Top member reports
Company Report
Last edited 4 weeks ago
PerformanceCommunity EngagementCommunity Endorsement
ranked
#2
Performance (62m)
-8.3% pa
Followed by
353
Straws
Sort by:
Recent
Content is delayed by one month. Upgrade your membership to unlock all content. Click for membership options.
#Innovation
Added 4 weeks ago

In @Strawman’s straw on #competition, the following conclusion got me thinking:

“From what I can see, the real danger for AIH is a structural shift in energy investment or a chemical breakthrough that renders their patented phenolic or silicone formulations obsolete.”

and it led to think about some further, related questions:

1.     How might the market opportunity in oil & gas evolve?

2.     How well positioned is AIH to adapt to change through innovation?

What follows is my exploration of those questions.


1. Evolution of the Market Opportunity in Oil & Gas

Ultimately, what’s driving the risk in oil and gas is the global energy transition in response to climate change, which is why I am lumping AIH oil revenue exposure (c. 55%) and LNG (c. 10% - my guesstimate) together – and calling it a two-thirds exposure.

Today, combined global oil and gas production (which includes LNG) is some 177 mmboe/d (million of barrels of oil equivalent per day). How this evolves in uncertain.

In the Bear Case, the "IEA Net Zero by 2050" case would see production fall to 39 mmboe/d – a 78% decline. Most sector commentators believe that’s not going to happen, and that Net Zero is more likely to be achieved some time from 2060 to 2080, unless there is a concerted and significant change in global political will. (Xi is targeting 2060 for China!)

More bullish scenarios that carry titles like “Current Policies”, “Stated Policies” and “Current Trajectory” by energy experts yield 2050 production levels anywhere from 163 – 207 mmboe/d - pretty much where we are today, and maybe more!

Of course, in all scenarios, a certain mount of depletion replacement is required. Annual depletion is around 6% (not the 8-10% Andrew indicated on the Strawman meeting). And what this means is that if oil and gas production remain flat, then over the 25 years to 205.0 some 265mmboe (or 150% of current production) needs to be brought online through capital investment.

Given collective global behaviour today, that might be considered a “Base Case”, and something getting down towardsthe "2050 Net Zero" scenario a Downside Risk.

Of course, investors will see this coming. First, it will take time for a renewed global political consensus to emerge, and then years more for the shift in infrastructure investment to impact aggregate production and capex. Changing global aggregate investment in the energy system is like turning a supertanker. We’ll see it coming.

 

2. How Well it AIH Positioned to Adapt?

It is clear from the Strawman meeting, that CEO Andrew and his team are alert to the risks of exposure to oil and gas! The downturn from 2014 - 2016 was a wake-up call. At the time, the business had 90% of its revenues exposed to oil. And over the following decade they have progressively evolved that to 55% (plus my “10%” for LNG).

Despite arguing in an earlier post that the oil and gas market is currently too attractive for them to want to diversify away much further at the moment (moat, lack of competition, relationships, reputation, margins, margins, margins), the relevant the point is that if they needed to, they could, albeit into more contested markets (lower margins).

So, my next question to understand is: how well they are positioned to adapt, i.e., how strong is their ability to innovate?

There are four relevant insights.

First, in the Strawman CEO interview, Andrew Bennion describes AIH’s culture as strongly entrepreneurial, problem-solving oriented, and deliberately unstructured to encourage innovation. If true, then that’s a culture consistent with being able to adapt to changing market realities. Tick.

