There were already some red flags, but understanding the article below has confirmed a lot.

You want 'honest and competent' management and I think this highlights Chris is definetly not honest.

I'm not sure how I feel about it re MinRes as a shareholder. I see the opportunity for MinRes given the set up, and Chris is key to the story, but there are also some serious red flags.

Chris Ellison’s offshore secret

An investigation by AFR Weekend has uncovered how Mineral Resources chief executive Chris Ellison, one of Australia’s richest men, allegedly evaded tax for years.

It was August 2007 and Chris Ellison received bad news in the mail. A year after he floated his iron ore and lithium company, Mineral Resources, the Australian Tax Office wrote to say it wanted to discuss his personal tax returns spanning “a number of years”.

It was terrible timing for the blunt-speaking New Zealander who has become one of Australia’s richest people on the back of the resources boom.

Coincidentally, Ellison was preparing to reshuffle his offshore business holdings. He decided not to tell the Tax Office about the scheme, which allegedly enabled him and four other MinRes executives to earn secret income while avoiding paying millions of dollars in Australian taxes. The scheme also meant MinRes shareholders missed out on millions in profits.

Twelve years later this omission would come back to haunt him. Fearing the scheme was about to catch up with him, he asked his lawyers to cut a deal with the ATO. He offered to share his secrets with the ATO, pay back any tax owing plus a multimillion dollar fine to avoid serious penalties.

Chris Ellison has cultivated an image as a straight-talking man of action. 

The deal he proposed to the ATO contained an important condition: the tax office would never reveal its existence or its investigation to anyone including the Australian Federal Police or the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.

In a document obtained by AFR Weekend, the tax commissioner concluded this year one of the executives involved in the scheme exhibited “behaviour that amounted to evasion for the income years ending 30 June 2004, 30 June 2007, 30 June 2008 and 30 June 2009”.

Ellison has cultivated an image as a straight-talking man of action who has gone where others wouldn’t to build a multi-billion-dollar mining company based in Western Australia.

But an investigation by AFR Weekend demonstrates the scheme raises tough questions for Ellison. It also raises questions about the readiness of the Tax Office – itself under scrutiny over its settlement with beleaguered accounting giant PwC – to cut generous deals with powerful players rather than expose questionable conduct.

In response to questions from AFR Weekend, MinRes chairman James McClements said: “The MinRes Board acts in the best interests of shareholders and has full confidence in the company’s executive team.

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“The Board takes seriously allegations regarding corporate governance practices and, where appropriate, investigates allegations with the assistance of external legal advisors.”

Building a fortune

A self-made billionaire, Chris Ellison boasts a brilliant career track that was recognised in 2022 with an investiture as a member of the New Zealand Order of Merit for his services to New Zealand-Australia relations.

Ellison built Mineral Resources out of three startup companies he launched in the 1990s, listed it as a $108 million company in 2006, then grew it to a business valued at $9 billion today thanks to ambitious iron ore and lithium plays.

He grew up in Dunedin in New Zealand’s South Island, leaving school the day he turned 15 and working on a farm, then a cattle station.

As Ellison tells it, when he came to Australia in 1977 aged 19, he and his brother would tell prospective employers they could do anything. Which meant, he explained on a MinRes video: “Well, we can ride pretty good, we can drive anything.”

Getting a crane driver ticket in Darwin set Ellison on his way. He moved to Port Hedland and in 1978, aged 21, started his first company, providing cranes for worksites, just as work on the North West Shelf exploded. “I was making $550,000 a month that I was banking as profit,” he says on the MinRes video.

Ellison sold out in 1982, aged 25, and went on to start a series of other businesses. In July 1992, “I decided I wanted to start another private company, so I started up MinRes,” he said on the 2023 corporate video. “I had $10,600 in the bank … but I had a credit card that had a $50,000 limit on it. I used all of that credit that I had to its absolute maximum. And I learned to appreciate it.”

That credit evolved into three businesses. First in 1993 was PIHA Pty Ltd, with former pipeline mechanic Bob Gavranich. PIHA built pipelines and site infrastructure for mining projects.

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In 1995 Ellison founded Crushing Services International, which provided contract crushing for miners. And in 2003 he started the Process Minerals International business, after buying rights to low-grade “reject” manganese ores mined from the Woodie Woodie tenements in north-west Australia.

These three businesses – PIHA, CSI and PMI – would merge to form Mineral Resources for its float in July 2006.

Ellison worked with a tight group of senior executives who had shares in the three businesses. They went on to buy property together in joint holdings, which was then leased by the businesses that became MinRes.

But according to ATO documents, Ellison offered other remuneration to this close-knit group as well. It was offshore, and access was on a need to know basis.

The extraordinary events that followed can only be told because in 2021 and 2022 Ellison’s tax advisors provided extensive records to the ATO in their attempt to strike a deal. The Tax Office used these documents to produce a detailed summary of how the offshore remuneration scheme worked.

Mineral Resources CEO Chris Ellison in his early years. 

Going offshore

In the 1990s RSM Bird Cameron in Perth was the auditor for CSI, PMI and PIHA. But it was another member of the global RSM network, RSM Nelson Wheeler, in Hong Kong, that introduced Ellison to the offshore world.

Nelson Wheeler’s corporate secretarial business traded as Asialink Services (HK) Ltd. Asialink set up a series of companies for Ellison and other MinRes executives domiciled In the British Virgin Islands, with nominee directors and shareholders. The British Virgin Islands are a tropical archipelago east of Puerto Rico in the Caribbean, with turquoise waters, palm-fringed beaches and a history of pirates. But the territory is better known for the zero tax rate it applies to companies domiciled there.

The ATO documents lay out an elaborate corporate structure that was constructed in the early 2000s. It enabled Ellison and his senior executives to move money into accounts held by the BVI companies, thereby avoiding paying Australian taxes, and to use credit cards to spend it.

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At first, when MinRes was still a private group, the big loser in this secret arrangement was the Australian tax man. But after MinRes floated in July 2006, the BVI profits were not only untaxed, they were paid from shareholder funds without being disclosed to MinRes directors.

ATO documents show the first two British Virgin Island companies, International Mining Supplier Limited (IMSL) and International Equipment Rentals, were operating by 2000.

The ATO documents don’t detail the activities of these two companies, but both had bank accounts in Hong Kong, and both held hundreds of thousands of dollars for Ellison, according to handwritten notes seen by AFR Weekend.

According to an ATO position paper produced this year, on May 27, 2003, Nelson Wheeler set up a third British Virgin Islands company called Far East Equipment Holdings Limited (FEEHL). And it’s this company which became the focus of a years-long ATO investigation.

FEEHL was owned by a nominee company on behalf of a trust set up for the five MinRes executives including Chris Ellison. Ellison took 51 per cent of the FEEHL earnings, while the other four executives held shares ranging from 5 per cent up to 21 per cent.

Just six weeks after FEEHL was set up, Crushing Services International (one of the original three Ellison companies that later formed MinRes) transferred $150,000 to the company on July 2, 2003.

FEEHL immediately sent $139,000 of this to one of the other BVI companies, IMSL, which in turn passed $5000 to the third BVI company, International Equipment Rentals.

IMSL had set up a string of Visa Gold credit cards. One of the cards went to Ellison, and two monthly statements obtained by AFR Weekend show how widely he used it.

His Visa billing statement for October 2003 shows he spent $7900 on shoes, curtains and paying $6866 in school fees at All Saints College Bull Creek, one of Perth’s top schools.

In February 2006 he spent $18,800, pulling the card out at Bunnings, flower shops and restaurants, spending $10,500 with Rosendorff’s Diamonds, and booking a $4800 New Zealand skiing vacation.

