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Valuation of $1.170
Added a month ago

Valuations are always tricky, and especially so when it comes to acquisitive companies. But let's just extrapolate things forward to get a rough sense of value.

In the last 3 years through to FY25, revenue has grown at roughly 16%pa. They usually average a net margin between 7-8%, and from what i can tell that's not overly ambitious given the potential for some operating leverage, and the fact that some players in the space do closer to 10%.

On an underlying basis, AIH has called for $387m in FY26 revenue (year ended 30th Sep), which is again around 16% growth.

I'll use $385m as a starting point and grow that by 12%, 15%, 17% for the next 3 years through to FY2029. To each of those, i'll apply a net margin of 6%, 7%, and 8%. (All on an underlying basis).

That gives my FY29 NPAT of $31m, $41m and $49m (rounded to nearest whole number).

Let's account for 3% dilution on the share count each year to get FY29 shares on issue of 460m, which gives me FY29 EPS of $0.071, $0.089 & $0.107.

The midpoint here represents an EPS CAGR of ~13%, ranging between 5% to 20%. Which is quite the spread -- but not unexpected given the sensitivity of things like compounding growth rates and margin differences. But i'll select a series of terminal PEs of 15, 17 and 20x which dont seem to require sentiment to do too much of the heavy lifting.

Using the simple valuation model, i get these results:

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Obviously, there's a big difference between the top and bottom valuations, but the idea here is to get a sense of a reasonable range and see if there's a favourable skew -- which is, in fact, exactly what you do see.

There's a nice heads i win, tails i dont lose too much situation here. a ~12% downside vs a 79% upside over a 3 year period. At least on these numbers.

Weighting the three scenarios at 25%, 50% & 25% gives me an average valuation of $1.17.

Now... that's all super rough and based on basic extrapolation. And it's worth remembering they are acquiring Matrix which does close to $80m in revenue and Imenco Aqua which does $15m. Add another sizeable acquisition or two and layer in some decent organic growth and things really start to take off -- especially if they attract a high multiple and push those margins higher.

But the point is you don't need to. They just need to keep pushing forward at a reasonable rate without too much margin slippage.

The current PE of 15 just gives you a good margin of safety, and the potential for a bit of a re-rate if they can deliver attractive EPS growth in the coming years.

But, of course, none of this counts for squat if they drop the ball in any serious way.

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#Innovation
Added a month ago

In @Strawman’s straw on #competition, the following conclusion got me thinking:

“From what I can see, the real danger for AIH is a structural shift in energy investment or a chemical breakthrough that renders their patented phenolic or silicone formulations obsolete.”

and it led to think about some further, related questions:

1.     How might the market opportunity in oil & gas evolve?

2.     How well positioned is AIH to adapt to change through innovation?

What follows is my exploration of those questions.


1. Evolution of the Market Opportunity in Oil & Gas

Ultimately, what’s driving the risk in oil and gas is the global energy transition in response to climate change, which is why I am lumping AIH oil revenue exposure (c. 55%) and LNG (c. 10% - my guesstimate) together – and calling it a two-thirds exposure.

Today, combined global oil and gas production (which includes LNG) is some 177 mmboe/d (million of barrels of oil equivalent per day). How this evolves in uncertain.

In the Bear Case, the "IEA Net Zero by 2050" case would see production fall to 39 mmboe/d – a 78% decline. Most sector commentators believe that’s not going to happen, and that Net Zero is more likely to be achieved some time from 2060 to 2080, unless there is a concerted and significant change in global political will. (Xi is targeting 2060 for China!)

More bullish scenarios that carry titles like “Current Policies”, “Stated Policies” and “Current Trajectory” by energy experts yield 2050 production levels anywhere from 163 – 207 mmboe/d - pretty much where we are today, and maybe more!

Of course, in all scenarios, a certain mount of depletion replacement is required. Annual depletion is around 6% (not the 8-10% Andrew indicated on the Strawman meeting). And what this means is that if oil and gas production remain flat, then over the 25 years to 205.0 some 265mmboe (or 150% of current production) needs to be brought online through capital investment.

