, NST's costs are more than A$1,000/ounce higher than what ChatGPT is claiming.
Further, when I ask about EVN, Google tells me that Based on the December 2025 quarterly report and subsequent half-year results (1H FY26), Evolution Mining (ASX: EVN) has updated its FY26 Cost Guidance (AISC) to A$1,640 – A$1,760 per ounce and that updated guidance represented a 6% improvement on their original guidance due to strong cost control and higher by-product credits, despite short-term operational impacts from a weather event at Ernest Henry. That's low costs, but Chatty has an even lower AISC listed above for EVN.
Again, Google has higher costs than Chatty does for CapMetals: An AISC of A$1,530 - A$1,630 per ounce - although, again, that's at the lower end of costs for Australian gold miners at this point in time.
The most striking error is Chatty naming WGX as the lowest cost gold producer with AISC of A$1,250 to $1,300/ounce. Google says their costs are MUCH higher than that: A$2,600 – A$2,900 per ounce, more than double what ChatGPT is claiming and it places WGX alongside NST as the equal highest cost producers out of that group.
Nah, hold the train, RRL's latest guidance is for an AISC of A$2,610 – $2,990 per ounce (according to Google) so they're a smidge higher still.
FWIW, Google says that GMD recently maintained their FY26 AISC guidance at A$2,500 – A$2,700 per ounce and RMS is claiming their FY26 AISC should be between A$1,700 – A$1,900 per ounce.
So we've got EVN, CMM and RMS as the lowest cost gold producers, with all-in sustaining costs (AISC) ranging from A$1,530 to A$1,900/ounce of gold produced and we've got NST, WGX, GMD and RRL guiding for AISC of between A$2,500 and A$2,990, basically A$3,000/ounce at the top end. So even the higher cost producers from that list of 7 of Australia's largest gold producers are selling their gold for more than double what it costs them to dig it up, process it, and turn it into gold bars.
So they can absorb higher costs, including significantly higher diesel costs.
But that's just a quick analysis of gold miner margins, and this thread isn't even supposed to be about gold miners, so what am I doing?!? Well, I've slipped back into my circle of competency I guess and attempted to analyse the higher diesel price impacts on an area I'm more familiar with. When it comes to Aussie miners outside of gold miners, I have far less insight unfortunately, but I guess it still comes down to margins, so those with higher margins can more easily wear higher costs, and those with much thinner margins could be in trouble, especially if the increased costs stay higher for longer.
That's all I've got for now. Hope some of it was helpful to somebody. At least I now know that ChatGPT is worse than useless.
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Here's a great post by @SudMav on the same topic:
I know you didn't ask me specifically, however from my understanding of the sector is that the impacts of the diesel situation are on a case by case scenario, and dependent on the company in question and their current stage in the mining cycle, their infrastructure (grid powered, solar, generator) and type of mining activity that is being undertaken.
While for a different purpose, i came across https://www.atse.org.au/media/5z0nb2dj/atse-decarbonising-diesel-industries-report-final.pdf when I was doing some reading on the impacts of diesel on my investments - which helped me understand the impacts a bit better on the companies I hold. An excerpt from the document below includes a good breakdown of the uses of diesel across multiple industries, along with proportionate usage from the mining industry.

Using the table above and the company I posted about yesterday Savannah Goldfields as an example, they only reported a fuel cost of $70k last half, which is likely to operate their vehicles and power their accommodation. That however is not the full picture as fuel costs are also embedded within a number of their mining activities such as transport of materials (the increase cost of shifting their ore 80km from Agate Creek to the mill) and subsequently the seller, blasting to mine the ore from the pit, crushing the ore for processing and any future exploration endeavours they need to fund.
Personally I think SVG's transport costs will be more than double (due to a combination of the increased price, increased activities and the further travel to the Agate creek mine in the future), and I have factored this into my cost calculations which are broken down on a $/tonne throughput for their operations.
I hope this helps you work out how the increased cost impacts the companies that you hold.
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On a separate note, the exec summary and commentary in the report regarding fuel security and the fact that people have been saying since 2020 that Australia’s heavy reliance on imported diesel undermines both its fuel security and its capacity for energy independence.
"Australia imports nearly 29 billion litres of diesel annually, reflecting a heavy dependence on international fuel markets and diminishing domestic refining capacity. This reliance presents national security vulnerabilities due to geopolitical risks and potential supply chain disruptions."
Who could have possibly seen this coming... lol
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And here's another excellent contribution, this one being specifically about RMS, by @Slideup:
@tomsmithidg just to add to what @Bear77 and @SudMav have written, the effect of the jump in diesel prices is going to be very company specific. For example RMS initially jumps out as a company that is going to be highly impacted by diesel costs given their hub and spoke mine model and the transport of ore to central mills. However, they have been savvy over the last few years and have been hedging the costs of some of their diesel. They currently have 3.9million litres at a cost of $0.78/L out til March 2027. They say this is a small portion but it definately helps and gives them some breathing room during the acute phase of this shock.
These guys have also added a hybrid (solar/gas with battery storage component) power plant at the Mt magnet mine partly as a response to their carbon reduction initiatives, but will now provide benefits in terms of the fuel input costs to generate electricity. So overall they will be partly insulated, but I am estimating that the diesel prices itself might add up to $200/ounce to their AISC costs, but given the price of gold they will still be making excellent margin per ounce. I think we will get good detail on this in the next quarterly.
The big risk for RMS or many miners is what happens in a scenario of fuel rationing, as I can't really see a good rationale for a gold miner to be given priority to limited fuel.
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Decent risk that the gold trade could be over as its on the nose to break through support. Liquidation in commodities has been acute. Obvs inflation/rates a driving risk factor but potentially another one is Gulf states and other "trade surplus" countries that are losing revenues are liquidating gold. This is something to watch for as if the central bank buying trend is over for some time, I think that could be it for gold.
