Company Report
Last edited 2 months ago
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#History
Added 2 months ago

I asked my business assistant, after enhancing the prompt via a certain cowboy;

[starter prompt] Can you understand the business from the share price history 5yr+?

Can we understand the business from its share price history? Pureprofile’s stock history tells a tale of early struggle followed by recent recovery:

  • IPO and Collapse: PPL listed around July 2015 at $0.50/share (market cap ~$29m)stockhead.com.au. After a brief period of meeting forecasts, the company made an $18m acquisition (Cohort in 2016) and growth underwhelmed (FY17 revenue +13%)stockhead.com.austockhead.com.au. The market’s reaction was brutal: over 2017–2019, Pureprofile’s share price fell by over 90%, wiping out most initial investors’ capital. In fact, at one point the stock was down ~97% from three years priorsimplywall.st. This collapse was due to strategic missteps and heavy losses – the company “tore up ~$40m” in the failed expansion and had to recapitalize (a major 8-for-1 rights issue in 2019, massively diluting shares, as indicated by the share count ballooning to ~1.15 billion).
  • Reinvention and Turnaround: Around 2020, new leadership (CEO Martin Filz) came on board and refocused the business on its core research platform. The finances slowly improved from FY21 onward. The share price stabilized in the low single cents. Over the last 3–5 years, PPL has essentially been flat to slightly up – it’s up ~15% over 3 years and ~100% over 5 yearssimplywall.st (from a very low base). This indicates the company stopped the bleeding and investors began to tentatively re-rate it as prospects improved.
  • Recent Rally: In the last 12 months, PPL’s stock has shown signs of life, rising about +57% year-on-yearsimplywall.st (trading around A$0.04–0.05 recently). This corresponds with the company’s return to profitability and record revenues in FY25. Essentially, as Pureprofile’s results have strengthened, the market has rewarded it – though the stock is still only A$0.045 (as of Nov 2025), a far cry from the IPO price. For context, the stock remains ~91% below its IPO levelsimplywall.st, reflecting that early overvaluation and dilution.
  • Business inference from chart: The share price chart looks nothing like a stable “stalwart” growth line. It shows a huge drop (2015–2019) then a long flat bottom and a recent uptick. This “fallen angel” pattern suggests a company that went through near-death and is now recovering. It also implies that earlier management overpromised and underdelivered, whereas current management might be hitting targets (hence renewed investor interest). One can infer the business had serious issues that are now being resolved.
  • Name/strategy changes: The company has not renamed or pivoted to a completely different industry – it’s always been about consumer data and marketing insights, though it did expand offerings (media buying, lead generation via Cohort) and is now emphasizing its tech platform. So the core concept remained, but execution and focus changed over time.

In summary, the share price history reveals Pureprofile as a high-risk turnaround story. Early investors were badly burnt, but those who bought in at the lows (pennies per share) in recent years are now seeing significant percentage gains. The history underscores the importance of management and strategy: PPL’s fortunes only improved after a leadership and strategy overhaul in 2020. It’s a reminder that while the stock’s past was rocky, the future could be quite different if the turnaround continues – but also that one must keep an eye on execution to avoid another collapse.

Assessment: Watch. (The volatile history means we approach with caution. However, the recent uptrend aligned with improved fundamentals is encouraging – it warrants watching for further confirmation of sustained success before a full commitment.)

#2023/24 Half report
stale
Added 2 years ago

I finally got around to watching the online presentation of results with Q&A.

Martin spoke to their business uniqueness. Basically his waffle was trying to say that large companies (eg Google) can provide the raw statistics, ie the what, but without the human interaction, they cannot get the why, and that is where businesses like PPL have a place.

Positive NPAT of $4k. Flag; This is an excellent outcome in the context of the business since FY21.

ANZ growth flat, all growth from O/S. Flag; Watch for a stall in O/S revenue.

Shift from equity STI to cash STI continues as flagged in FY23 AGM. No LTI program in FY24. Flag; Shift to cash good, no LTI bad.

Actual close dates for the “amplify” business units was in July 23. Flag; This has made the results a bit muddy, as some details are ‘inclusive’ and some are ‘exclusive’ of Amplify.

Martin and Melinda both presented. Flag; Melinda is the power base. She is articulate and clear in her language, a warning flag if she was to depart. Martin is a wet sock. He rambles, is non-specific in his language and inspires no confidence. However, both have been constant since FY21 and that’s a good thing.

Note. Melinda remarked that cash flow is “slow” in first half, and they make ‘most of their cash flow’ in H2. Flag; to meet guidance of 46-51mil, with 1H revenue of 24mil … the maths is a bit off, as that would be another 24-26mil in 2H… so that same as 1H?

Note. Melinda reiterated guidance of 46-51mil revenue. FY23 was 43.7mil, therefore a increase to the lower end of 46mil would be a 5% increase in full year revenue. That would be a very good outcome, considering it would be higher on a single business unit, as FY23 had 3x business units to generate revenue.

Overall, PPL is showing the signs of a positive turnaround. Still many risks at play.

Quick 5yr DCF models at 20% growth with 10% discount show ranges from $0.16 to $0.41 in share price, depending on variables.

#Management
stale
Added 3 years ago

Non-Executive Director Tim Hannon resigned recently. Normally who care's when a NED resigns?

The spicy part of this tale is as follows.

Prior to 31 August 2021, Tim held ~13.5 mil shares, or 1.2% of the shares on issue.

On 31 August 2021, Tim sold 10 mil shares on market. Nine days late on 9 September, PPL board notified the ASX with this announcement.

Those following along at home (aka retail shareholders), were upset that a director would sell so many, and that the board took so long to announce it.

Awkwardly (or hilariously) Tim was up for re-election at the AGM (Resolution 2) and then only mere days before the AGM, his resignation is released.

I know that I voted no for Resolution 2.

Did the early tally indicate the outcome?

Did he jump willingly to save face?

Was he pushed early to save company face?

Was he leaving anyway to pursue the fund he seeded with the sale proceeds?

We'll never know. Either way. I found it funny.