Given collective global behaviour today, that might be considered a “Base Case”, and something getting down towardsthe "2050 Net Zero" scenario a Downside Risk.

Of course, investors will see this coming. First, it will take time for a renewed global political consensus to emerge, and then years more for the shift in infrastructure investment to impact aggregate production and capex. Changing global aggregate investment in the energy system is like turning a supertanker. We’ll see it coming.

 

2. How Well it AIH Positioned to Adapt?

It is clear from the Strawman meeting, that CEO Andrew and his team are alert to the risks of exposure to oil and gas! The downturn from 2014 - 2016 was a wake-up call. At the time, the business had 90% of its revenues exposed to oil. And over the following decade they have progressively evolved that to 55% (plus my “10%” for LNG).

Despite arguing in an earlier post that the oil and gas market is currently too attractive for them to want to diversify away much further at the moment (moat, lack of competition, relationships, reputation, margins, margins, margins), the relevant the point is that if they needed to, they could, albeit into more contested markets (lower margins).

So, my next question to understand is: how well they are positioned to adapt, i.e., how strong is their ability to innovate?

There are four relevant insights.

First, in the Strawman CEO interview, Andrew Bennion describes AIH’s culture as strongly entrepreneurial, problem-solving oriented, and deliberately unstructured to encourage innovation. If true, then that’s a culture consistent with being able to adapt to changing market realities. Tick.

Second, in the prospectus, the company's commitment to innovation in materials science is demonstrated by several key factors:

  • Dedicated R&D Workforce: AIH employs a multidisciplinary team of approximately 60 scientists and engineers. This team is structured around specific disciplines such as polymer chemistry, composite engineering, and new energy applications.
  • Proprietary Formulation Chemistry: Over three decades, AIH has developed proprietary libraries of core chemistries, including phenolics, silicones, epoxy resins, polyurethanes, rubbers, and composites.
  • In-House Testing and Optimization: The company operates an integrated R&D platform that combines formulation chemistry, numerical modelling, and full-scale physical testing. Using on-site mixing capabilities, pilot scale reactors, and proprietary testing laboratories, AIH formulates, tests, and optimizes materials in-house to meet specific and extreme mechanical, thermal, and fire performance requirements.
  • Next-Generation Product Rollout: This ongoing, capitalized investment in research and development is explicitly aimed at driving innovation and enabling the rollout of new products tailored to both traditional and emerging transition energy markets


Ok, that's Prospectus-speak, and I'm not entirely sure what to make of it. But, this IS a company with the in-house ability to innovate, and that's not necessarily common in an industry several decades down the path of outsourcing.

Third, the Prospectus refers to an annual investment in R&D of $5.2 million – about 1.7% of revenue. So, we can examine how this benchmarks. With the help of my BA (ChatGPT), I’ve assembled the following R&D benchmarks relevant to this industry.

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In terms of R&D spend, AIH is a little underwhelming. And of course, that’s compounded by the fact that it is a small cap.

So, this brings me to the fourth and final insight – M&A. Clearly, the company has been reinvesting to build capability and market reach via M&A. But I think this has also assisted advancing the diversification strategy, as the following table indicates.

Table: AIH Acquisitions and Their Diversification Impact

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And we can add to the in progress acquisition of $MCE – but this is predominantly an O&G play, with some minor exposure to defence, resources and mining. $MCE is more about an Australian base, including manufacturing and local content competitiveness on tenders.


My Conclusions

With it’s strong balance sheet, $AIH is clearly pursing M&A to build capabilities and it has to be recognised that it has come a long way in diversifying its oil and gas exposure over the last 10 years. Moreover, the O&G “Golden Goose” is far from dead. And if AIH can continue to build market share through its growing reputation and capability, there is every prospect that it can enjoy another decade or two of exploiting the relationships, reputation, and high barriers to entry this sector offers.

I believe that, having already shown it can evolve from a 90% to 55%+ revenue exposure to one sector in a decade, it is well-positioned to manage the uncertainty ahead.