Second, in the prospectus, the company's commitment to innovation in materials science is demonstrated by several key factors:

  • Dedicated R&D Workforce: AIH employs a multidisciplinary team of approximately 60 scientists and engineers. This team is structured around specific disciplines such as polymer chemistry, composite engineering, and new energy applications.
  • Proprietary Formulation Chemistry: Over three decades, AIH has developed proprietary libraries of core chemistries, including phenolics, silicones, epoxy resins, polyurethanes, rubbers, and composites.
  • In-House Testing and Optimization: The company operates an integrated R&D platform that combines formulation chemistry, numerical modelling, and full-scale physical testing. Using on-site mixing capabilities, pilot scale reactors, and proprietary testing laboratories, AIH formulates, tests, and optimizes materials in-house to meet specific and extreme mechanical, thermal, and fire performance requirements.
  • Next-Generation Product Rollout: This ongoing, capitalized investment in research and development is explicitly aimed at driving innovation and enabling the rollout of new products tailored to both traditional and emerging transition energy markets


Ok, that's Prospectus-speak, and I'm not entirely sure what to make of it. But, this IS a company with the in-house ability to innovate, and that's not necessarily common in an industry several decades down the path of outsourcing.

Third, the Prospectus refers to an annual investment in R&D of $5.2 million – about 1.7% of revenue. So, we can examine how this benchmarks. With the help of my BA (ChatGPT), I’ve assembled the following R&D benchmarks relevant to this industry.

fa4376f3bd9a08052177a5126663a79364115a.png

In terms of R&D spend, AIH is a little underwhelming. And of course, that’s compounded by the fact that it is a small cap.

So, this brings me to the fourth and final insight – M&A. Clearly, the company has been reinvesting to build capability and market reach via M&A. But I think this has also assisted advancing the diversification strategy, as the following table indicates.

Table: AIH Acquisitions and Their Diversification Impact

a7e2c1cd5c69e9efcbc43c8c29c4236229d9fc.png

And we can add to the in progress acquisition of $MCE – but this is predominantly an O&G play, with some minor exposure to defence, resources and mining. $MCE is more about an Australian base, including manufacturing and local content competitiveness on tenders.


My Conclusions

With it’s strong balance sheet, $AIH is clearly pursing M&A to build capabilities and it has to be recognised that it has come a long way in diversifying its oil and gas exposure over the last 10 years. Moreover, the O&G “Golden Goose” is far from dead. And if AIH can continue to build market share through its growing reputation and capability, there is every prospect that it can enjoy another decade or two of exploiting the relationships, reputation, and high barriers to entry this sector offers.

I believe that, having already shown it can evolve from a 90% to 55%+ revenue exposure to one sector in a decade, it is well-positioned to manage the uncertainty ahead.

Should the Global Community “hard pivot” to Net Zero in the next few years, there is no doubt in my mind that this would push AIH into more contested markets. So, yes this is a risk. But it is one I am confident management is alert to.

So where have I ended up. Back where @Strawman started “From what I can see, the real danger for AIH is a structural shift in energy investment or a chemical breakthrough that renders their patented phenolic or silicone formulations obsolete.”

I'm less concerned about the risk of the structural shift in energy. Yes, it will challenge margins over time and force the business to build new heartlands. But, overall, I consider AIH are as well-positioned as they can be to evolving global energy markets.

However, they are unlikely to be at the cutting edge of developments in materials science and engineering, and so this is the key vulnerability given their scale and relatively low level of investment in R&D.

As a potential long-term investment, this is not a flag (red or orange) for me, but a risk to monitor over time.

Disc: Not held

##Segments and Value
Added 4 weeks ago

I finally caught up with the $AIH SM Meeting today. It sure is an impressive story.

In this straw, I just wanted to capture a few quick thoughts about 1) industry sector exposure and 2) valuation.

1) Industry Sector Exposure

One thing I've looked into was CEO Andrew Bennion's remark about sector diversification. He said that they reduced dependency on oil and gas down to 55% of revenue, and that LNG and Offshore Wind were important other sectors.

So I've generated the charts below (one via ChatGPT and one via Claude - each using some different but also overlapping quality industry sources) to look at the annual global capex in offshore upstream oil and gas, LNG (liquefaction) and offshore wind.

