Today, I reluctantly exited my full position in $AD8 (IRL and SM). I sold off one-third ahead of results at $10.08 and the balance today around $8.50, a weighted price of $9. I’ve held this since mid-2018 … another Matt Joass MF Pro recommendation. So, it done OK, although not what I’d hoped for.
Why did I exit today? This Straw is my investment decision diary entry. I make a number of assertions and assumptions about audio, video and software enablement. I’m not an expert in these areas. Having watched the investment thesis unfold over 4 years, in the absence of support from favourable economics, I am uncomfortable holding a sizeable position going forward. That said, should SP fall significantly below my target price, I’d consider buying again.
What was the initial thesis? As shown in the figure below, which is faithfully updated each year, $AD8 has world-leading tech in audio networking. (Note: I’ve written audio and not broader digital media.) Sure enough, ever since following AD8, whenever I am at a conference venue or a lecture theatre (part time day job), you find evidence of “Audinate Inside”. It is truly dominant in digital networking of audio equipment.
Tracking the evolution of cashflows since 2016, it appeared that operating leverage (dashed grey line) was developing, albeit slowly.
Then four things happened:
1. COVID19 – driving a market slow down in the use of venues using networked audio equipment
2. CVOID19 Part 2 – supply chain constraints, chip constraints, inflation
3. Acquisition of Video capability (Cambridge, UK and Belgium)
4. Shift in focus from hardware to hardware and software; audio to media and cloud-enablement
Now 1 & 2 are simply a temporary set-back, 3. is an adjacency with a logic that has been articulated clearly by management and 4. Is logical, being a strategy followed in many other industries.
So as a narrative that’s all good. I’m onboard. But investing needs more than a narrative.
A few things dawned on me during the presentation yesterday. Aidan and Rob explained that the large step up in staff costs/headcount over the last year is driven in part by the acquired workforce and getting the bench in place to double the business over the next three years. However, as part of this discussion, it was clear that more staff would be required albeit a slower rate of growth. However, no indications were provided as to the likely trajectory.
Second, strategically, $AD8 has stepped from a niche where it has clear industry leadership (digital audio networking) to a more contested space: video, video-networking and software enablement via cloud-solutions.
My concern is that this broadening of the development front is going to bring with it increased costs. While Aidan and Rob and the team are experts in audio, I don’t think they can claim to be so in video, and the acquired teams from Cambridge and Belgium – while having unique IP – also don’t have experience in scaling their technology across global markets. (We have seen just in the last year how at $AMS, slight changes in go-to-market approach can quickly have dramatic, adverse impacts on sales growth.)
In short, I am uncomfortable seeing this widening of focus, particularly when we haven't even been able to see if the current business model can scale. That's a big red flag.
So, I did some what-if analysis around cost and investment uncertainty, around reasonable growth scenarios. The base case is set out in today's Valuation Report, and yields a valuation of $8.50, which by coincidence is in the ball park of today's price.
(Note: the broker consensus (yet to be fully updated) is about $10.50.But the more I read, the more I wonder if they are cuaght up in the story, driven off revenue growth and not analysing the economics. We shall see.)
Bear Case:
In this case, revenue growth slows sooner, because the combined audio and video and cloud solutions are playing into a more contested space, and costs scale less favourably. I ended up with a valuation of c. $4.50. But you could get anything from $2.50 upwards. What was instructive, was that it didn’t take much to seriously impair the economics. This kind of scenario would result if, in years 1 to 3, they incur higher development costs, then followed by increased competition in the market due to others contesting the space leading to an earlier maturing. There is, after all, little evidence they can replicate their dominance in networked audio to networked media. I’m not saying the can’t or won’t. They might well be successful. I just don’t have any basis of confidence so that’s my bear case.
Bull Case:
In this case, 30% revenue growth is sustained for a further three years beyond 2025, with favourable economics for operations and investment, with the business maturing but still growing by 2029. This yields a value/share of c. $11.50. Again, you can easily get anything from $11-14 depending on your assumptions.
My Conclusion:
Going for video, software and hardware and cloud-enablement on the back of a major industry setback and ongoing headwinds in chip supply and staff costs has muddied the waters around what I had expected would be solid emergent operating economics by this time. There are too many uncertainties and I don’t know enough about the industry or the competition. On balance, I feel scenarios towards the bear case are more likely than the bull.
I am selling. (Have now sold.) I like this company and the management, and I am going to continue to follow them. I am confident that I will be presented with future opportunities to get back onboard well below $8.50, should evidence indicate that we are more towards the Bull Case. At this early stage in its life - absent compelling economics - history tells me that the SP will be volatile.
(Note: This is not investment advice. It is a record of my own decision process.)
Disc: Not held IRL and SM