Pinned straw:
Some excellent posts on BOT. Here are my thoughts on it.
I agree with @slideup the two deals that BOT has struck with Fresh Tracks to buy SB seems so good as to be implausible. The first deal to buy SB in May of last year was explained by BOT management as being executed at a time when funding capital for drug developers was essential on its knees. OK fair enough, capital was very tight in the middle of last year particularly for non-earners like Fresh Tracks. Lightening then strikes twice. BOT purchases from Fresh Tracks the royalty stream for an amount of $US8.25m. The near term value of this, assuming FDA approval is $US12m and the potential longer term value is well in excess of US$100m. How do you explain this?
Well BOT management explains it by Fresh Tracks being in severe financial distress. Is this explanation plausible? In recent times the financial tracks left by Fresh Tracks stink. No doubt this helps account for the name change from Brickell. In the last 4 years it has consistently lost money, in total US$105m. In the March quarter they had cash of $10.8m and lost $4.3m. There was no results conference call. (Can’t be too harsh on FT management for that, if I were them I would want to run and hide too). Sure looks like a company on the bones of its arse. See @Nnyck777 who steps through company the travails.
So the ASX small biotech steal of the year deal, you can argue, is plausible. What about management? BOT has been ASX listed since 2014 and has had a number of drug setbacks and has lost investors money. When it comes to small cap biotechs, nothing new here. (Same goes for most ASX listed companies) The ED Matt Callaghan similarly has had his share of biotech disappointments. However as long as he is not a crook (which I can find no evidence of), then so what.
At least the guy knows his way around. Also he appears to be surrounded by people who are experienced in the right fields and geographies. The US management appear to be well connected in the dermatological drug market.
DOWNSIDE:
Assuming SB does get FDA approval, like the breaking of a drought, it does not just rain cash. BOT has to hire around 30 sales staff and spend money and time selling initially mainly to dermatologists. And there is established competition in the hyperhidrosis market to contend with. See @Nnyck777 for window on the emerging competitive landscape. It will take time before the drug earns money. . So a capital raise on approval is just about a certainty. Based on the Japanese experience and according to the CEO, sales in the US are expected to be around US$200m in 2 to 3 years time.
Another point to consider, if SB’s penetration to the Japanese market has been such a success where are the rivers of cash back to FT? In the March quarter of 2023 FT seems to have earnt next to nothing from SB royalties and only $92k (yes ninety two thousand dollars) in the corresponding 2022 quarter.
The other obvious point is the FDA approval may never arrive.
OVERALL:
The other part of the BOT value equation is the earlier stage drugs they are developing clearly have some value. So if there is no FDA approval, BOT will not go to zero. See @mikebrisy for good valuation scenario guestimates.
Overall, looks a pretty reasonable deal at the current BOT market cap.
Hi @mikebrisy @Slideup @JimmyKaken’s Ecclock 5% Sofporonium Bromide (SB) product initially arranged it’s royalty structure with Brickell Biotech (which rebranded as Freshtracks). The percentage royalties and previous deal that Botanix has inherited, with full rights purchase of the SB product, has not been disclosed.
Hence, building models on this is difficult. I view Ecclock as a derisking signal for SB approval by the FDA. Japan is notoriously strict and difficult to get approval of new medical devices or drugs. Not to cross discuss but David Williams all but suggested avoiding the Japanese market for Polynovo for this reason in his Strawman interview.
So current likelihood of approval in contrast to your 70% approval @mikebrisy is more likely to be 90% as dermatology is included in the ‘other basket’ circled above. Plus in my view the fact that this has already been met in a tough market increases my confidence.
Hyperhydrosis is a common problem in Japan but the market is estimated to be 1/3 of the size of the US.
The income from Kaken is fairly immaterial. Japan has priced the product at $70 US equivalent a month. This is small fry to the expected pricing in the US. I posted a link previously to the most recent discussions with Howie Mckibbon chief product officer. He suggests that based on comps in the US market and current insurance payer arrangement for Drysol and Qbrexa (the incumbent substandard products) a $600-700 a month price would be achievable. Remembering SB will likely become gold standard product due to ease of use, efficacy, accessibility and minimal side effects.
