JIN a long time between drinks (17/3/26)
I held Jumbo for a little over 2 years up to August 2022, selling partly due to cash demands but also an underlying concern about the longevity of the Lottery business (ie 75% of revenue) and it’s deteriorating contract terms. I sold at $14 for a ~40% return, so I parted on good terms with Jumbo, but I have not looked back since.
Today I had another look, prompted by @Rick’s & @SudMav’s work of a few months ago and an Intelligent Investor (II) article. Yikes, a PE of 10 and at $8 a share I figured I needed to review my prior assessment to see if there was value. A summary of the II article is below, it’s not flattering, but at the current price, it still warranted a look, sometime II go off the deep end and miss good opportunities.
In reviewing I got stuck in a few rabbit holes, so I will cover these which is as far as I think I am going to go for now with JIN because I still have strategic concerns and if anything these have increased (see article) along with the number of moving parts to make value even harder than it was (my 2021 valuation had a ridiculous range) these are some points of interest I found:
- H1FY26 with 2 months of acquisition impact, expenses have exploded… up 50% (21.4m) from 42.6m to 64.0m while revenue is up just 29% PcP, according to the FY26 outlook ~A$3m of M&A transaction costs were expected but H1 had $5.3m in one-off adjustments to underlying EBITDA, 2m of it is amortisation (see next point), advertising and marketing has almost tripled which explains most of it but Employee and other costs add almost 3m each as well. The acquisition additions are much of the reason I suspect but it’s too messy currently to have any idea on how costs are moving.
- NPAT is dead (and hence PE), long live EBITDA… Intangibles have increased from $69m in FY25 to $243m! The amortisation of the Customer Contracts balance additions added $2m in amortisation expense in 1HFY26, but that was just 2 months I believe, so expect an additional $12m in amortisation expense in FY26 Vs FY25. This P&L expense will not be tax deductible, so the impact will go straight to NPAT. The Goodwill which is almost as large a balance is not being amortised, or this would be a bigger impact – but watch out for any “fair value adjustments” to Goodwill down the track, so this may also be a $96m NPAT bomb at some point.
- Another near-term impact to NPAT (and EBITDA) is going to be financing costs, which should be obvious given the change form net cash to net debt with the acquisitions and diminish over time. However, for context 1HFY26 had ~$1.8m of additional finance costs vPCP, so again, if this was 2 months then we will see ~$10.8m PBT impact in FY26 Vs FY25, or ~$7.5m after tax NPAT reduction.
- Comparing the FY24 to the FY25 & H1FY26 results presentation it is remarkable how the focus on numbers and informative charts and graphs has reduced, replaced with smiling people and wordy strategy diagrams that any management consultant would be proud of.
So, the key takeaway is that the current PE is mostly useless as a valuation tool without care to adjust for changes which are also relevant for comparative to previous PE’s the company has traded at. The change in balance sheet risk is one reason, the financing costs which will also impact earnings is another, both will resolve over time but non-cash amortisation costs is going to muddy the PE due to it’s significance to the P&L and will be around for many years. As always cash flows will provide a better view of performance and expect a lot of “underlying” and EBITDA focus by management.
II Article Summary (by AI):
Jumbo has shifted from low-risk lottery reselling into owning prize-draw businesses in the UK and US, which adds complexity, volatility, and leverage.
Key points for an investor:
- Core strength is digital lottery infrastructure and marketing, not owning prizes and inventory.
- New prize-draw acquisitions are outside this competence and in highly competitive, lightly regulated markets with 400+ UK operators.
- Prize draws require sourcing prizes, funding campaigns upfront, and managing fulfilment, making margins more volatile.
- Regulatory risk increases across multiple jurisdictions and advertising regimes.
- FY25 interim: revenue up 29%, NPAT up 23%, but mainly from acquisitions; Australian underlying EBITDA down 3%.
- Fewer large jackpots, flat ticket sales, 21% fall in active players, and slight market share loss despite higher marketing spend.
- Balance sheet weakened: moved from net cash of 80m to net debt of 49m to fund deals.
- Still heavily reliant on The Lottery Corp agreement, with renegotiation due by 2030.
- Analyst ceases coverage, viewing risk-reward as unattractive despite an 11x 2026 PE.
Disc: I don’t own, unlikely to own unless the price falls significantly from here.