Should the Global Community “hard pivot” to Net Zero in the next few years, there is no doubt in my mind that this would push AIH into more contested markets. So, yes this is a risk. But it is one I am confident management is alert to.

So where have I ended up. Back where @Strawman started “From what I can see, the real danger for AIH is a structural shift in energy investment or a chemical breakthrough that renders their patented phenolic or silicone formulations obsolete.”

I'm less concerned about the risk of the structural shift in energy. Yes, it will challenge margins over time and force the business to build new heartlands. But, overall, I consider AIH are as well-positioned as they can be to evolving global energy markets.

However, they are unlikely to be at the cutting edge of developments in materials science and engineering, and so this is the key vulnerability given their scale and relatively low level of investment in R&D.

As a potential long-term investment, this is not a flag (red or orange) for me, but a risk to monitor over time.

Disc: Not held

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##Segments and Value
Added a month ago

I finally caught up with the $AIH SM Meeting today. It sure is an impressive story.

In this straw, I just wanted to capture a few quick thoughts about 1) industry sector exposure and 2) valuation.

1) Industry Sector Exposure

One thing I've looked into was CEO Andrew Bennion's remark about sector diversification. He said that they reduced dependency on oil and gas down to 55% of revenue, and that LNG and Offshore Wind were important other sectors.

So I've generated the charts below (one via ChatGPT and one via Claude - each using some different but also overlapping quality industry sources) to look at the annual global capex in offshore upstream oil and gas, LNG (liquefaction) and offshore wind.

Estimated Annual Global Capex US$bn (Source Claude.ai):

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Estimated Annual Global Capex US$bn (Source: ChatGPT)

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While there is some significant differences (due to the underlying datasets and definitions, the big picture is the same - so I am happy they directionally correct, particularly with respect to the relative sizes of each sector.

Why Is This Interesting?

A few observations:

  1. The magnitude of upstream capex is so large, that I believe that $AIH will only diversify further only so far and only gradually.
  2. It is worth seeing both Oil&Gas and LNG as somewhat linked. For example, every LNG plant is fed by upstream fields, and there is a linkage of LNG prices to the oil price. For example, LNG contracts into East Asia are usually linked to a crude oil basket (like JCC) through a formula, which include a 3-6 month price lag. (Although, over time there has been a tendancy for increased linkages to gas pricing, (i.e. Henry Hub).


So, what we didn't get an understanding of is how much LNG there is.

If we look at the Propsectus, their segmental split is more along product lines than industry segments, as follows.

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This indicates that Offshore Wind is about 10% of Revenue.

If as a "finger in the air estimate", we consider that LNG is likely of the order of 10% as well, then $AIH is about 65% exposed to oil/gas/LNG. This means it is quite exposed to the global oil price, with about one-third dampening from a pure play oil/gas supplier.

That one-third is quite important, because it means that in times of low oil price and reduced global upstream/LNG Capex, they are able to keep their top talent, most vital to sustaining their technology-based competitive advantages.

However, this large exposure to the upstream oil and gas segment could impact the earnings multiple they are able to attract, because the market will always perceive a significant oil price influence on quality of earnings.


Implications for Valuation

Here's a quick ready-reckoner on potential earnings multiples relevant to the oil industry.

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My view is that $AIH probably sits across the "Capital Equipment/OEM" sector and "Energy technology / Higher-margin equipment & solutions" segments - perhaps at the higher end of the former and the lower end of the latter. The rationale is based on their proprietary technology, barriers to entry, verticle integration, and responsive innovation capability.

One challenge to this is that their equipment is more linked to project capex, rather than sustenance capex or opex, and therefore it is more exposed to oil price cyclicality, which drives the capex cycle.

That potentially means that P/Es in the range 15x - 20x might be reasonable. (Note: I've not taken a look at valuation yet - am still getting my eye in at a high level here.)

So where are they at today's closing SP of $0.875?

On a historical earnings for FY25 (pre-Ovun acquisition) of $0.054, I get a P/E of 16.2

And on a forward basis, assuming EPS scales with FY26 EBITDA guidance, I get FY26 EPS of $0.062 and a P/E of 14.09.