None of this could be traced back to Ellison as taxable income.

But the money funnelling into these companies was being used for more than just Ellison’s personal expenses.

Back in 2003, Crushing Services sent FEEHL a further $500,000 in August, then $400,000 more in September.

Chris Ellison as a teenager on a New Zealand cattle station.  

At the time, Crushing Services (CSI) was regularly buying used mining equipment, sometimes for its own operations, sometimes to resell to other miners.

CSI bought Svedala scalping screens and belt feeders from the closed Mount Todd Gold Mine in the Northern Territory. There was a ball mill and small batching plant from St Barbara Mines, and five gyratory crushers from Mount Leyshon gold mine.

But when the paperwork went through – and without the knowledge of some of those who handled the deal – it turned out it was FEEHL that had bought the machinery, using CSI funds, so it was FEEHL that earned the profit from the resale.

More frequently FEEHL sold the equipment to one of the MinRes companies for as much as five or 10 times the original cost.

The Tax Office has concluded that FEEHL cleared $1.69 million profit in the 2004 financial year. But this does not seem to include almost $1 million which the ATO says was transferred to International Mining Supplier, which funded Ellison’s Visa Gold credit card, and $1.5 million which was transferred to an Australian trustee company that Ellison controlled, World Wide Infrastructure.

FEEHL’s activities slowed down in the two years leading up to the August 2006 float, when the newly merged MinRes group faced heightened governance and accounting scrutiny. The Tax Office concluded that FEEHL actually lost $1.3 million in fiscal 2005 and another $190,000 the next year.

But according to the ATO documents, soon after MinRes floated on July 28, 2006, FEEHL returned to making money for Ellison and his close-knit group of executives, at the expense of MinRes, the new public company.

The ATO position paper states that on August 30, 2006, just a month after the float, MinRes subsidiary Crushing Services paid $1.895 million to FEEHL, marked as “first payment for purchase of plant and equipment Ref 4704”.

Any such transfer involved the publicly listed company’s money. The ATO says it was an undeclared related-party transaction, a secret transfer arrangement that delivered huge untaxed profits to Ellison and the four execs, at the expense of MinRes shareholders.

MinRes was using the inflated prices it paid to FEEHL for machinery to claim depreciation at elevated levels. This was also at the expense of taxpayers.

FEEHL earned $1.8 million profit in the MinRes group’s first year as a public company, the ATO says. Six weeks later, in August 2007, the Tax Office knocked on Ellison’s door.

The auditors knew nothing of Ellison’s offshore activities. They were more concerned with apparent discrepancies in the multiple trusts and holding companies which held Ellison’s assets in Australia.

Ellison had other problems. The offshore accounts were now run by Singapore-based Boardroom Corporate Services, which bought Nelson Wheeler’s corporate secretarial arm Asialink Holdings (HK) in 2005.

On October 11, 2007, a MinRes executive instructed Boardroom “to close all the credit card accounts” in International Mining Supplier Ltd (the other BVI company, International Equipment Rentals Ltd, would be deregistered in May 2008).

That same day email correspondence shows Ellison asked Boardroom to set up a new sub-account for him at Standard Chartered Bank: “From time to time I will provide you with fund transfer instructions together with the relevant supporting documents.”

Ellison’s new sub-account would be held in the Asialink Holdings account at Standard Chartered.

Chris Ellison after the Mineral Resources AGM last year.  

Ellison added a Letter of Wishes, which instructed Boardroom that in the event of his death the funds should be transferred to his then-wife, Debbie Ellison, and if she pre-deceased him, to his children.

Within a week similar sub-accounts had been set up by Asialink Holdings’ account for each of the other executives as well, with new credit cards. In December 2007, $2 million was transferred into these sub-accounts from FEEHL, of which $1.09 million went to Ellison’s sub-account, the ATO says.

But the Tax Office wasn’t going away. In early January 2008 they requested a meeting with Ellison. He agreed to meet them on Friday, January 18, in the Perth offices of accountancy firm RSM Bird Cameron.

Bird Cameron was in an awkward position: it was the auditor for Mineral Resources, while it was providing personal tax services to the CEO, Ellison.

The tax officers had a long list of queries for Ellison: trust records showing the wrong trustees, asset revaluations, loans to associates, and discrepancies in the reporting of transactions.

Business as usual

None of this attention from the tax man appeared to affect Ellison’s activities offshore.

Just three days after the meeting with the ATO, a statement of receipts for FEEHL dated January 21, 2008, showed: “’Funds received from Mineral Resources Limited for final payment for purchase of plant and equipment (ref. 4704) in the amount of $1,895,303.71.”

Almost all of it went straight to Ellison and the four executives. On January 30, 2008, Ellison instructed Boardroom to distribute $1.88 million in the FEEHL account to the five men. Ellison’s share was $958,800. The money was in their Standard Chartered accounts in Hong Kong by the next day.

There were further cash transfers to the five men, according to the ATO.

In August 2008, with new anti-money-laundering laws coming in, Boardroom notified the MinRes executives that they were no longer willing to house the five sub-accounts.

“Under advice from Boardroom Corporate Services the individual accounts had to be closed,” one of the executives advised the others in a handwritten note seen by AFR Weekend. “All the monies have been transferred back to FEEHL. Individual accounts have now been set up within FEEHL (see attached for details of your account).

“Authority is given that any individual can operate on his own individual account without the approval or reference to anyone (see attached – I leave it to you should you wish to set up a password).”

FEEHL closed its own account at Standard Chartered and opened a new one. Boardroom would administer “child accounts” for each of the new five executives within the new account. And everything was back to normal.

Meanwhile, the ATO completed its audit of Ellison’s personal tax affairs, finding he owed a modest amount of money – some say it was as low as $20,000. He told colleagues he counted this as a victory.

The ATO position paper does not detail any records for FEEHL after 2009. The company was deregistered in 2014.

But according to the ATO’s calculations, based on documents provided by Ellison, in MinRes’s first three years as a public company it made regular payments to FEEHL from which the British Virgin Islands company earned $6.6 million in profits. These profits were split between the five executives. Ellison’s share was $3.38 million.

This does not include multiple transfers from FEEHL to International Mining Suppliers, and to World Wide Infrastructure in Australia.

The Tax Office documents refer to a total of $13 million in undeclared income associated with the British Virgin Islands scheme, which appears to include MinRes’s claims for depreciation on the inflated purchase prices.

Staying ahead of the game

None of this might have come to light, but in December 2019 Mineral Resources executives began to worry that details of the British Virgin Islands companies might be exposed.

Ellison turned to well-known Sydney tax accountant Christopher Batten.

Correspondence shows that on December 16, 2019, Batten met with a director of integrated compliance at the ATO and two other tax officers to discuss a voluntary disclosure by five taxpayers OF undisclosed offshore income. Under Australian law, voluntary disclosures of undeclared income qualify for an 80 per cent reduction in any penalties that apply.

A month later Batten nudged the tax officer: “I hereby request a letter outlining the Commissioner’s agreement not to refer a disclosure that my clients intend to make to law enforcement agencies as well as other Federal Government agencies,” he wrote on January 14, 2020.

“The agencies are to include but not limited to the Australian Securities and Investment Commission, the Australian Federal Police and the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions.”

On February 4 the ATO wrote back to Batten: “The Commissioner will agree not to refer the disclosure to other Government agencies subject to the following conditions …”

These included the absence of any current criminal investigation, and that the five executives would disclose “approximately $10 million in income from Hong Kong previously not disclosed by five individuals resulting from transfer pricing concerning mining equipment; the excess depreciation claims of companies in relation to the mining equipment acquired from Hong Kong; [and] a finding of evasion resulting in amended notices of assessment for the years 2005-200? [sic]”

There was a lot at stake. ATO documents suggest that without the disclosure discount, a 75 per cent penalty could be applied to the unpaid tax.