Estimated Annual Global Capex US$bn (Source Claude.ai):

271908015eed16358bc0412c8b44b187ffeba3.png

Estimated Annual Global Capex US$bn (Source: ChatGPT)

e334f544bc2675f057eac8b9586371145d84ea.png

While there is some significant differences (due to the underlying datasets and definitions, the big picture is the same - so I am happy they directionally correct, particularly with respect to the relative sizes of each sector.

Why Is This Interesting?

A few observations:

  1. The magnitude of upstream capex is so large, that I believe that $AIH will only diversify further only so far and only gradually.
  2. It is worth seeing both Oil&Gas and LNG as somewhat linked. For example, every LNG plant is fed by upstream fields, and there is a linkage of LNG prices to the oil price. For example, LNG contracts into East Asia are usually linked to a crude oil basket (like JCC) through a formula, which include a 3-6 month price lag. (Although, over time there has been a tendancy for increased linkages to gas pricing, (i.e. Henry Hub).


So, what we didn't get an understanding of is how much LNG there is.

If we look at the Propsectus, their segmental split is more along product lines than industry segments, as follows.

4c9de432eac5a66bb722069b9a21b80fc06e0d.png

This indicates that Offshore Wind is about 10% of Revenue.

If as a "finger in the air estimate", we consider that LNG is likely of the order of 10% as well, then $AIH is about 65% exposed to oil/gas/LNG. This means it is quite exposed to the global oil price, with about one-third dampening from a pure play oil/gas supplier.

That one-third is quite important, because it means that in times of low oil price and reduced global upstream/LNG Capex, they are able to keep their top talent, most vital to sustaining their technology-based competitive advantages.

However, this large exposure to the upstream oil and gas segment could impact the earnings multiple they are able to attract, because the market will always perceive a significant oil price influence on quality of earnings.


Implications for Valuation

Here's a quick ready-reckoner on potential earnings multiples relevant to the oil industry.

a43eb4af0cdd828a0fb32bdb8e2a16aab79790.png

My view is that $AIH probably sits across the "Capital Equipment/OEM" sector and "Energy technology / Higher-margin equipment & solutions" segments - perhaps at the higher end of the former and the lower end of the latter. The rationale is based on their proprietary technology, barriers to entry, verticle integration, and responsive innovation capability.

One challenge to this is that their equipment is more linked to project capex, rather than sustenance capex or opex, and therefore it is more exposed to oil price cyclicality, which drives the capex cycle.

That potentially means that P/Es in the range 15x - 20x might be reasonable. (Note: I've not taken a look at valuation yet - am still getting my eye in at a high level here.)

So where are they at today's closing SP of $0.875?

On a historical earnings for FY25 (pre-Ovun acquisition) of $0.054, I get a P/E of 16.2

And on a forward basis, assuming EPS scales with FY26 EBITDA guidance, I get FY26 EPS of $0.062 and a P/E of 14.09.

Here, I've not taken into account the acquisition of Matrix Composites and Engineering ($MCE) - which appears almost certain to close.

If $AIH can hit ifs FY26 guidance, it will have achieved an EBITDA CAGR of 37% over 4 years (organic and inorganic). While I haven't unpicked the underling organic growth in this, the valuation appears reasonably undemanding.


Conclusion

For other reasons (not covered here) I think $AIH looks like an interesting business. The SP does not appear demanding. Of course, lacking history as a public company, it will no doubt take time to earn investor confidence.

There are probably several holes in what I've written here, as it is based only on a cursory look.I'm looking forward to doing some more work on this ahead of Tuesday's Spotlight, and also hearing what other Straw People have to say.

With everything going on the Strait of Hormuz, there is likely to be strong support for the oil price for some time to come. Even if the crisis is resolved soon, Middle East oil has attracted a new risk premium, countries around the world will be investing in building stocks (which will support prices for a good year or two), and as Andrew Bennion has indicated, a lot of countries will be look hard at their undeveloped fields - many of which are offshore including in deepwater. This all looks good for the future order book!

Disc: Not held