Here, I've not taken into account the acquisition of Matrix Composites and Engineering ($MCE) - which appears almost certain to close.

If $AIH can hit ifs FY26 guidance, it will have achieved an EBITDA CAGR of 37% over 4 years (organic and inorganic). While I haven't unpicked the underling organic growth in this, the valuation appears reasonably undemanding.


Conclusion

For other reasons (not covered here) I think $AIH looks like an interesting business. The SP does not appear demanding. Of course, lacking history as a public company, it will no doubt take time to earn investor confidence.

There are probably several holes in what I've written here, as it is based only on a cursory look.I'm looking forward to doing some more work on this ahead of Tuesday's Spotlight, and also hearing what other Straw People have to say.

With everything going on the Strait of Hormuz, there is likely to be strong support for the oil price for some time to come. Even if the crisis is resolved soon, Middle East oil has attracted a new risk premium, countries around the world will be investing in building stocks (which will support prices for a good year or two), and as Andrew Bennion has indicated, a lot of countries will be look hard at their undeveloped fields - many of which are offshore including in deepwater. This all looks good for the future order book!

Disc: Not held

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#Competition
Added a month ago

I've had a look at the competitive landscape for Advanced Innergy Holdings for next week's roundtable, and the CEOs framing seems on the money. That is, they don't really have a single direct competitor across all segments but instead the competition is more fragmented.

In the subsea insulation world, they face big names like TechnipFMC, CRC Evans, and Vipo. This is a high-stakes flow assurance space which is all about keeping oil hot enough to prevent "hydrate plugs" at 3,500 meters. AIH’s edge is their chemistry -- they formulate resins from scratch for specific conditions. This "materials-first" approach contrasts with giants like TechnipFMC, who often bundle insulation into a total package. Interestingly, TechnipFMC is actually a major customer of AIH as well as a rival with the competition mainly about the in-house material divisions of these EPC giants.

AIH’s vertical model also provides a speed advantage. Owning their own test rigs means they can qualify a product in nine months, while a competitor waiting on an external lab might take eighteen. Beyond time, there is also a financial hurdle beacuse Type Approvals can cost up to $2m each which creates a steep capital barrier for new entrants.

On the subsea buoyancy side, the sector is led by veterans like Balmoral and Trelleborg. While AIH already has a "single-shot" pump for 8-tonne components, the pending Matrix acquisition is aimed at adding rotational moulding scale and an APAC manufacturing base. This should provide a significant logistics and schedule advantage over European rivals in the local region. Well, that's the claim at any rate.

The offshore wind sector features UK rivals like Tekmar and First Subsea. This is a high-growth area where insurance claims are the primary driver (subsea cable failures account for roughly 80% of all claims apparently). Reputation is everything here and AIH has to prove their cable protection systems (CPS) can provide 25 years of "fit and forget" reliability given a single export cable repair can exceed $30m.

The most crowded front is EV battery protection, where AIH competes with chemical heavyweights like 3M and Henkel. AIH’s alleged differentiator here is the loop between their chemistry and their AIT (formerly CAPSE) testing facility. By offering accredited in-house abuse testing (crush, nail penetration, etc.), they provide a data-driven service that pure play chemical giants rarely offer.

Lastly, in marine fenders and aquaculture, you have specialists like Resinex and Floatex. AIH remains unique here through vertical integration: they aren't just buying and moulding chemicals; they are formulating, testing, and sending their own crews for installation.

From what i can see, the real danger for AIH is a structural shift in energy investment or a chemical breakthrough that renders their patented phenolic or silicone formulations obsolete.

But for now their biggest protection seems to be something of a specification incumbency (the "IBM effect"). Energy majors prefer the incumbent whose materials are already written into their global design standards. Replicating that massive catalog of type approvals would take a new rival years and millions of dollars, which strikes me as a not-insignificant moat.

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#History
Added 2 months ago

I thought i'd kick things off with some background history on the business. Partly because it's interesting in and of itself, but also because i think it's somewhat relevant to understanding the merits of their strategy.