Based on initial estimates that the undeclared income totalled $7.5 million, the nightmare scenario was that Ellison and the other executives could have faced a tax bill of up to $17 million. This would include tax and penalties, but the biggest cost would be the interest accrued over a decade.

If the deal was agreed, however, the base penalty would be 80 per cent lower. This saving, which would also lead to lower interest costs, would cut up to $5.8 million from the total tax bill owed.

But as Ellison’s advisors gathered more documents and records, estimates of the undeclared income jumped from $7.5 million to $10 million, then to $13 million, which would have produced even higher tax, penalty and interest payments.

On February 24, 2020, Batten was asking again: “Are we any closer? I have some anxious taxpayers.”

It wasn’t until May 2021 that Ellison’s advisors delivered the first tranche of documents to the Tax Office, the clearest signal that a deal with the ATO had been struck. More documents followed in September, then January 2022.

AFR Weekend has been unable to independently confirm if the deal was actually agreed. Neither the ATO nor Ellison would comment.

The documents provided by Ellison are the basis for a 98-page summary paper prepared by the Tax Office this year, which provides granular detail of the FEEHL transactions, and highlights Ellison’s role in orchestrating the scheme. His name appears 53 times in the document.

The explosion in the MinRes share price since 2006 has created share market windfalls worth tens and for some hundreds of millions of dollars for the five executives.

In comparison, the proceeds from the British Virgin Islands scheme are small beer. It begs the question why men who were wealthy even back then would engage in something so risky.

For Chris Ellison, public scrutiny is part of running a listed company. Last month he shrugged off concerns raised by governance group Ownership Matters over an estimated $10 million earned by his daughter’s shipping agency, which MinRes requests shipowners use when carrying its ores.

“We’re a public company, we’re open to scrutiny . . . and I need to be held to account, there’s no doubt about that,” he told The West Australian.

Nice rebound - still iron ore and lithium in for tough few years from the latest resources quarterly - resource_and_energy_quarterly_september_2024.pdf (industry.gov.au)

This absolute ball-tearer of a week has obliterated the steep downtrend that formed in the months preceding it.

It is hard to be bearish on technical grounds now (save for a healthy pullback or consolidation near-term), and with the fundamentals set to improve over the next couple of years, the set up still looks good for accumulation for those with a long-term view.

I made some recent notes for MIN, duplicated (below) for those interested.

• The perfect storm – recent market sell-off likely due to a combination of factors: low Iron Ore and lithium prices, concerns around China demand for iron ore, lots of debt and the business being in a CapEx cycle, despite the concerns around them.
• At time of writing, MIN’s market cap was 5.95b. MIN’s Mining Services recently delivered 550m of EBITDA in FY24. This is a fantastic business – steady cash flows not impacted by Iron Ore cyclicality. Onslow will be serviced by their Mining Services division, so EBITDA should be increasing -- and materially -- over the next 24 months. This division ALONE justifies the current share price / market cap for me.
• Their lithium, iron ore and gas ventures are less fantastic, although the recent Onslow project has enhanced their competitive advance re: Iron Ore production.  
• MIN was previously a high-cost producer of iron ore, that would ramp up and down to suit market conditions (when they could make a buck). Onslow changes this – despite being joint-owned (with MIN owning majority) production costs have more than halved. This changes the game for MIN.
• Iron Ore costs dropped below $US90 recently. Management recently said that Onslow provides them with the ability to stomach a $US65-$70 iron ore price and still make 20% return on invested capital.
• Yes, there is significant debt, but my bet is plenty of investors don’t understand this debt properly. Are they in danger of defaulting? Don’t think so. Will they go broke? Definitely not. Repayment of the debt is attractive – not a cent to be repaid until 2027 (how on earth did Ellison swing this?!) and lots of assets on the balance sheet.
• Onslow hits full capacity next year – will provide meaningful cash flows that will curb current market concerns.  
• Grey clouds above our heads short term. But those that can stomach the volatility will likely make market-beating returns (and then some) at these levels – a classic contrarian purchase. I am happy to sit tight and wait.

Minres has announced the Foreign Investment Review Board has approved the sale of the Onslow haul road, and that all sale conditions have now been met.

They expect to receive $1.1 billion in the next 15 days, and use that to cancel a $750 million bridge facility. A further $200 million is expected June 2025 (assuming Onslow reaches full production by then).

Net debt is currently ~$4.4 billion.

MIN handed in thier 'report Card' in Release Date: 28/08/24 19:22

Its a B - minus - the markets have played havoc here:

• Revenue of $5,278M, up 10% (FY23: $4,779M). -
• Underlying EBITDA of $1,057M, down 40% (FY23: $1,754M).
• - Underlying Net Profit After Tax (NPAT) of $158M, down 79% (FY23: $769M).
• Statutory NPAT of $114M, down 53% (FY23: $244M).
• - Operating cash flow before financing and tax of $1,909M, up 9% (FY23: $1,750M), including iron ore customer prepayments of $600M. Excluding the iron ore prepayments, cash conversion was 124%

• Strong liquidity position maintained during peak investment for Onslow Iron
• - Completed US$1,100M Senior Unsecured Notes Offering in October 2023.
• - Executed an iron ore customer prepayment of US$400M ($600M).
• - Available liquidity of $2,833M (FY23: $1,791M), including cash of $908M (FY23: $1,379M). -
• Net debt of $4,428M (FY23: $1,896M).

Presentation

Performance:

CommSec | Quotes & Research

Return (inc div)   1yr: -30.44%   3yr: -4.00% pa   5yr: 31.93% pa

MIN looks to have hit guidance from all divisions. Any recovery in lithium would really kick this along but I don't see that happening especially with China in a slump and a possible Trump Presidency weighing on sentiment.

Lithium

Operator

Our next question today is a text question, which is coming from David Feng from CICC. David says, "It's great to see that your lithium pricing performed much better than your peers. Could you remind us of the pricing methodology for lithium, e.g., what referencing indices should we refer to? And is there any provisional adjustment terms?"

Christopher Chong

Thanks, David. Thanks for the question. Yes, I think the best way to be thinking about our realized pricing in our lithium business is there are 5 index prices around spodumene. And if you took an average, that shouldn't be too far off the mark. Now there might be times where we might try to link it to chemicals, but that will be a dynamic, and we'll take a view on that. But I think for now, the best way to think about it is just look at the spot indices as a diverse reference.

In terms of discount to the like, as you know, with Mt Marion, you need the grade adjusted. But for our 3% product, there is an additional discount there that you need to take into account. But beyond that, just look at the indices that you can see in the market.

Iron Ore

Lachlan Shaw

Two from me. Firstly, on Onslow and just on the sort of FOB cost guidance. We're seeing a number of your peers guiding to sort of 4% to 5% inflation in the next 12 months. Just wondering, are you still comfortable with the AUD 45 per tonne FOB, including infrastructure charge, at Onslow at 35 million tonnes per annum?

Chris Soccio

At the moment, we are. So we've been able to control our costs, and we're performing well within the operations. Obviously, we need to get to nameplate to obviously realize those prices, but we're still confident that it's an accurate guidance

Debt really does seem to be a relative non-issue:

"Turning to the balance sheet. In relation to the sale of our 49% interest in the Onslow road to Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners, we expect to receive further approval soon. So the first payment of $1.1 billion will be received this half.

