Nice work @jcmleng

I'll get this scheduled ASAP

Hi @jcmleng , I've only been following the company for a few months myself, but the B2C part of the business is no longer accepting new customers. If you go to the website, you'll only be able to join the wait list and the mobile apps are no longer available. There is only very brief commentary of this on the Q2FY25 quarterly:

"Noting that the Company only closed the acquisition of R-DBX on December 28, 2024 (andtherefore having limited impact on our Q2 numbers herein), the Company collected $18k (Previous Qtr (Q1): $45k) in cash receipts for the quarter from consumers transacting via theDouugh App. The drop in collections was as a result of the Company shutting off new customer sign ups and a system outage and subsequent update in December causing a suspension in loan originations."

The fact that this was not even a footnote is quite the red flag, which should spook sensible investors, but is consistent with the constant pivoting of the company over the years (red on red flags).

R-DBX

From what I understand, the R-DBX acquisition is more of a customer acquisition play rather than capability. R-DBX services were:

• Database Solutions: they provide tools and platforms aimed at increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of database operations.
• Data Integration: Radical DBX highlights the significance of merging data from various sources to facilitate thorough analysis and insights.
• Innovative Technologies: the company dedicates resources to research and development, delivering solutions that tackle today's data management issues.

This essentially got combined with the nascent B2B proposition that Douugh had already created in-house. That's probably why all of the commentary around the acquisition is focused on the customer contract value. I'm not too fused about the boundaries between the two now, given that this is the primary focus on the company.

Hope this clarifies a few things.

@Keyboardcat999 , both those points do make sense and explains a fair bit, thanks!

I have not yet gone into the Appendix 4C's as I focused on getting my head around the actual product first. The way that was handled is a huge red flag - ditching customers after an all-out assault on capability build and customer acquisition.

Your R-DBX comments are interesting. So it would seem that:

DOU took in a lot of investor money to (1) build the B2C capabilities, then rapidly and completely ditched it, leaving customers stranded (2) in parallel, tweaked those B2C capabilities so that they can resell the B2C capabilities to other neobanks (3) acquired R-DBX so that they have a platform to sell the B2B capabilities.

And now, the contracts are rolling in for those B2B capabilities ....

What I still don't understand:

1. Why do they need R-DBX to make the B2B sales, if the product was that good and that marketeable?

2. Instead of ditching the B2C in the manner that they did, why could they not have kept B2C going, while they built the market for the B2B?

3. What is the actual value-add of R-DBX to SKK? I saw the same services that you listed, but still don't quite understand what underlying technical capability it adds to SKK. If there is no technical capability, then what has changed to now enable them to sell B2B post the R-DBX acquisition.

4. What exactly is the B2B product that SKK has and why is that so marketable - this was my original question leading to the request to chat with SKK.

Thats what I can't get my head around ... these would be my first questions to Andy in the SM chat ...

These are great questions and I don't have any further clarity on this other than point 4.

If you've ever opened an account with a neobank/fintech you may have found that the process to sign up as a customer and open an account is much faster than traditional banks. Banks have rather strict compliance requirements to 'Know Your Customer' (KYC). Banks firstly have to onboard you as an individual so if you are 'new to bank' you have to provide copies of your identity to prove who you are. Once you've been 'onboarded' you then request an account ('originate'). If you're borrowing money, then you need to prove your credit-worthiness as part of risk management. A 'bank' is simply a collection of databases wrapped in immense layers of processes and rules.

Let's say you're T-Mobile: a network provider who suddenly wants to offer savings accounts. You don't want to do any of that. That stuff is expensive, it requires highly-skilled workers and systems you'd need to build so that you have an audit log for regulators etc.

Rather than making a customer walk into a branch with 100 points of ID, SKK's products allow T-Mobile to scan a customer's ID with their phone and SKK will validate it and proceed to the next step. If T-Mobile wants to offer lending products, SKK's products allow them to assess the credit-worthiness of the customer and then create the account. A bank account isn't very useful if you cannot transact on it, and so SKK gives T-Mobile the technology to process, settle and reconcile transactions using industry-wide payment rails.

For me, the big $100bn question is how SKK's products 'stakk' up (get it? haha) against Stripe's products and solutions. Stakk is not the only provider, and I would put it to Andy what differentiates SKK against other providers of embedded finance.