The story starts in way back in 1993 when a guy named Simon Shepherd founded a little firm called Alderley Materials in the UK. At the time, the biz was all about using phenolic chemistry to create durable, heat-resistant materials that you could wrap around industrial equipment to keep it from melting in a disaster. And that tech is still pretty much the secret sauce inside a lot of their products today.

The real turning point for the business happened in 2008 when Andrew Bennion, the current CEO and the guy we interviewed last week, teamed up with Simon to lead a management buyout. This was at a time when the business was doing only $6m in revenue and had a dozen staff working in a converted railway shed.

From what i can tell, they seemed to have built a good reputation with some of the larger oil & gas players (eg Chevron and Shell) for being good problem solvers and catering to a range of niche issues. But the masterstroke (or just good fortune) was somehow managing to get their proprietary materials written into the global design standards of these giants, which essentially locked them in as the preferred supplier for future projects.

Back then, a lot of the work was focused on deep water oil and gas, providing subsea insulation to pipes and valves so you could keep oil flowing in the freezing depths of the ocean. That, and the provision of super tough fire and blast walls, panels, and "jackets" for offshore rigs. There was a big safety aspect to this, with these solutions ensuring that critical equipment could survive a jet fire or explosion long enough for personnel to evacuate.

Another key part of their success seemed to be associated with their reputation for going the extra mile. Unlike most providers that just shipped the product, these guys were known for a "supply and apply" service, where they would send specialised installation teams to fabrication yards all over the world to ensure their tech was installed properly.

In short, they made their name by taking on the specialised, high-risk, engineered to order jobs that were too small for the massive conglomerates to focus on, but too complex for anyone else to handle.

Over the next decade, they went on a bit of a tear. Having experienced the lumpy nature of work in oil and gas they started diversifying into other sectors like renewables (largely offshore wind) which they did through a large number of bolt-on acqusitions.

(This is relevant because acquisitions remain a key pillar of the current growth strategy. So it helps to know they seem to have good form on that front).

They had a stint with private equity between 2014 to 2024, and although that helped fund some growth they still found it too restrictive (as Andrew mentioned in our chat). So in mid-2024 the management team bought out their private equity partners and again took full control of things. All of this builds the case that these guys are not about engineering a quick and lucrative exit.

Instead, i get the sense this is a very experienced, hands-on management team, with significant insider ownership and a track record of successful acquisitions and profitable growth:

8c90c5ea82dfba0184ac4c90b7b80757d33006.png

That pretty much brings us to today. With the business still on track for growth, a decent order book, a strong balance sheet, decent tailwinds and a very aligned owner-operators. They do have the ability to divest more of their shares later in the year, and again next year, so something to watch (although a bit more free float wouldnt be a bad thing).

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#CEO Meeting
Added 2 months ago

Over the years i've grown a soft spot for engineer CEOs. They just tend to strike me as straighter shooters, with a tighter focus on providing solutions to customers. Less polish and hype, more "getting it done with little fuss" type thing.

And Andrew at AIH certainly came across the same way. The back story of doing a management buy-out in 2008 and growing the business from a team of 12 to more than 800 today is wildly impressive.

I wouldnt invest in AIH on any of that, but it does help (assuming i got a good read of things..which is hard to be confident of after one brief interaction!).

Anyway, what you have here is a profitable business, with a strong legacy of growth, with a few big tailwinds and is already a major player in a very niche industry. Also lots of capacity in terms of manufacturing their products (Andrew said they could do 160% of current levels), a strong balance sheet and a full order book.

That money is pretty much ear-marked for acquisitions, so i'd expect a few more of those. That was the whole point of listing after all. They seem to have a good history on that front, but we all know that these things also carry risk. So something to be mindful of.

Anyway, a lot more due diligence is needed, and it'd be good to hear some negatives if anyone has had a look at AIH before and come across any. But with a trailing PE of ~14 (using normalised trailing NPAT), and some seemingly decent growth potential, it's probably worth a closer look.


Here's the transcript: AIH Transcript.pdf

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