We expect FY '24 net debt to be around $4.4 billion. And I'd like to take the opportunity just to remind people that our unsecured U.S. bonds have no financial maintenance covenants of any kind, and the earliest maturity is in May 2027. Overall, we have significant liquidity of $2.8 billion at 30 June. This includes cash of $900 million.

We entered into a $600 million iron ore customer prepay, not dissimilar to what FMG has done in the past, and we see this as a good diversification of funding. It's non-dilutive, it's a non-debt form of capital, and will be treated as such in our accounts as well other peers, and that's how our rating agencies view it, too. It's cost competitive and unsecured, and we restructured the repayment profile to align with our cash flows, with amortization over 3 years starting in FY '26, which is when Onslow would be at the 35 million tonne run rate.

As previously announced, we entered into a $1.1 million bridge facility with JPMorgan, and we expect that to remain undrawn, and we will cancel it upon receipt of the first $1.1 billion of payment from the road sale.

We also upsized our undrawn revolving credit facility from $400 million to $800 million, reflecting our larger business size.

I'd also like to highlight our Onslow carry loan receivable of around $500 million, which we will earn interest on. This gets paid back from 80% of our JV partner's free cash flow. So effectively, we will receive 92% of MineCo free cash flow.

We know we are at peak leverage over the next 6 months, and that will start to deliver very quickly as Onslow ramps up and cash flow grows. Our Onslow ramp-up targets are unchanged. We are targeting 20 million tonnes per annum by the end of the year and 35 million tonnes in June next year. And to highlight the earnings potential for Onslow for us, at the 35 million tonne run rate and at spot prices today of around USD 100 a tonne, Onslow generates EBITDA for MinRes of $1.3 billion. So clearly, the payback on our capital is very rapid."

,,,,

Ben Lyons

I really need to clarify the net debt amount, please, if we can get that out of the way upfront. Further to the question earlier, it appears you've included the cash from the prepayment but not the debt in your net debt calculation of $4.4 billion. Is that correct? So it would be $5.0 billion, if you actually reflected the fact that you have to repay this facility just in iron units rather than cash.

Christopher Chong

Ben, thanks for the question. Yes, to clarify, the $900 million cash, we have a $600 million cash of the prepayment in that. And as for the opening remarks, it will be in the current liabilities as a prepayment, but it won't be in the borrowings or net debt, and that's how it's accounted for.

....

Paul Young

Yes. Okay. All right. And then maybe further, Chris, sorry to interrupt, just further to the accounting treatment. It sounds as though this is being classified, say, FMG, a decade ago, when they did the prepayments as deferred income on the balance sheet. We're effectively recognizing the revenue, but not the cash receipts from customers through the cash flow statement. That's simply how we're accounting for this.

Christopher Chong

Yes, it's exactly the same way to be treating it. Yes, we might not call it deferred income, we'll just call it prepayment in the accounts, but yes, it'll be the same accounting treatment as done by FMG and others.

.....

The $600M prepayment is interesting - its $200M pa for 3 years at spot rates - not fully clear what the buyer gets out of the deal, wouldn't have though supply was an issue but anyway alleviates more risk.

Glyn Lawcock

Firstly, just on the prepayment again. My parents always told me there's no such thing as a free lunch. So on the $600 million prepayment, like what is the gentleman on the other side, the company on the other side, getting in return? Is there a bigger discount? Or are you paying interest? There must be a rub on the other side. I'm just trying to make sure I understand what it is.

Christopher Chong

Glyn, thanks for the question. Look, there's nothing we can disclose in terms of who the other party are or is. As I said, we've got commercial agreements in place. It's not similar to other prepayments, Glyn, and the terms are not dissimilar as well. That's all I can really say.

Glyn Lawcock

But there must be something.

Christopher Chong

Yes. No, no. And it is very cost competitive. So if you look at where our bonds trade, et cetera, it's not materially different, I'd suggest.

Glyn Lawcock

Okay. So there's some rub on the other side. And then maybe just a question on Onslow and the build-out. Chris, you mentioned similar capital intensity, which is AUD 85 a tonne on the first 35 million tonnes. That would suggest another [ $1.3 billion ] for the remaining 15 million tonnes to get to 50 million tonnes. Is that about right? It seems like I would have thought you've already built the hall road, so that $500-odd million should come out. You have to repeat that. So I would have thought the capital intensity be cheaper. And is that sort of -- we should expect that over the next couple of years, spend?

Chart fest from Morgan Stanley:

[held]

21-May-2024: Onslow-Iron-delivers-first-ore-on-ship-ahead-of-schedule.PDF

This is an important milestone for MIN. The whole sector (iron ore) is down today, so they're not getting the love they deserve for this achievement today, but it will come. I think this is another "up yours!" moment for Chris Ellison - because people definitely had their doubts especially a number of analysts who love to hate on Chris and MinRes. He was too bullish. His timeline wasn't achievable. He was too abrasive and abusive during analyst briefings and investor calls. Well, Chris isn't trying to win any popularity contests. He's running a business. And as businesses go, it's one of the better ones for sure.

MIN closed at $79.49 yesterday. MIN and RIO are both down by around -1% today. FMG -0.5%. BHP slightly up, but essentially flat, however BHP is trying to takeover Anglo American, so there's that - BHP would become a copper play if that goes through, which it probably won't - see here: BHP debates improved Anglo bid as time runs out in takeover saga - MINING.COM

I hold MIN.

I hear lots of bear cases and chartists calling MIN overvalued due to possible balance sheet pressure especially in regards to the Ashburton hub.

However it appears MIN is addressing this with divestments of non core assets (including their sale of DVP and AZS shares). Definitely got lots of options on the table to relieve the balance sheet.

I don't know but I think I can only see upside from here.

Pity I missed buying the dip around $52 back in February..Should have just gone a bit generous on my order.

On another note I got blocked by some guy on Twitter when they were calling $60 and I said it is now $70. Some people are too sensitive...

But I wouldn't mind seeing a pullback which may never happen now.

The AFR released an article this afternoon titled, "Billionaire MinRes founder slams critics over balance sheet".

Mineral Resources founder Chris Ellison slams critics over balance sheet

Just a few things that made me smile, highlighting why I like this company, and love the way Chris Ellison goes about it.

• “We have so many friggin’ levers we can pull,” he said in response to the balance sheet doubters.
• Mr Ellison suggested he felt pressure to sell a 49 per cent stake in a 150-kilometer private haul raod that connects the mine to the Port of Ashburton on the west Pilbara coast.“The pressure I’m under at the moment with everyone whining and bitching, [I’m] going to go out and sell half of it [the haul road] just to put the money in the bank and go like ‘f--- you’,” he told analysts.
• Mr Ellison said MinRes would limit production at the Wodgina lithium mine it owns in partnership with New York-listed Albemarle until prices improved in a market dominated by China. “When Mr. China decides to pay us enough [for lithium], we’ll turn it on,” he said.

In my view, there is a lot of criticism of Chris Ellison... a man who has proven himself as a great CEO who makes very sound and strategic decisions time and time again.

23-November-2023: OK, MinRes (MIN) is certainly one of Australia's best mining services companies, and Gaurav Sodhi went as far as to call them "the best mining business on the ASX" in his 14-Dec-2022 article titled "Lithium: The mania and the cure - part 2" for the Intelligent Investor paysite where Gaurav has been their resources analyst since 2009. As well as resources, Gaurav covers telecommunications and power infrastructure. As Gaurav points out, MinRes' unique business model, far-sighted management and exceptional growth prospects have resulted in fantastic long-term returns.