Find Kaken’s recent report here:
(https://ssl4.eir-parts.net/doc/4521/ir_material_for_fiscal_ym4/139291/00.pdf)
Kaken recent qrtly report shows a huge 66% increase in sales on previous FY22. This highlights the success of the product and indicates that once prescribed patients are staying on Ecclock. Qbrexa’s data is flat and the growth of this product is less than impressive.
So I treat Ecclock as a test case rather than a major revenue stream – as we do not know the details until the next few BOT qrtlys where we can calculate this for ourselves.
Remember US $13million is based on a US $70 monthly sale price. However pricing in the US will be a lot higher not $70/month more like $600-$700 a month. So pricing is higher and sales numbers should be 3x higher due to population difference.
@Slideup my Botanix post from a month ago titled #Research hopefully with will cover my thoughts on this. Matt also made comments about this in the Kohler interview as you noted.
Kohler question from question on the 8th of August (see below) (https://www.eurekareport.com.au/investment-news/botanix-awaits-fda-approval-for-super-antiperspirant/152770)
“after approval and based on sales, in
fact, profit on those sales. So, at the
time we did the deal, we had about $5
million bucks upfront, $4 million on
approval and then about another $160
million in milestones if we were very
successful with a product up to about
$1 billion in sales and some double-digit
royalties. So, we had the opportunity
that arose pretty quickly in the last
couple of weeks as the company that
we acquired it from are kind of moving
onto a new phase of their own
development and we were able
to
negotiate with them to buy-out all of
those future financial obligations for a
lump sum of $US8.25 million. So we
owed them about $4 million when we
got approval which is planned for this
September, so for another $4.25 million
we were able to buy out all the rest of
those financial obligations.”
With regards to pricing and margins I thought this section was interesting.
@Slideup good question: “Why did no one else buy them out?” Because they didn’t have FDA approval, a production sight, marketing or distribution plan. This is very hard to do and most companies fail. It takes expertise, experience and money. The Botanix team has this in spades. Large pharmaceuticals will value a drug much more highly if it is ready to go.
SB is still a dermatology product and the team are dermatology experts. Apparently several employees had come across from Brickell and had bought the product to the Botanix management team.
The rosacea and acne plans (using synthetic CBD) are still very much alive but they need money to get these two drugs through phase III. Vince and Matt were both very clear that they were looking for advanced assets that they could buy to fund this future drug development. COVID slowed everything right down and everyone was nervous about money drying up. Rosacea was successful with 2b and the acne study was complicated a poorly run. Australia’s arms results were fantastic but the US arm had a massive stuff up due to state CBD laws and using multiple manufacturers. (See straws from several years ago I covered this too).
@slideup “This all makes me suspicious that FreshTracks could be the better poker players, and they know/suspect something (as the drug developer) that could become problematic during its market rollout.”
I think it is wise to question everything but Ecclock is seems to be successful in Japan and it is demonstrating growing numbers. Botanix is using the same drug but a 10% formulation rather than 5%. Which was shown to be extremely safe at higher concentrations during Brickell’s earliest trials of SB.
I don’t like the use of highly statistically significant either (face palm) but @mikebrisy hit the nail on the head about that.
Ha ha perhaps you are right @slideup, I might be the sucker at the table.
@Slideup it is a good question, and I don't have a robust answer.
What I do know is that Fresh Tracks is a small company running multiple clinical trials. They haven't reported this Q, but in their 10-Q for end March 2023, they had issued $6m in new capital, burned $4.5m in OpCF, and ended the Q with less than $10m cash. They have no revenue stream.
So perhaps they were a distressed seller, given that the US market can currently be described as challenging for raising new capital in biotech. Sunk costs don't really play into deal valuation.
Also, the rights on their own are probably not valuable to another buyer, or in any event they might have had trouble finding another buyer better able to value them.
I think $BOT imply as much. $BOT as owner of the asset is the natural acquirer of the rights,
On the face of it, they settled for a value that implies either or both of 1) greater approval risk (than the 90% the $BOT Chair has implied, in general terms) or 2) limited market uptake.
But there is no escaping your challenge, it looks like a very good deal. We'll find out soon if it was too good.