They are also either the largest or one of the largest mining services businesses in the world, specialising in moving and crushing iron ore, they have billions of dollars worth of earthmoving equipment, fixed plant, trains, trucks and port assets, mostly in Western Australia - where most of the iron ore is.

They are also mine owners and operators, with a number of producing iron ore mines and other mining assets that includes two of the best lithium deposits on the planet - Wodgina and Mt Marion - neither currently in production but they will be soon enough. MIN is a company where a PE ratio is a flawed metric because the Earnings do not include the value of assets that haven't produced any revenue and earnings at all in the past year or two - or during whatever historical period you are looking at. These assets, while not currently producing any earnings, have substantial value and should not be overlooked.

On top of that we have MIN buying into various other Australian lithium companies while the lithium price is down and that's obviously for strategic reasons but part of it seems to be to stop Chinese and other overseas companies getting control of too much Australian lithium and other "critical minerals".

On 22-May-2023 the AFR published an interesting article titled, "What are Australia’s ‘critical minerals’ (and why are they critical)?": https://www.afr.com/companies/mining/the-critical-minerals-boom-is-about-geopolitics-not-geology-20230519-p5d9t7

Excerpt:

The wave of new lithium hydroxide processing plants built in WA is slowly reducing China’s dominance of battery grade lithium, but will amount to only 10 per cent of world lithium hydroxide supply by the end of 2024.

It’s a similar story in cobalt; 63 per cent of world supply is mined in the Democratic Republic of Congo, but it needs to be processed before it is turned into something useful, and China is responsible for 60 per cent of global cobalt refining.

To exacerbate the situation, China also makes about 75 per cent of all lithium-ion batteries and produces about 76 per cent of the world’s silicon metal, a crucial ingredient in solar panels.

As things stand, the world can decarbonise only if China permits it to do so.

--- end of excerpt ---

Source: https://www.afr.com/companies/mining/the-critical-minerals-boom-is-about-geopolitics-not-geology-20230519-p5d9t7

I'm not sure how Australia have 53% of global lithium production while China have 56%, but I'm guessing it's to do with the Chinese investments into Australian lithium mines, but in any case I believe Chris Ellison at MinRes and Gina Rinehart (Australia's richest woman, on the back of iron ore mining mostly, plus some other investments) both would like to (a) keep control of the best of our remaining Australian lithium assets right here in Australia, and (b) make some money for themselves in the process.

In Chris's case, he'd be making money for himself and other MinRes shareholders. Gina Rinehart's companies are not listed, they're all private family controlled companies, but we CAN invest in MinRes (MIN) and have exposure to Chris Ellison's vision and shareholder value creation.

In the past year or so, there's been a flurry of buying by MIN of blocking stakes in lithium companies like Wildcat Resources (WC8: 19.9% of WC8 is owned by MIN), 13.56% of Azure Minerals (AZS) where Gina Rinehart also owns 18.3%, and 17.4% of Delta Lithium (DLI) where Gina owns another 7%. It is not clear if there are any plans for Chris and Gina to work together with respect to any of these companies towards a mutually beneficial outcome, but it's interesting to view those companies in the context of what Chris and Gina control together between them.

Additionally, Gina and daughter Bianca Rinehart own 19.99% of Liontown Resources (LTR), another lithium company, and MIN have issued Lithium Australia (LIT) a $4.5m convertible note which LTR have begun drawing down recently. According to LIT's 30-Oct-2023 First-drawdown-from-Mineral-Resource's-convertible-note.PDF announcement, "On successful completion of the pilot plant operations and engineering study, MinRes’ convertible note will convert into equity in a new 50:50 joint venture (“JV”) between MinRes and Lithium Australia, which will wholly own the LieNA® technology going forward. The JV plans to license the LieNA® technology to third-parties at a target headline gross product royalty rate of 8%"

Fingers in many pies, but many of them are clearly lithium-related.

This is all while there have been overseas takeover attempts of some of these companies (LTR, AZS) and the lithium price has fallen quite a bit, AND lithium companies represent 5 of the 20 most shorted stocks on the ASX, including the number one most shorted stock, Pilbara Minerals (PLS), currently 18.5% sold short and rising.

Source: https://www.shortman.com.au/ [with some colourful highlighting on the left side added by me.]

MinRes also own 12.87% of Develop Global (DVP), the new miner/mining services hybrid company (just like MIN only a lot smaller) that is being built up currently by Bill Beament, the former driving force behind Northern Star Resources (NST) for all of those years. There are some analysts who believe that Bill B is the natural successor to Chris Ellison at MIN once Chris decides to step back or retire - both Chris and Bill admire each other's accomplishments with what they have done in business and their entrepreneurial mindsets. For that change at the top of MIN to occur however, it is likely that MIN would have to acquire the rest of DVP with Bill's blessing and for Bill to stay on to run the combined company. No guarantees but that's one possible future outcome, and makes sense in the context of MIN owning 12.87% of DVP, being a blocking stake that stops all other suitors from fully acquiring DVP, unless MIN agrees to sell. That blocking stake may hold DVP's SP back a little but doesn't do MIN's any harm. For clarity, Chris Ellison owns around 4.25% of MinRes shares on issue and Bill Beaument owns 18.5% of DVP shares on issue.

In 2006, Ellison and others established Mineral Resources as a merger of three mining services firms – pipeline contractor PIHA, ore-crushing firm Crushing Services International (CSI), and Process Minerals International (PMI). Ellison was a major shareholder in each of the three. Mineral Resources was floated on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in 2006 at 90 cents per share. By 2022 the company's share price had risen to $71 per share, with Ellison holding around 12 percent of the company. He has since sold down that stake, but still holds 22,471,416 MIN shares, a stake with a current market value (based on MIN's closing SP of $64.72 yesterday) of $1.454 billion. He also owns one of Australia's most expensive homes and has other assets.

The Mosman Park mansion bought for $57.5 million in December 2009, setting an Australian record at the time.

The following is a small excerpt from: https://www.intelligentinvestor.com.au/recommendations/mineral-resources-takes-a-dive/152981 [Gaurav Sodhi, 10-Oct-2023]

The story of Mineral Resources is now legend. After leaving school at the age of 15, Chris Ellison made a fortune as he founded, then sold, a mining services business to Monadelphous in the 1980’s.

Then a troubled firm, Monadelphous went to the wall and Ellison lost everything. The firm was later revived under new management and is now a blue chip stalwart of WA, but Ellison missed all of that. He used his credit card, reportedly maxed to $10,000, to tie up three small services firms to create Mineral Resources.

The firm listed on the ASX in 2006 at 90c per share. It is now a $12bn colossus, the largest third-party crushing business in the world and, until recently, a stock market darling.

Source: Pilbara Minerals

Lithium meets the cycle

Lithium is a notoriously difficult commodity to analyse. There is no spot market. Sales are made by opaque contracts and prices only disclosed after a lag.

Carbonate and hydroxide prices, which are processed lithium products used to make cathode materials for lithium batteries, require specific offtakes and prices are usually contracted and secretive.

Most miners, however, sell a spodumene concentrate, and prices for the concentrate have diverged from processed carbonate and hydroxide. While carbonate prices have fallen by 80% over the past 12 months, spodumene prices have merely halved.

These intricacies are lost when prices are driven by euphoria and fear. 

We have been cautious about lithium. Markets tend to accommodate new demand with new supply in unexpected ways. When the world expected peak oil, shale extraction technologies upended the narrative. When cobalt became hard to access outside Congo, car makers learned how to build without it. Indonesian nickel producers have disrupted nickel supply by learning to process complex laterite ores. We’ve always been skeptical of the higher for longer camp in any commodity because that hasn’t been the path of history.

Lithium, however, is in a unique spot.

Niche gets big

As we have noted in Lithium: the mania and the cure, lithium is moving from a niche commodity to a bulk commodity, a transition that will take time and require oodles of capital. To attract that capital, prices will need to stay above marginal costs for an extended time.

Lithium is out of favour now. Prices rose too far; subsidies in China have played havoc with inventories and new supply is coming. Yet we think there is a good chance that prices remain higher for a while. Only higher prices can incentivise new supply.

Albermarle, one of the world’s largest lithium producers, is valuing spodumene from Liontown, a takeover target, at US$1,600 a tonne. Industry insiders don’t always get it right, but their actions shouldn’t be ignored. Albermarle’s actions suggest new supply, especially low-cost supply, is hard to introduce.

MinRes is currently expanding output from its two hard rock mines (each 50% owned) and should produce about 900,000 tonnes of spodumene concentrate within 3 or 4 years, up from about 300,000 tonnes last year.

Costs are expected to fall to between $500-600 a tonne, which leaves plenty of margin even if prices decline further.

Services and iron ore

MinRes is, of course, more than just lithium. The mining services business at the heart of MinRes has raised volumes by 20% a year for the past decade. We’ve explained why our valuation of the services business, at about $30 a share, sits higher than most in previous reviews.

The iron ore business is undergoing a step-change in quality that will see output double and costs crumble from about $100 a tonne to $40 a tonne. That is being done by building an integrated logistics line to take ore from pit to port.

All the infrastructure to move ore will be owned by MinRes and it could be opened for third party access, or even partial sale, at some point. We don’t think improvement in the iron ore business, or the attached infrastructure, is being counted by the market. Iron ore adds another $10-15 per share to our valuation.

Following its expansion, the lithium business could be worth the entire market capitalisation of the business today. On a sum of parts basis, we think MinRes is worth over $90 a share.

Slow down

The balance sheet remains a risk. Over the next three years, MinRes will spend about $4bn in capital expenditure to grow lithium and iron ore volumes. Net debt has grown to $3.6bn and could climb further.

Yet the founder owns 12% of the business and management have built a track record of conservatism and success. We note that MinRes retains plenty of options of lowering risk such as selling project equity or infrastructure. The balance sheet is a risk, but not an insurmountable one.

Lithium prices also present a risk. Prices could remain weak. We also need to be aware that, like oil, cobalt or nickel, new technologies could change everything. Low costs, however, should protect margins as volume growth adds to cash flow.

It’s uncomfortable to buy when commodity prices are falling but these are the opportunities we must seize. We recommend starting slowly, but it’s time to BUY.

Disclosure: The author owns shares in Mineral Resources, as does the Intelligent Investor Equity Income Fund, Equity Growth Fund, and Ethical Shares Fund.

IMPORTANT: Intelligent Investor is published by InvestSMART Financial Services Pty Limited AFSL 226435 (Licensee). Information is general financial product advice. You should consider your own personal objectives, financial situation and needs before making any investment decision and review the Product Disclosure Statement. InvestSMART Funds Management Limited (RE) is the responsible entity of various managed investment schemes and is a related party of the Licensee. The RE may own, buy or sell the shares suggested in this article simultaneous with, or following the release of this article. Any such transaction could affect the price of the share. All indications of performance returns are historical and cannot be relied upon as an indicator for future performance.

--- ends ---

Note: As I explained earlier, Chris Ellison no longer owns 12% of the business as Gaurav suggests there, but he does still own around $1.5 billion worth (4.25% of MIN).

And Gaurav hasn't mentioned the various stakes that MIN is buying in other lithium miners (that I discussed above) which I think points to a longer term plan to control or at least provide the mining services for a larger group of lithium mines than what MIN currently owns.

MIN are market leaders in Mining Services but not yet in lithium and they are still a higher cost iron ore producer from their own iron ore mines. However, they do have a number of competitive advantages, not least of which is Chris Ellison, and his very entrepreneurial management, but also their off-balance-sheet assets like their P&E (plant and Equipment) graveyards - they will happily clean up old mining and crushing/ore-processing sites from miners who have gone broke, where MIN remove all of the old mining, crushing and loading equipment and plant - and also often do some site rehab - sometimes they are paid to do this and other times they will do it for free for the salvage rights because they store all of the old conveyors and ore crushing hardware etc. and use it to build new crushing plants at either their own mine sites or their clients' mine sites. And all of that used plant and equipment has a book value of $Nil. It probably has little to no value until they use it again, and then it does.

MIN can be sold down on poor iron ore sentiment or on poor lithium sentiment - and also when people are concerned by Chris's M&A moves, but having watched Chris Ellison operate for a number of years, it's an easy decision for me to buy MinRes shares at below $60 or up to $65/share, particularly with that very significant future lithium upside. 

As usual, Chris has a longer term view and he's not content to JUST be a large player in spodumene - he wants that vertical integration and to refine the spodumene to produce battery-grade lithium hydroxide - and so far he's mostly used Albemarle for that, and he's outplayed them at every turn so far, but he's fairly agnostic about where his partners come from as long as he gets a good deal from them. And when he can't get a good deal, he just ploughs on and does it himself.  

Here's a quick case study - just of Wodgina: when Chris Ellison was first developing Wodgina he said he was getting into lithium for a good time, not a long time, and he would likely sell out at a good profit before the peak, and then he sold half of it to Albemarle in late 2018 pretty much at the previous lithium peak, with an agreement that gave MIN half of the Albemarle Lithium Hydroxide (LH) plant that was being constructed at Kemerton (near Bunbury in south west WA) as well, and when that sale (for half of Wodgina) settled - at $US1.15 billion (A$1.58 billion), it looked like Albemarle had overpaid by quite some margin because the lithium price had declined sharply - and then Chris recut that deal a few more times over the next few years (always in MIN's favour), which saw Albemarle further increase their stake in Wodgina - which remained on "care and maintenance" (i.e. not producing anything) since shortly after the first sale announcement at the lithium peak. 

This year Chris announced that MinRes had "simplified" their JV arrangements with Albemarle and that Albemarle would now control all of the Kemerton LH refinery but that MinRes would increase their own stake in Wodgina back up to 50% and would remain the mine operators. This came with a further payment to MinRes by Albemarle of US$380-400 million, including the net consideration for MinRes’ share of Kemerton and completion adjustments at Wodgina and Kemerton. See here:  https://www.mineralresources.com.au/news-media/simplified-marbl-jv-agreement-reached/ [20 July 2023]

And here: https://www.afr.com/companies/mining/ellison-eyes-new-lithium-prize-near-albemarle-joint-venture-20231018-p5ed9f [22-Oct-2023]

He's not silly, that one! Smart cookie, and great to have in your corner. Not so good when you're on the other side of a deal with him or his company, but apparently he's loyal to his friends, employees, clients and partners, and so far longer-term MinRes shareholders have done very well out of investing in his company as well.

https://www.mineralresources.com.au/investor-centre/annual-reporting-suite/

Disclosure: I hold MinRes (MIN) shares in my major real life portfolios (including my SMSF) and have recently added them back into my virtual SM portfolio as well, taking advantage of the lower share price.

07-Aug-2023: LIT-Landmark-joint-development-agreement-with-Mineral-Res.PDF

It's interesting. I hold MIN, but I do not hold LIT shares. Back on the 20th July, MinRes (MIN) announced that they'd made some big changes to their arrangements (via the MARBL JV) with Albemarle - Simplified-MARBL-JV-Agreement-Reached.PDF - and the market initially sent their share price up +5.16% (or +$3.72 to $75.78) before selling them down over the next fwo days by -9.86% to $68.31. Then, on July 26th, MinRes released their FY23-Q4-Quarterly-Activities-Report.PDF and their share price rose +4% (to close the day at $73.82).

Monday's announcement (reproduced above, with a link at the top of this straw) didn't result in much movement; just -0.77% or 54 cents down to $69.42, on a day when the overall market was slightly down anyway.

By contrast, on the same day - Monday 7th August 2023, the LIT share price finished the day up +66.67%. They'd been trading at 3.3 cents ($0.033) for a week, and they finished Monday at 5.5 cents ($0.055), which is also where they finished Tueday (yesterday evening) after trading as low as 4.9 cps and as high as 6.6 cps during the day (Tuesday).

While this is Big News for a $67 million microcap like LIT (possibly a nanocap coz they had a market capitalisation of only $40 million last Friday), it's not such big news for MinRes (MIN), whose market cap is now $13.5 Billion. MinRes are no longer small - they're an ASX50 company now.

There's always plenty going on at MinRes, but I reckon the market often struggles to know how to interpret it. Certainly, if the recent Money-of-Mine Podcast coverage of Chris Ellison on the latest quarterly earnings call is anything to go by, the analysts at Australia's major broking houses don't have much of a clue!

Here's what happened to the LIT share price on Monday:

lit

Good if you're a holder (I'm not), but the context is that they were trading at higher levels a year ago and people were just giving up on them and selling out for the past 11 months. That is a massive lift in volume for LIT though, ain't it?!

Those sort of movements no longer happen with companies as big as MinRes is these days, but they can and do still grind higher, and MinRes (MIN) do tend to trend well both up and down for weeks and months at a time, so you can also trade them if you've got the time. I've done that in the past, but I'm just planning to hold them now.

For what it's worth - a summary of some recent broker reports for MIN post the announcement to exit Kemerton and China downstream - run's the gamut of possibilities :)

20/07/23: Macquarie: Outperform with 12m Price Target of $100

20/07/23: RBC: Outperform with Price Target of $84

21/07/23: Morgan Stanley: Equal Weight with a PT of $70

21/07/23: Goldman Sachs: Sell with a 12m PT of $57

Mineral Resources Limited (ASX: MIN) (MinRes or Company) has made a significant natural gas discovery, and also provides an update on the lithium business and Mt Marion exploration program.

MINERAL RESOURCES LIMITED (ASX:MIN) - Ann: Exploration and Lithium Business Update, page-1 - HotCopper | ASX Share Prices, Stock Market & Share Trading Forum

MIN Market Cap $14.17Bill

Noted share price taking a breather the moment.

Noted: the free flow has came off the boil.

Massive returns: Return (inc div)   1yr: 40.78%   3yr: 59.77% pa   5yr: 38.85% pa

maybe pick up some on price weakness

But IGO & PLS are good propects..

An article in todays AFR: MinRes to pay $970m for China Lithium Assets

From the article...

Chris Ellison’s Mineral Resources will stump up close to $1 billion for a share in lithium hydroxide plants in China in a rebuff to Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s push for onshore processing of battery minerals into finished products

And US-based battery minerals heavyweight Albemarle has cast doubt on whether it will ever invest in another lithium hydroxide plant in Australia as big car-making nations demand downstream assets close to their home factories.

Albemarle has flagged WA becoming a lithium workhorse to the world rather than a maker of batteries and is eyeing more acquisitions in the state on top of its stakes in the world-class Wodgina and Greenbushes mines and a lithium hydroxide plant it has built at Kemerton an estimated cost or more than $2 billion.

New York Stock Exchange-listed Albemarle regards WA lithium mining and Chinese processing as joined at the hip for now, but is looking to supply hydroxide from Kemerton to other Asian nations and to send spodumene concentrate, an intermediate lithium product, to Europe where governments and carmakers want downstream battery minerals processing.

Albemarle president of energy storage Eric Norris told The Australian Financial Review on Thursday that WA was essential to the electrification of transport.

“All of these regions that are large automobile production areas are going through a significant transition to not only build electric vehicles, but to help build the supply chains in their countries to reduce the supply time, lead times, the CO2 (emissions) that gets involved in moving material around,” he said.

“The interesting fact of the matter is that neither China, we believe, nor the US, nor Europe can meet their EV ambitions without WA,”

Mr Ellison has been trying to convince Albemarle about the merits of building a lithium hydroxide plant near the Wodgina mine they co-own in WA’s Pilbara, but for now has agreed to acquire a 50 per cent share of two Albemarle plants in China at a cost of about $US660 million ($970 million), including an initial payment of $US350 million.

The downstream deal was unveiled on Thursday, less than 24 hours after Mr Albanese was lukewarm about Chinese investment in lithium and said his government wanted to see lithium-ion batteries produced onshore.

Mr Ellison offered supported for Mr Albanese’s sentiments on value-adding and said MinRes had been talking to the government about the best way to achieve that goal.

However, the mining billionaire said the investment in China would ensure MinRes could convert the spodumene from Wodgina mine into battery-grade chemicals in the short-term.

“Doing more here in Australia is my preference over the long term. Any potential future hydroxide plant in Australia that could take our spodumene is some years off. We need capacity today,” he said.

“We’re encouraged by the federal government’s commitment to grow the battery supply chain here in Australia and have been consulting with them on the best way to support industry to do it.”

Albemarle remains unconvinced about building another lithium hydroxide plant in WA after enduring cost blow outs and labour shortages it expects to continue in WA in building the Kemerton plant, but hasn’t ruled it out.

In addition to their deal on the Chinese plants, Albemarle and MinRes are restructuring the existing joint ownership of the Wodgina mine and the Kemerton plant in WA’s South-West.

Albemarle’s share in Wodgina will be cut to 50 per cent from 60 per cent while its ownership of the first two, 25,000 tonne-a-year production trains at the Kemerton plant increases to 85 per cent from 60 per cent.

MinRes is set to pocket $US100 million to $US150 million from Albemarle in the form of an adjustment payment that reflects the restructure being back dated to April 1, 2022.

Albemarle and MinRes will form a new 50-50 joint venture to produce lithium battery chemicals in China from spodumene produced at Wodgina.

Under the new joint venture, MinRes will pay for a 50 per cent share of Albemarle’s Qinzhou and Meishan plants in China.

Mr Ellison still wants Albemarle to agree to invest in downstream processing in the Pilbara where MinRes estimated a 50,000 tonne a year lithium hydroxide plant would cost $US650 million to build, and believes that is still a possibility under plans to expand the Wodgina mining operations.

Albemarle built the Kemerton plant to process spodumene from the Greenbushes mine where it has a 49 per cent stake alongside Chinese Tianqi and ASX-listed IGO, which have their own lithium hydroxide plant at Kwinana south of Perth.

Under the terms of the new arrangements, Albemarle will supply MinRes’ 15 per cent share of spodumene concentrate for processing at Kemerton from the Greenbushes mine.

MinRes, which does not have an ownership stake in Greenbushes, will pay the benchmark price for its share of the spodumene concentrate.

Mr Norris said Albemarle was on track to start selling hydroxide from train 1 at Kemerton in the second half of calendar 2023 as it finishes work on train 2.

He confirmed Albemarle remained committed to building trains 3 and 4, taking total capacity to 100,000 tonnes a year, in its own right and outside its partnership with MinRes in another sign of faith in WA.

Albemarle’s Qinzhou plant is up and running and has capacity to produce 25,000 tonnes a year. The plant is expected to start converting Wodgina spodumene in early 2024.

The Meishan plant will have capacity to produce 50,000 tonnes a year and is scheduled to be commissioned by the end of calendar 2024.

Mr Ellison, who hopes to produce low-cost gas from the Perth Basin to support downstream minerals processing in WA, said the new deals with Albemarle would cement MinRes’ place as a world-leader in lithium mining and leverage off Albemarle’s strong track record in battery chemical production.

Mr Norris said Albemarle, which reported December quarter sales of $US2.6 billion driven by lithium, said there was “tremendous opportunity” in the rapid growth of lithium-ion batteries.

He said Albemarle would consider the Asia Pacific region, including Australia, for any additional lithium hydroxide plant linked to any expansion of Wodgina.

Mr Norris noted there were advantages in operating close to mines in WA and through the Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act which applies to investment in Australia.

DISC: Held in RL

Some more interesting commentry around a potential spinoff of MinRes's Lithium assets in todays AFR (behind the paywall)

MinRes, lithium rally add weight to US spinoff case

Mineral Resources shares soaring to an all-time high on the back of huge demand for lithium stocks have re-ignited prospects of the $18.3 billion miner spinning out its lithium assets in the US.

The huge run, fuelled in part by heady buying in the cosy Perth broker set, has breathed new potential for the plans, which are gathering dust inside MinRes HQ.

The Perth grapevine was buzzing on Tuesday that MinRes was assembling a board keen to progress the spin-off.

Sources close to the company kiboshed the hype, saying any deal would still be a long way off. However, it’s all helpful at a time when MinRes is keen to capitalise on investor interest in the company and its lithium assets. It also spent considerable energy mulling its options last year, as revealed by Street Talk in September.

MinRes’ big run - to finish at a staggering $96.28 on Tuesday - came as broker UBS put out a bullish note on lithium and upgraded MinRes, Pilbara Minerals (also up 5.19 per cent on Tuesday) and IGO (up 4.49 per cent).

The bank’s note came just as NYSE-listed lithium giant Albemarle, a bellwether for the global lithium markets, beat consensus production guidance by about 130 per cent.

Those hoping for a lithium spin-off - or at least MinRes to use the assets to create even more value for shareholders - reckoned there was more behind MinRes’s spectacular share price performance during the day. Its quarterly numbers are due on Wednesday, and they were hoping for a nice set of results.

When Street Talk revealed the talks in September, MinRes boss Chris Ellison was out on front-foot, telling investors he didn’t have plans to “peel off” any business units “right now”. MinRes followed up with site visits to its Mt Marion and Wodgina lithium mines in early October, repeating the no-deal stance to analysts and investors who visited.

But investors know better than to take Ellison’s comments at their face value. As an example, he’s recently called Perth Basin gas “overvalued” while buying shares in M&A target Warrego Energy at a premium to either bid on the table.

More importantly, the big driver for MinRes’s mooted lithium IPO spin off is still very much hanging around the scene - the valuation gap between pure-play lithium businesses like Albemarle and roll-ups like MinRes.

While MinRes may not be able to serve up a lithium carveout to make the most of its all-time high, it did benefit at its M&A target Norwest Energy.

MinRes increased its offer marginally, from one-for-1367 shares to one-for-1300 shares. However, the share price pop (from $82 a share on December 15 to $96.28 on Tuesday) meant its bid for Norwest went from a 33 per cent premium to 65 per cent premium to its undisturbed price. It was enough for Norwest to recommend MinRes’ offer.

DISC: Held in RL

An interesting article in the AFR today (behind paywall)

MinRes turns kingmaker as it taps out of Warrego bid

Extract below:

Chris Ellison’s Wednesday night declaration that Mineral Resources does not intend to bid for Warrego Energy leaves it an envious spot, even if it has left investors with more questions than answers for now.

The most immediate one is MinRes’s claim that gas asset prices in Perth Basin are now over-inflated, just three days after it bought Warrego shares at as high as 39.2¢ a pop to round off its 19.17 per cent stake.

MinRes reckons its stake is a “strategic” one, making the whole statement even more of an oxymoron. It declined to clarify its comments.

The big question though is what’s the way forward for Warrego Energy, which has two takeover bids and three strategic investors squatting on its register.

There’s MinRes with 19.17 per cent and “no intention to make a takeover bid”, West Erregulla joint venture partner Strike Energy with 20.57 per cent and an unconditional one-for-one scrip bid, and Gina Rinehart’s Hancock Energy offering 36¢ a share if it can get to 40 per cent of the Warrego’s shareholders (acceptances were 26.1 per cent at January 12).

Two months ago, Seven Group-backed Beach Energy was also involved with a 25¢ a share cash offer.

While all that M&A attention has translated into exciting price action for Warrego’s shareholders (the stock has more than doubled from 17¢ prior to the bidding war to 39.25¢ now), its two current suitors are in a bit of a stalemate even if they are determined. (Both’s offers are open; Hancock’s closes on January 31 and Strike’s on February 13).

MinRes’s support key for rival bidders

For Hancock to come good on its 40 per cent minimum threshold, it will have to find acceptances worth another 13.9 per cent from Warrego’s constipated register, which has only about one-third of its shares still up for grabs.

However, Hancock has the target board’s support and the inherent allure of a cash offer. Also off its back, at least for now, is MinRes as a competing bid.

In the opposite camp, Strike needs to coax out close to 30 per cent in acceptances for its scrip bid if it wants control of Warrego (even though its bid has no minimum acceptance threshold), which is a tough ask too.

It’s hard to see how either wins Warrego without two of the three parties coming together. There are three combinations possible: Hancock-MinRes, Strike-MinRes and Hancock-Strike.

Hancock and Strike joining forces to win Warrego seems the least likely. At face value, the combination would do little for Hancock. If the two bought Warrego, Strike would have a controlling position on the underlying West Erregulla project, making it hard for Hancock to get much strategic gain from the investment.

Which means MinRes looks like it has the trump card, if you believe it can be trusted on its intention of not making a bid.

If MinRes threw its 19.17 per cent stake into Hancock’s offer, it would get Hancock over its minimum acceptance threshold and just shy of the 50 per cent controlling mark. Without MinRes, Hancock has an uphill battle of getting to either.

Were MinRes to go down the path of supporting Hancock’s bid, investors reckon, it would be pushing hard to strike a joint venture with Hancock for West Erregulla.

That would be a leaf out of Andrew Forrest’s playbook at Western Areas in 2022. Wyloo vouched its 9.8 per cent stake in favour of IGO’s bid for Western Areas (instead of bidding on its own and against shareholder calls for a higher offer given perky nickel prices) and concurrently announced a downstream WA nickel processing joint venture with IGO.

If MinRes was to vote in favour of the opposite camp, Strike, it would get a 7 per cent odd toe hold stake in Strike.

Like we said, MinRes’s wedged itself into a rather envious position where it can make or break either camp’s bid. It’s a very strategic stake, indeed.

28-July-2022: MinRes-FY22-Q4-Quarterly-Activities-Report.PDF

MIN is up by almost 5% so far today on the back of this report. They are a significant iron ore player and by this time next year will also be a significant lithium player here in Australia. They have two of the world's largest known hard rock lithium mines (Wodgina and Mt Marion), and they have partnered with Albemarle whose Lithium Hydroxide refinery at Kemerton (200km south of WA's capital, Perth) is ramping up now after years of construction and they're already talking about a major expansion.

Albemarle lithium processing plant just weeks from first production already looking to expand - ABC News [16-May-2022]

Albemarle Bunbury lithium facility facing workplace safety investigation after complaints - ABC News [24-May-2022]

Image: One of MinRes' iron ore mines.

Disc: I hold MIN shares.